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1 
 
SUMMARY 
 
With the abolition of apartheid and the introduction of a new constitutional 
dispensation, the state’s totalitarian exclusion of homosexuals from legal 
recognition was relegated to a past era. The constitutional commitment to 
human dignity and equality and the inclusion of sexual orientation as a 
prohibited ground of discrimination led to the recognition of same-sex life 
partnerships and, inevitably, same-sex marriage by means of a civil union 
regime. The object of this study is to investigate the scope of the legal 
consequences provided to same-sex couples by the Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006 and to determine the legal standing of same-sex couples who fall 
outside the ambit of the Act. The study includes constitutional arguments 
pertaining to the continued recognition of same-sex life partnerships and a 
critical analysis of the constitutionality of the Civil Union Act as a separate 
measure to govern same-sex marriage. This investigation is conducted with 
reference to relevant legislation and case law.  
2 
 
KEY TERMS 
 
sexual orientation  
human dignity 
equality 
permanent same-sex life partnership 
same-sex marriage 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
Constitution 
totalitarianism 
gay men 
lesbian women 
 3 
‘With the introduction of a constitutional democracy in 1994, South Africa entered a new era 
characterised by values, such as respect for the dignity and privacy of all its citizens, a 
principled commitment to equality, recognition of diversity of different groups in our 
heterogenous society and, last but not least, a particular emphasis on bringing the most 
vulnerable groups in society within the ambit of constitutional protection’.
1
  
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
 
Sexual orientation is defined by reference to erotic attraction: in the case of 
heterosexuals, to members of the opposite sex; in the case of homosexuals to 
members of the same sex.2 The notion of sexual orientation includes both 
personal and individual identity and also social and emotional relations.3 
 
The social and legal system of apartheid did not protect sexual minorities who 
expressed an erotic attraction to members of the same sex. Because their 
sexual orientation differed from the majority norm which was based on 
Christian beliefs, homosexual conduct was condemned and punished by law.4 
The political and legal systems of pre-1994 South Africa were specifically 
noted for the totalitarian invasion of the state in the private sphere of people’s 
day-to-day lives.5 
 
With the abolition of apartheid and the introduction of a new constitutional 
dispensation, a democratic, legal and intellectual framework was created that 
allowed historically marginalised groups, for example, gays and lesbians, to 
challenge the religious and ideological hegemony that dominated South 
                                               
1
  Sloth-Nielsen and Van Heerden ‘The constitutional family: Developments in South 
African family law jurisprudence under the 1996 Constitution’ (2003) International 
Journal of Law, Politics and the Family 121. 
2
  Cameron ‘Sexual orientation and the Constitution: A test case for human rights’ (1993) 
110 South African Law Journal 450 at 452. 
3
  Botha and Cameron ‘Sexual orientation’ (1994) South African Human Rights Yearbook 
281 at 283. 
4
  Jivan ‘From individual protection to recognition of relationships: Same-sex couples and 
the experience of sexual orientation reform’ (2007) 11 Law, Democracy and 
Development 19 at 21. 
5
  Van der Vyver ‘Constitutional perspective of Church-State relations in South Africa’ 
(1999) 2 Brigham Young University Law Review 635 at 636. 
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African politics.6 The constitutional commitment to human dignity and equality 
and the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination 
in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution, 1996, created ample opportunity 
for gay men and lesbian women to question the validity and constitutionality of 
the common law and certain provisions of legislation that excluded them from 
recognition and protection during apartheid. These constitutional provisions 
have formed the Grundnorm of several court cases7 in which recognition and 
protection of same-sex relationships have been at issue.8 In National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,9 the constitutional court 
emphasised that these provisions propose that everyone has rights to equal 
concern and respect across difference10 and that the Constitution dictates an 
adjustment of the way in which intimate relationships are legally regulated and 
acknowledged in South Africa.11 
 
The common-law definition of marriage did not make provision for same-sex 
marriage and consequently deprived same-sex couples of certain benefits that 
accrue to married couples. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v Minister of Home Affairs12 the constitutional court restructured the 
conformist social order of intimate monogamous relationships and 
acknowledged the existence of ‘another form of life partnership which is 
different from marriage as recognised by law. This form of life partnership is 
represented by a conjugal relationship between two people of the same 
                                               
6
  Mosikatsana ‘The definitional exclusion of gays and lesbians from family status’ (1996) 
11 South African Journal on Human Rights 549 at 554. 
7
  Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 3 SA 312 (T); National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC); National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC); Farr v Mutual & 
Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2000 3 SA 684 (C); Satchwell v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); J v  Director General, Department of Home Affairs 
2003 5 SA 621 (CC); Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Minister 
of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC); Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC). All these cases 
will be discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. 
8
  Van Aardt and Robinson ‘The biology of homosexuality and its implications for human 
rights in South Africa’ (2008) 71 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 179 
at 180. 
9
  1999 1 SA 6 (CC). 
10
  National Coalition at par 132. 
11
  De Vos ‘Same-sex sexual desire and the re-imagining of the South African family’ 
(2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 179 at 181. 
12
  2000 2 SA 1 (CC). 
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sex’.13 This judgement introduced the concept of a ‘same-sex life partnership’ 
into our legal vocabulary. In this case the court held that the constitutional 
rights to equality and dignity demanded the recognition and extension of 
spousal benefits (in this case, immigration rights) to gay and lesbian partners 
in a permanent same-sex life partnership.14 In subsequent cases, the 
constitutional court and supreme court of appeal have further extended 
pension benefits;15 the right to inherit on intestacy;16 the common-law action 
for damages for loss of support17 and the acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights18 to partners in a permanent same-sex life 
partnership. 
 
In order to determine whether a same-sex life partnership is in existence the 
court takes into account the totality of facts presented by the partners and the 
intention of the same-sex life partners to form a permanent same-sex 
relationship.19 In essence, a same-sex life partnership confers a sense of 
status upon gay and lesbian relationships if their relationships mimics the 
characteristics associated with an ideal heterosexual marriage. 
 
The legal recognition of permanent same-sex life partnerships inevitably led to 
the recognition and extension of marriage rights to same-sex couples.20 The 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 came into operation on 30 November 2006 and 
provides same-sex couples who are above the ages of 18 years with the 
option to conclude either a marriage or civil partnership; collectively known as 
a civil union.21 Section 13(1) of the Act equates a civil union with a civil 
marriage. In other words, the Act provides for the application of the required 
changes to contextualise the reference to marriage in any other law including 
                                               
13
  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 
(CC) at par 36. 
14
  Home Affairs at par 97. 
15
  Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC), 2003 4 SA 266 
(CC). 
16
  Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC). 
17
  Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA). 
18
  Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); J v 
Director-General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 621 (CC). 
19
  Home Affairs at par 88.  
20
  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
21
  See the definition of ‘civil union’ in s 1 of the Act. 
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the common law so that they can apply in respect of a civil union.22 The Act 
further dictates that, with the exception of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 and 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, any reference to 
husband, wife or spouse in any other law, including the common law, includes 
a civil union partner.23 Although the Civil Union Act formally affords same-sex 
couples the same rights and responsibilities the Marriage Act affords 
heterosexual couples some inequalities and differentiations still exist. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND PURPOSE OF STUDY 
 
Two questions arise from the recognition of same-sex unions by way of the 
Civil Union Act. The first question relates to the scope of the legal 
consequences and protection provided to same-sex couples by the Civil 
Union Act. The second question relates to the legal consequences of same-
sex life partners who fall outside the ambit of the Civil Union Act. This study is 
therefore undertaken with a view to answering the aforementioned questions. 
 
1.3 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
Roman-Dutch law as influenced by Canon law is the common law of the 
Republic of South Africa. The principles of the Roman-Dutch law of marriage 
characterised by monogamy, heterosexuality and values affirmed by Christian 
theology formed the foundation of marriage law in South Africa in the pre-
constitutional era. These principles will be discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
study. Chapter 2 will also provide a discussion on how lesbian and gay 
movements created alliances with certain political movements that fought 
against apartheid and it will be indicated how these alliances eventually led to 
recognition of same-sex unions in South Africa and of their full protection 
under the new constitutional dispensation. 
 
In order to answer the first question mentioned above, namely the scope of 
the legal consequences and protection that is provided to same-sex couples 
                                               
22
  S 13(2)(a). 
23
  S 13(2)(b). 
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by the Civil Union Act, it is necessary to give a general description of the Act. 
The purpose of the description is to determine who has the capacity to enter 
into a civil union and to set out the requirements for the solemnisation and 
registration of a civil union and, importantly, to identify any shortcomings 
which may render the Act unconstitutional. This investigation is undertaken in 
Chapter 3. 
 
In order to answer the second question mentioned above, namely the legal 
consequences of same-sex life partners who fall outside the ambit of the Civil 
Union Act, it is necessary to indicate the regulation of these relationships by 
means of the ordinary rules of the law. It is also necessary to discuss the legal 
recognition that has been conferred on same-sex life partnerships prior to the 
coming into operation of the Civil Union Act. In order to confer certain spousal 
benefits upon same-sex life partners it is essential to determine whether a life 
partnership is in existence. The concept of a same-sex life partnership was 
judicially developed in an inconsistent manner, with the courts employing a 
diverse range of definitions and criteria. The most telling example of 
inconsistency is created by the required presence of a reciprocal duty of 
support or the voluntary assumption of a contractual duty of support between 
same-sex life partners in some cases. In order to create some certainty, 
Chapter 4 of this study will provide essential criteria for the existence of same-
sex life partnerships.  
 
Chapter 5 of this study will provide a comprehensive discussion of the 
continued protection and recognition of same-sex life partnerships that fall 
outside the ambit of the Civil Union Act. This study will be conducted within a 
social and historical context and with the focus fully on the notion of 
substantive equality. In Volks NO v Robinson24 the constitutional court 
reassessed the objective model of choice which demands that the law should 
not intervene or attach consequences to relationships where the parties chose 
not to enter into a legally valid marriage. This approach assesses the 
availability of ‘choice’ by merely focusing on the presence or absence of legal 
                                               
24
  2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC). 
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impediments to marriage. The Civil Union Act makes provision for same-sex 
marriage and thus eradicated the legal impediments that the law imposed 
upon same-sex marriage. Based on the view of the judgement in Volks 
together with the enactment of the Civil Union Act the continued extension of 
spousal benefits to same-sex couples who do not enter into a civil union may 
no longer be justified and may amount to differential treatment of homosexual 
and heterosexual couples. This issue will be discussed with reference to the 
mentioned case law. Based on the findings, certain recommendations will be 
made. 
 
Chapter 5 of this study will also address the constitutionality of the Civil Union 
Act as a separate measure to regulate same-sex marriage. It is, therefore, 
essential to determine whether the Civil Union Act complies with the guiding 
principles provided by the constitutional court in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fourie (Doctors for Life International and Others, Amicus Curiae); Lesbian and 
Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of Home Affairs25 which required 
the legislature to provide same-sex a couples with a public and private status 
equal to heterosexual couples.26 This chapter will include an analysis of the 
implication of the constitutional court’s deference to the legislature in Fourie. 
Based on the findings, certain recommendations will be made.  
 
After the assessment of the aforementioned questions the study will conclude 
with a critical analysis of the emancipation of gays and lesbians in South 
Africa.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHOD  
 
In the past, research in South Africa took place within a structure of 
parliamentary sovereignty but now in the post-apartheid era research is 
conducted within a constitutional paradigm. An applied research study will be 
done within a framework of subjective rights inclusive of a micro-comparison 
study to indicate the promotion and enhancement of human rights of same-
                                               
25
  2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
26
  Fourie, at par 82. 
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sex couples in South Africa. The envisaged research is not of an empirical 
nature but involves a literature study of books, journal articles, legislation and 
case law.  
 
 10 
„People make their own history (runs a celebrated phrase), but not in circumstances of their 
own choice; they act in an arena shaped by the past. Accordingly, to understand the present 
conjuncture in South Africa it is essential to have a sense of its history, to reflect on 
constraints and the possibilities created by that history.‟
1
 
 
 
 
2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter consists of a historical overview of the legal and social position 
regarding same-sex unions before and after the new constitutional 
dispensation but prior to the coming into operation of the Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006. For purposes of the historical overview it is necessary to discuss the 
concept of marriage and to indicate the grounds on which exclusion of same-
sex partners from marriage was justified. Below it is explained that religion, 
and specifically the Christian doctrine, was the main reason for the exclusion 
and alienation of those who dared to be different from what was regarded as 
the normal standard of behaviour. This explanation is followed by a discussion 
on how lesbian and gay movements created alliances with certain political 
movements that fought against the apartheid regime and it will be indicated 
how these alliances eventually led to recognition of same-sex unions in South 
Africa and of their full protection under the new constitutional dispensation. 
Finally, post-constitutional legislative and judicial developments prior to the 
enactment of the Civil Union Act are discussed. 
 
2.2   SAME-SEX UNIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF MARRIAGE THAT 
WAS RECEIVED INTO SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In the period before 1994 the Westminster system of government applied in 
South Africa.2 During this period the courts of law did not have the 
competence to question the legality of parliamentary legislation.3 The concept 
                                               
1
  Bundy (1993) 49 as quoted in Terreblanche A history of inequality in South Africa, 
1652-2002 (2002) 3. 
2
  Robinson „The evolution of the concept of marriage in South Africa: The influence of 
the Bill of Rights in 1994‟ (2005) Obiter 488 at 489. 
3
  Ibid. 
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of marriage as it existed during this period essentially reflected the position in 
Canon and Roman-Dutch law.4 
 
2.2.1 CANON LAW AND THE CHURCH-STATE/STATE-CHURCH 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
Canon law was basically Roman law as modified to meet the needs of the 
medieval church.5 The Catholic Church of the Middle Ages was not only a 
spiritual institution but a State with its own legislature and courts of law which 
exercised supra-national jurisdiction.6 The jurisdiction of the Church not only 
included matters pertaining to the organisation and property of the Church, but 
also matters relating to faith, sacraments and sins.7   
 
The sources of Canon law were primarily the Bible, the writings of Church 
fathers, Justinian‟s codification of the Corpus Juris, the canons of Church 
councils and the decretals of the popes.8 According to the Church, Christ 
elevated marriage between baptised persons to a sacrament.9 The institution 
of marriage, therefore, was the creation of God and not the creation of the 
State or even of the Church.10 Accordingly, the status created by marriage as 
a sacrament was instituted by God; it was a natural relationship whose ends 
and essential properties were determined by natural law and these ends and 
properties could not be varied by human legislation or by the consent of the 
parties.11  
 
The primary purpose of marriage as it was elevated by God was the 
procreation and rearing of children and the early church fathers were 
                                               
4
  Ibid. 
5
  Hahlo and Kahn The South African legal system and its background (1968) 511. 
6
  Idem, at 512. 
7
  Ibid. 
8
  Ibid. 
9
  Snee „Canon law of marriage: An outline‟ (1957-1958) 35 Detroit Law Journal 309 at 
311. 
10
  Idem, at 310. 
11
  Idem, at 312. 
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intolerant of sexual pleasures not directed towards procreation.12 Any sexual 
acts that were not directed towards procreation were seen as contrary to the 
order of nature and were variously termed by the old authorities as sodomie, 
venus monstrosa or onkuysheyd tegens de Natuur and were therefore 
considered crimes and punishable by death.13 
 
When Constantine became the first Christian Roman Emperor the Christian 
Church and political decree became inseparably involved — consubstantial.14 
The emperor became the chosen representative and instrument of God and 
was there to guarantee political and spiritual peace by bringing people to the 
service of God.15 Both religious belief and state policy became embodied in 
the head of state. Thus, the church became the state and the state became 
the church.16 
 
The state‟s attitude toward same-sex unions was extremely hostile. Same-sex 
intimacy was outlawed by the Justinian Code of AD 533 and in the seventh 
century in the Western Empire the Visigoth State in Spain criminalised 
sodomy.17 Particularly from the 13th century onwards the Church took a 
stronger stand against same-sex intercourse as evidenced, for example, in 
the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.18 
 
There is no doubt that the Christian doctrine was in future to determine what 
the standard for normal behaviour should be. 
 
 
                                               
12
  Snee „Canon law of marriage: An outline‟ (1957-1958) 35 Detroit Law Journal 309 at 
313; Church „Same-sex unions ─ Different voices‟ (2003) 9 Fundamina 44 at 49.  
13
  R v Gough and Narroway 1926 CPD 159 at 161; Church „Same-sex unions ─ Different 
voices‟ (2003) 9 Fundamina 44 at 49. 
14
  Barnard „Totalitarianism, (same-sex) marriage and democratic politics in post-apartheid 
South Africa‟ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 500 at 501. 
15
  Knowles „Church and state in Christian history‟ (1967) 2 Journal of Contemporary 
History, Church and Politics 3 at 5. 
16
  Barnard „Totalitarianism, (same-sex) marriage and democratic politics in post apartheid 
South Africa‟ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 500 at 501. 
17
  Church „Same-sex unions ─ Different voices‟ (2003) 9 Fundamina 44 at 48. 
18
  Idem, at 49. 
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2.2.2 ROMAN-DUTCH LAW AND THE SECULARISATION OF 
MARRIAGE LAW 
 
Canon law was received into Roman-Dutch law. Roman-Dutch law can be 
seen as the offspring of the union between the law of Holland and Roman 
law.19  
 
In Roman-Dutch law the philosophies of Montesquieu‟s doctrine of tria 
politica, namely that the powers of legislation, administration and adjudication 
should be separated, were embraced.20 The old ecclesiastical courts were 
abolished and the Reformed Church became the State Church of the 
Netherlands.21 By virtue of the jus majestatis circa sacra the Church was 
subject to control by the Government.22 All matters relating to the position of 
the Church in the community, the administration of its property, and the legal 
consequences of acts performed in church, including marriage, were from this 
day forward the concern of the State.23 Accordingly, after the Reformation, the 
marriage law of Holland became secularised and the sacramental nature of 
marriage was disclaimed.24 
 
However, it was still accepted that marriage was a relationship between one 
man and one woman. The comparison of the relationship between husband 
and wife with that of Christ and his congregation provided for the view of 
marriage as a relationship solely between one man and one woman.25  
 
These were the principles of the Roman-Dutch law of marriage that were 
brought to South Africa when Jan van Riebeeck established the first European 
Settlement at the Cape of Good Hope, and they remained largely 
unchallenged in the pre-constitutional era. 
                                               
19
  Hahlo and Khan The South African legal system and its background (1968) 511 and 
514. 
20
  Idem, at 528. 
21
  Ibid. 
22
  Ibid. 
23
  Ibid. 
24
  Sinclair assisted by Heaton The law of marriage (1996) 191. 
25
  Ephesians 5:23-33. 
 14 
The biblical justification for marriage as an exclusive relationship between one 
man and one woman, fundamentally monogamous, was reflected holus bolus 
by the moral and legal climate predating the transitional Constitution.26 South 
African courts often referred to the well-known English decision in Hyde v 
Hyde and Woodmansee27 where it is stated that „[m]arriage in Christendom, 
may…be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to 
the exclusion of all others…‟ 
 
Based on the concept of marriage as it was defined within Christendom, any 
kind of recognition of same-sex unions in South Africa was forbidden, and 
sexual relations between persons of the same-sex were characterised as 
abnormal and criminal behaviour. The legal notion of marriage as defined by 
the common law and statutes was based on principles of monogamy and 
heterosexuality, principles affirmed by Christian theology.28  
 
Polygyny and same-sex unions were regarded as contrary to public policy and 
destructive of society. 29 Ironically, while divorce is inevitably destructive of the 
family and consequently of society it was not regarded as contrary to public 
policy in South African law although it was forbidden in terms of Christian 
beliefs.30 It might therefore be argued that the real issue was not destruction 
of society, but rather upholding a state policy that represented the views of a 
white Christian community on what was acceptable conduct.31 
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2.3 THE CHURCH-STATE/STATE-CHURCH RELATIONSHIP AND 
TOTALITARIANISM WITHIN THE APARTHEID REGIME 
 
Roman-Dutch law as influenced by Canon law is the common law of the 
Republic of South Africa. It is evident that these common-law principles 
formed the foundation of the pre-constitutional government where all conduct 
was supposed to uphold Christian beliefs.  
 
When considering the constitutional history of South Africa two aspects of its 
legal arrangements come to mind: the systematic institutionalisation by the 
state of racist structures; and, in the context of religious matters, a distinct 
bias for a certain brand of Christianity.32 These two characteristics of the 
South African social, economic, political and legal structures denote the fabric 
of a totalitarian regime both in the state‟s interference in the private lives of 
individuals and the state‟s regulation of the internal affairs of non-state social 
institutions.33  
 
A „distinct bias for Christianity‟ was one of the aspects that denoted the fabric 
of the apartheid regime.34 The church-state consubstantiality provided a 
religious foundation for the „political perpetration of isolation and loneliness 
(for example of gays and lesbians) that is required for terror to thrive‟.35 It is 
evident that this religious bias was an indispensable component of the 
apartheid government‟s totalitarian recipe.36 This particular brand of a 
totalitarian regime in terms of which the church and the state are 
consubstantial can be described as „totalitarianism par excellence‟.37 Hannah 
Arendt emphasises that totalitarian domination as a form of government 
distinguishes it from all others. According to her view, totalitarianism is never 
                                               
32
  Van der Vyver „Constitutional perspective of Church-State relations in South Africa‟ 
(1999) 2 Brigham Young University Law Review 635. 
33
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34
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35
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South Africa‟ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 500 at 504. 
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  Ibid. 
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content with the destruction of political life; it seeks the destruction of private 
life above and beyond all else.38 
 
The political and legal systems of pre-1994 South Africa were particularly 
noted for the totalitarian interference of the state in the private sphere of 
people‟s day-to-day lives.39 In 1948, D F Malan, who was a Dutch Reformed 
Minister, became the first prime minister of the apartheid era.40 Soon after 
Malan‟s election the Dutch Reformed Church propagated the „purist‟ concept 
of apartheid, which required total separation between white and black South 
Africans as a necessity for the survival of white „civilization‟ in South Africa. 
From a political point of view this concept of apartheid was essential for the 
continuation of white rule.41 At the insistence of the Dutch Reformed Church42 
Parliament passed the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949, which 
prohibited marriage and any form of co-habitation between white and black.  
 
Sexual intimacy between males was prohibited by the common-law offence of 
sodomy and unnatural sexual acts were prohibited in terms of the Immorality 
Act 5 of 1927. Under apartheid, the Immorality Act was repealed and 
substituted with the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. Section 20A of the 
Sexual Offences Act criminalised any act between males at a party43 if such 
an act was calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual 
gratification.44 The penalty prescribed for such an act was a maximum fine of 
R4000 or two years‟ imprisonment or both.45 The Act further prohibited 
„immoral or indecent‟ acts between men and boys under 19 years.46 In 1988 
Parliament extended the prohibition on „immoral or indecent‟ acts to acts 
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between woman and girls under 19 years.47 Discrimination was evident as this 
prohibition differed from the heterosexual age of consent, which was 16 years 
and not 19 years as in the case of the homosexual age of consent. 48  
 
It can therefore be concluded that during the apartheid regime gay men and 
lesbian women and other sexual minorities suffered a ruthless fate, having 
been categorised as criminals and rejected by society as outcasts and 
perverts.49 This exclusion and marginalisation was experienced more 
intensely by those South Africans already suffering under the yoke of 
apartheid because of their race, sex and economic status.50 
 
2.4  GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICAL 
COALITION BUILDING THAT LED TO THE INCLUSION OF 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS  
 
During the late 1980s the apartheid regime was criticised and sanctioned 
worldwide for the abuse and discrimination directed towards black people, and 
it was during this period that gay and lesbian movements were established to 
place gay issues on the agenda of the anti-apartheid struggle both in South 
Africa and abroad.51 
 
Prior to the 1980s there was little sign of a gay rights struggle in South Africa. 
However, the 1980s brought with it the politicisation of gay life.52 The Gay 
Association of South Africa (GASA) was the first gay and lesbian organisation 
established in Johannesburg in 1982.53 The principal function of this 
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organisation was to serve as a social meeting place for white, middle-class 
gay men.54 At first, the nascent gay and lesbian movement did not align itself 
with the anti-apartheid struggle. This position changed drastically when GASA 
got involved in the isolation of groups sympathetic to the apartheid 
movement.55 This was fatal for GASA and subsequently led to its expulsion 
from the International Lesbian and Gay Alliance (ILGA).56 
 
Due to heightened politicisation, Lesbian and Gays Against Oppression 
(LAGO) was formed in Cape Town in 1986 ─ the first gay and lesbian 
organisation with explicit links to anti-apartheid groups.57 Also in the 1980s, 
gay anti-apartheid activist Simon Nkoli established the first mass-based black 
gay and lesbian organisation, the Gay and Lesbian Organisation of the 
Witwatersrand (GLOW).58 This organisation committed itself to a „Non-Racist, 
Non-Sexist, and Non-Discriminatory Democratic Future‟.59 Nkoli emphasised 
that the battles against homophobia and racism were inseparable.60 He 
stated: 
 
„I‟m fighting for the abolition of apartheid, and I fight for the right of 
freedom of sexual orientation. These are inextricably linked with each 
other. I cannot be free as a black man if I am not free as a gay man‟.61  
  
Then followed the affiliation of the Western Cape Organisation of Lesbian and 
Gay Activist (OLGA), which eventually replaced LAGO. Although the majority 
of the members OLGA were white, the organisation located itself within the 
liberation struggle and was led by anti-apartheid activists.62 OLGA was 
affiliated with the leading organisation in the struggle for democracy, namely 
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the United Democratic Front (UDF), a broad-based political alliance aligned 
with the African National Congress (ANC). 
 
Until the late 1980s the ANC had no policy on sexual orientation and some 
senior officials within the party even dismissed gay issues as irrelevant.63 In 
the late 1980s gay political activists flew to London to argue the case for gay 
rights with the ANC.64 These activists met with, amongst others, Albie 
Sachs,65  then a member of the ANC constitutional committee, and impressed 
on him and others the need to put the rights of gay men and lesbian women 
on the ANC agenda.66 By the time the South African political parties began 
the drafting process of the Interim Constitution, the ANC had formally 
recognised gay and lesbian rights and had agreed to include a prohibition 
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in its proposed Bill of 
Rights.67 
 
According to Pierre de Vos the gay and lesbian movement was ultimately 
successful because its leaders were fortunate and wise enough to present 
their struggle as forming part of a broader struggle against oppression by the 
apartheid state. He further states that some political scientists, for example, 
Doug McAdam, argue that in order for any minority group to be successful in 
their struggle for acceptance and/or rights, its activists must „tap highly 
resonant ideational strains in mainstream society‟.68 Often their ability to do so 
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is influenced by the availability of „master frames‟69 or what De Vos describes 
as „master narratives‟.70 In South Africa the most powerful master frame or 
master narrative available was that of the anti-apartheid struggle.71 Gay men 
and lesbian women could refer to this struggle and were able to argue that 
their struggle fitted the same frame, namely the larger struggle for human 
rights and the emancipation of the oppressed.72 
 
2.5  INCLUSION OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN THE INTERIM 
CONSTITUTION 
 
2.5.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
It is difficult to identify a clear beginning and end to the political and social 
transformations of South Africa. The process of adopting a new Constitution 
for South Africa was a complicated, intentionally reflective process set against 
the dramatic historical backdrop of the end of apartheid and the fundamental 
reformulation of the political and societal structure of the entire nation.73 
 
Talks between the National Party (NP) and the ANC officially started in 
February 1990 when the liberation movements were unbanned.74 The 
constitutional negotiations commenced at a forum called the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991 where delegates of 
the various political parties gathered at Kempton Park‟s World Trade Centre.75 
These negotiations ended in controversy, deadlock and violence. In 
November 1993 negotiations were resumed at the Multi-Party Negotiation 
Process (MPNP).76 During these negotiations an agreement was finalised.77 
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Despite the finalisation of the agreement, conflict with regard to the writing 
process continued between the dominant parties, being the ANC and NP. The 
negotiated solution to the conflict was a two-stage constitutional drafting 
process.78 The first stage involved drafting an interim constitution, planning 
elections, and setting up a new Parliament that would elect a new president. 
During the second stage the newly elected Parliament in its role as the 
Constitutional Assembly would draft a „final constitution‟. 79 
 
2.5.2  THE VARIOUS VIEWS ON THE INCLUSION OF SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION 
  
In the draft Bill of Rights of the South African Law Commission that was 
appointed by the Government and the draft Bill of Rights of the ANC the 
following were accepted: 
 
1. the centrality of individual rights of equality; 
2. that limitations must be placed on governmental power; and 
3. that the exercising of governmental power must be subject to 
oversight by the judiciary.80 
 
Although all the parties that participated in the drafting process agreed that an 
equality clause must be enshrined in the Constitution, that all persons are 
equal before the law and that discrimination is unconstitutional, they differed in 
their view on how this agreement was to be embodied.81 In its first paper on 
Group and Human Rights the South African Law Commission suggested that, 
along with being a woman, a child or a disabled person, gays and lesbians 
constitute a „natural group‟.82 The common characteristic of these groups is 
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that „they have not chosen to have a particular status in a particular group, but 
have been assigned to that status by nature‟. 83 
 
When the NP published its constitutional proposals on 2 February 1993 the 
party adopted the Law Commission‟s formulation, in that it indicated that 
protection against discrimination must be awarded to gays and lesbians but 
under the so-called „natural characteristics‟.84 According to Cameron this 
indicated that although the Government wanted to extend protection to gays 
and lesbians it only wanted to do so obliquely and that the protection that it 
wanted to afford was limited to protection from discrimination.85 He further 
states that the protection that was envisaged would be insufficient and would 
not outlaw many of the pervasive forms of discrimination that homosexual 
persons encountered. The NP‟s draft further created a problem in that it 
implied that „natural characteristics‟ were „disabilities‟ and that only 
„disabilities‟ which were „natural characteristics‟ would be protected. 86  
 
That most parties agreed on including either explicit or implicit anti-
discrimination protections for gays and lesbians was a remarkable 
achievement. However, it did not ensure the inclusion of an express reference 
to sexual orientation in the Interim Constitution.87 By the time of the MPNP, it 
remained unclear within the Technical Committee of Theme Committee Four 
of the Constitutional Assembly88 whether the equality clause would be a 
provision prohibiting discrimination against specific, enumerated classes or a 
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generic non-discrimination provision.89 Ultimately, party negotiators chose to 
accept an equality clause that prohibited discrimination on specific grounds, 
including sexual orientation. Thus, section 8(2) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (the Interim Constitution) prohibited 
unfair discrimination, directly or indirectly, on the ground of sexual orientation.  
 
2.6  THE RETENTION OF THE SEXUAL ORIENTATION CLAUSE IN 
THE FINAL CONSTITUTION  
 
As late as October 1995, the inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected 
ground in the final Constitution (hereinafter Constitution) remained an 
outstanding issue. The Technical Committee of Theme Committee Four of the 
Constitutional Assembly clearly supported the inclusion of sexual orientation 
in the Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Bill of Rights of 9 October 1995 
that was prepared for the Constitutional Committee. The Committee 
recommended that sexual orientation be included as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination in the equality clause.90 The Technical Committee 
demonstrated the similarities between sexual orientation and other forms of 
forbidden discrimination in various human rights documents and emphasised 
that the enumerated grounds of discrimination in international law related to 
characteristics and choices which all formed an integral part of human 
personality and identity. The forbidden discrimination specifically related to 
groups that were particularly vulnerable to discrimination, exclusion and 
subordination, for example, gays and lesbians.91 
 
Due to the absence of national precedents and human rights documents 
within South Africa, the Technical Committee based their arguments and 
recommendations on various international human rights documents. Within 
the international arena no formal international human rights document 
explicitly afforded gays and lesbians equal rights and protection from unfair 
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discrimination based on sexual orientation.92 International human rights 
bodies therefore had to interpret certain rights to extend them to gays and 
lesbians. Thus, for example, the United Nations Rights Committee (hereinafter 
UNHRC) interpreted sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination in articles 
2(1) and 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR) 
to include sexual orientation.93 The UNHRC therefore ruled that legislation 
criminalising all forms of sexual intercourse between consenting homosexual 
men violated the right to privacy protected in article 17 of the ICCPR read with 
the right to non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights protected in the 
ICCPR.94 This interpretation is consistent with the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights.95 
 
The Technical Committee further referred to the Canadian case of Haig v 
Birch96 where it was held that sexual orientation should be treated as an 
analogous ground of discrimination and should therefore be included within 
the scope of section 3(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act which prohibits 
discrimination on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, 
sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for 
which a pardon has been granted.97 
 
Not all the members of the Constitutional Assembly were convinced by the 
arguments that were based on international human rights precedents mainly 
due to the fact that equal rights for gays and lesbians lacked universal 
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acceptance.98 Advocates for the inclusion of sexual orientation „responded 
that universal acceptance only defined the minimum platform that had to be 
provided. It did not stop the constitution-making body from including other 
kinds of protection, even if not universally accepted‟.99 Despite the debate that 
was occurring in the Constitutional Assembly, the Technical Committee was 
unequivocal in its final endorsement: 
 
„[I]t is our strongest recommendation that sexual orientation be included 
as a prohibited ground of discrimination in the equality clause‟.100 
 
During the final drafting period the gay and lesbian community‟s endeavour to 
influence the final Constitution  was supported  by a coalition of activists under 
the name National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (hereinafter 
NCGLE).101 The NCGLE was formed in December 1994 in anticipation of the 
struggle to keep sexual orientation in the final Constitution‟s equality clause.102 
The Coalition‟s work included coordinating coalition member actions, 
organising lobbying efforts that reflected the racial and linguistic diversity of 
gay and lesbian South Africans, preparing submissions to the Constitutional 
Assembly, and orchestrating very successful letter-writing, petition and 
postcard campaigns.103 The preservation of protection for sexual orientation in 
the final Constitution can be viewed as the result of the successful campaign 
by the NCGLE.104 
 
On 10 October 1995 the Constitutional Committee agreed to follow the 
recommendations made by the Technical Committee to retain sexual 
orientation as a ground for protection from discrimination despite public 
opposition, limited legal precedent, fragmented organisations, and 
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conservative cultural elements.105 South Africa thus became the first country 
in the world explicitly to recognise in its Constitution106 sexual orientation as a 
ground on which discrimination would automatically be unfair until proven 
otherwise.107  
 
2.7 POST-CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination in 
terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution created an opportunity for gay men 
and lesbian women to question the validity and constitutionality of the 
common law and certain provisions of legislation that excluded them from 
recognition and protection during apartheid.  
 
2.7.1 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
None of the legal consequences of marriage automatically applies if a same-
sex couple concludes a life partnership. However, some Acts extend the same 
protection and benefits to same-sex life partners that they afford to married 
couples and heterosexual life partners. 
 
For example, the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 places a legal duty on any 
person to maintain any other person irrespective of the nature of the 
relationship between those persons.108 The Act therefore extends recognition 
to a contractual duty of support by same-sex life partners who have agreed on 
a duty to support each other.109 The Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 
affords protection to persons who live or lived together in a relationship in the 
nature of a marriage and therefore includes same-sex life partners in its 
ambit.110 In terms of the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998, a medical scheme 
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will not be allowed to be registered if the rules discriminate against anyone on 
the ground of sexual orientation.111 A medical scheme may therefore not deny 
membership to a person because of his or her sexual orientation.112 The 
Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 protects same-sex life partners from unequal 
treatment and prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds of marital status 
and sexual orientation.113  
 
Changes to legislation that have been the result of post-constitutional court 
decisions will be discussed under the next heading below. 
 
2.7.2 JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The Constitution contains an explicit prohibition against unfair discrimination 
on the ground of sexual orientation and marital status,114 and guarantees 
everyone the right to privacy,115 human dignity116 and equality before the law 
and equal protection and benefit of the law.117 These constitutional provisions 
have been raised in several cases118 in which protection and recognition of 
same-sex relationships have been at issue. The constitutional court has 
emphasised that these provisions suggest that every one has rights to equal 
concern and respect across difference119 and that the Constitution demands 
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an adjustment of the way in which intimate relations are legally regulated and 
acknowledged in South Africa.120  
 
The promise of equality for all has been fulfilled in several court cases after 
1994. These cases can be viewed as signifying a move away from the idea 
that heteronormativity forms the basis of policy formulation in our society. The 
cases will be discussed in detail under the following headings: The so-called 
„Sodomy Judgement‟; Extension of rights to same-sex life partners where a 
contractual reciprocal duty of support has been undertaken; Acquiring 
parental authority in a same-sex life partnership; Affording marriage rights to 
same-sex couples. 
 
2.7.2.1  THE SO-CALLED ‘SODOMY JUDGEMENT’ 
 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice121 was 
the first case in which the constitutional court had to give judgement on 
alleged discrimination based on sexual orientation. The case dealt with the 
confirmation of an order made by the Witwatersrand local division. The 
Witwatersrand local division had granted an order declaring unconstitutional 
and invalid the common-law offence of sodomy and certain statutory 
provisions which prohibited and criminalised sexual conduct between 
consenting male adults.  
 
Although the constitutional court did not need to confirm the invalidity of the 
common-law offence of sodomy,122 Ackermann J, who delivered the majority 
judgement, indicated that the constitutional court was obliged to consider the 
correctness of the high court‟s order with regard to sodomy to enable it to 
consider the correctness of that court‟s order declaring unconstitutional and 
invalid the statutory provisions that criminalised any conduct between men 
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which is „calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual 
gratification‟.123  
 
Ackermann J held that the sole purpose and existence of the offence of 
sodomy was to criminalise a particular form of gay expression which failed to 
conform to the moral or religious views of a section of society.124 The objective 
of the common-law offence of sodomy was not dictated by the punishing of 
„male rape‟. The fact that the ambit of the offence was wide enough to include 
„male rape‟ was mere coincidental. The core of the offence was to punish 
sexual expression between gay men.125 
 
Ackermann J further held that gay men were a permanent minority in society 
and had in the past suffered from patterns of disadvantage, and that the 
consequences of the disadvantage were severe, affecting the dignity, 
personhood and identity of gay men at a deep level.126 Although the right to 
equality was the primary basis on which the case was argued, Ackermann J 
held that the criminalisation of sodomy also infringed the right to dignity 
enshrined in section 10 of the Constitution. He stated that the common-law 
prohibition on sodomy criminalised all sexual intercourse between men 
regardless of the circumstances surrounding the relationship, thus punishing a 
form of sexual conduct the broader society identified with homosexuality.127 
The existence of a law which criminalises a form of sexual expression for gay 
men degraded and devalued gay men in our broader society and constituted 
an invasion of their dignity and thus infringed section 10 of the Constitution.128  
 
Ackermann J further held that the criminalisation of sodomy infringed the right 
to privacy enshrined in section 14 of the Constitution. He stated: 
 
„Privacy recognises that we all have the right to a sphere of private 
intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human 
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relationships without interference from the outside community. The way 
in which we give expression to our sexuality is at the core of this area of 
private intimacy. If in expressing our sexuality, we act consensually and 
without harming one another, invasion of that precinct will be a breach of 
our privacy‟. 129  
 
It was therefore concluded that the common-law offence of sodomy was 
unconstitutional because it breached the rights to equality, dignity and 
privacy.130 The limitations on these rights were not justifiable in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution. It was held that the „enforcement of the private 
moral views of a section of the community, which are based to a large extent 
on nothing more than prejudice, cannot qualify as such a legitimate 
purpose‟.131 
 
The concept of equality as emphasised in this case laid down a solid 
foundation for future recognition of same-sex unions. It endorsed the view that 
the „desire for equality is not a hope for the elimination of all differences‟ 
because „to understand “the other” one must try, as far as humanly possible, 
to place oneself in the position of “the other” ‟.132 According to Ackermann J: 
 
„It is easy to say that everyone who is just like “us” is entitled to equality. 
Everyone finds it more difficult to say that those who are “different” from 
us in some way have the same equality rights that we   enjoy. Yet so 
soon as we say any . . . group is less deserving and unworthy of equal 
protection and benefit of the law all minorities and all of . . . society are 
demeaned. It is so deceptively simple and so devastatingly injurious to 
say that those who are handicapped or of a different race, or religion, or 
colour, or sexual orientation are less worthy‟.133 
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In his concurring judgement Sachs J held that „equality means equal concern 
and respect across difference‟ and that equality „does not imply a levelling or 
homogenisation of behaviour‟, but instead indicates that we must 
acknowledge and accept the differences in our society.134 Sachs J further 
held: 
 
„At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the basis for 
exclusion, marginalisation, stigma and punishment. At the best, it 
celebrates the vitality that a difference brings to any society‟. 
 
Therefore, the right to equality is conceptualised as the right to be different 
from stated or unstated norms without suffering unfavourable consequences 
because of such difference.135 According to Sachs J the decision of the court 
should be seen as „part of a growing acceptance of difference in an 
increasingly open and pluralistic South Africa‟. He further expressed the hope 
that „the emancipatory effects of the elimination of institutionalised prejudice 
against gays and lesbians will encourage amongst the heterosexual 
population a greater sensitivity to the variability of the human kind‟.136 
 
The constitutional court confirmed the order of the Witwatersrand local 
division declaring invalid and unconstitutional the common-law offence of 
sodomy and certain statutory provisions which criminalised and prohibited 
consensual sexual male intercourse.  
 
Another aspect of inequality on the ground of sexual orientation was 
subsequently declared inconsistent with the Constitution. In Geldenhuys v The 
National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others137 the constitutional court 
confirmed an order made by the supreme court of appeal declaring that 
sections 14(1)(b) and 14(3)(b) of the Sexual Offences Act unfairly 
differentiated and discriminated between heterosexual and same-sex sexual 
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activities. This unfair discrimination was found to be unjustifiable and was 
declared unconstitutional. The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment 
Act 32 of 2007 subsequently repealed section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 
of 1957. Sections 15 and 16 of the 2007 Act set a uniform age of consent, 
namely 16 years, for all consensual sexual activities.  
 
2.7.2.2 EXTENSION OF RIGHTS TO SAME-SEX LIFE PARTNERS WHO 
HAVE UNDERTAKEN A CONTRACTUAL RECIPROCAL DUTY OF 
SUPPORT  
 
The common-law definition of marriage does not make provision for same-sex 
marriage and consequently deprives same-sex life partners of certain benefits 
that accrue to married couples. In the following cases the courts used the test 
of a reciprocal duty of support to extend certain benefits that are usually 
afforded to married couples to the parties to same-sex life partnerships. 
 
In Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security138 the constitutionality of the 
rules and regulations of the police medical aid scheme, Polmed, was 
questioned. The scheme afforded benefits to a legal spouse, widow or 
widower and the children of a member of the police force. These persons 
alone could be registered as a member‟s dependants. It was argued that the 
definition of „dependant‟ in Polmed‟s rules was inconsistent with section 9(3) 
of the Constitution.  
 
The applicant had been a member of the South African Police Service for 15 
years. She had been living with her same-sex life partner since 1986. Since 
that date they owned a house and operated joint finances, were financially co-
dependant, made joint decisions and named each other as beneficiaries in 
their respective insurance policies. Their relationship was described as an 
abiding and serious one. The applicant applied to register her partner as her 
dependant under the Polmed scheme, but the respondent rejected the 
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application on the basis that the definition of „dependant‟ did not include a 
same-sex life partner. 
 
The court held that a „dependant‟ is someone who relies upon another for 
maintenance and that this includes a same-sex partner. The court further held 
that where a same-sex union has existed for many years in a common home 
the parties to that union must owe each other a duty of support. Roux J 
concluded that the rules and regulations of Polmed led to the exclusion of 
many de facto dependants of members of the police force and that this 
exclusion amounted to discrimination.139 Roux J did not indicate the specific 
ground of discrimination but declared the discrimination to be unconstitutional 
and ordered the chairman of the police medical scheme to review his decision 
and register the lesbian partner as the dependant of the police officer.140 
 
In Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa141 sections 8 and 9 of 
the Judge‟s Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 
were found to be inconsistent with the equality provisions of section 9 of the 
Constitution.142 Sections 8 and 9 provided that two-thirds of the salary that 
would have been payable to a judge had to be paid to his or her „surviving 
spouse‟ until the death of such spouse. The „surviving spouse‟ was also 
entitled to a gratuity and certain allowances. These benefits were reserved for 
„spouses‟ of judges and were not payable to a „partner in a permanent same-
sex partnership‟.  
 
The applicant, a female judge, launched an application in the Transvaal 
provincial division. She alleged that the said provisions violated her right to 
equality as entrenched in section 9 of the Constitution because they denied 
her and her same-sex life partner benefits that were afforded to judges and 
their spouses. The applicant and her same-sex life partner had been involved 
in an intimate, committed, exclusive and permanent relationship since 1986. 
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They lived like a married couple and were acknowledged as such by their 
respective families. 
 
The Transvaal provincial division declared sections 8 and 9 of the Act 
inconsistent with the Constitution and ordered that the defect be rectified by 
the reading in after the word „spouse‟ of the words „or partner, in a permanent 
same-sex life partnership‟. This order had to be confirmed by the 
constitutional court. 
 
Delivering the constitutional court‟s judgement, Madala J stated that the 
benefits afforded to spouses of judges were afforded to them because of the 
importance of marriage in our society and because judges owed a legal duty 
of support to their spouses. Historically our law only recognised marriages 
between heterosexual spouses. This narrowness of focus excluded many 
relationships which create similar obligations and have a similar social 
value.143 The constitutional court held that the fact that the provisions afforded 
benefits to spouses and omitted same-sex partners who established a 
permanent long-term relationship similar to that of a marriage, including 
undertaking a reciprocal duty of support, constituted unfair discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation and marital status.144 The court emphasised 
that section 9 of the Constitution does not require that spousal benefits be 
extended to same-sex partners who had not undertaken a reciprocal duty of 
support.145 The court ordered sections 8 and 9 of the Act, as well as the 
ancillary regulations, to be read as including the words „or partner in a same-
sex partnership in which partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of 
support‟ after the word „spouse‟.  
 
After the judgement of the constitutional court the Judge‟s Remuneration and 
Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 was replaced by the Judge‟s 
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001. Like its 
predecessor, this Act and its regulations did not afford benefits to a judge‟s 
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same-sex life partner. Judge Satchwell was granted direct access to the 
constitutional court to challenge the constitutionality of this omission.146 The 
constitutional court declared the provisions and regulations unconstitutional 
and corrected the defect with a reading-in order similar to the order it made 
during the first Satchwell decision. 
 
In Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund147 the appellant and the deceased were 
partners in a same-sex union when the deceased was killed in a motor vehicle 
accident. The appellant and the deceased had lived together since 1988. 
Their relationship was stable and they were acknowledged by family and 
friends as a couple. They even concluded a ceremony that was similar to a 
marriage ceremony. They would have legally married had they been permitted 
to do so. 
 
The primary question was whether the plaintiff was entitled to institute a claim 
for loss of support against the respondent (the Road Accident Fund) in terms 
of the provisions of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. The claim was 
dismissed by the court a quo. In terms of section 17 of the Road Accident 
Fund Act the defendant is obliged to compensate any person for loss or 
damage which that person has suffered as a result of the death of any other 
person that was caused by or arose from the driving of a motor vehicle if the 
death was caused by the negligence of the driver or owner of the motor 
vehicle. However, section 19(a) of the Act exempts the defendant from liability 
in instances where neither the driver nor the owner who caused the death 
would have been liable at common law.148 
 
The appellant requested the court to develop the common-law action for 
damages for loss of support and to bring the common law in conformity with 
the right to equality and dignity as enshrined in the Constitution. Although at 
that stage only marriage gave rise to an automatic reciprocal duty of support, 
Cloete JA emphasised that there is another form of life partnership which is 
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different from marriage where a similar duty of support existed between the 
parties to that relationship namely, a conjugal relationship between people of 
the same sex.149 Cloete JA held that the appellant had proved a legally 
enforceable duty of support on the part of the deceased. This finding was 
based on the fact that the appellant and the deceased had lived together as if 
they were legally married in a stable and permanent relationship until the 
deceased was killed; they had been accepted by family and friends as 
partners; they had pooled their income and had shared family responsibilities; 
each of them had made a will in which the other party was appointed sole 
heir; and when the plaintiff was medically boarded, the deceased had 
expressly stated that he would support the appellant financially and in fact did 
so until he died.150 Based on these facts the appellant had a valid claim for 
loss of support against the Road Accident Fund. The supreme court of appeal 
accordingly extended the common-law action for damages for loss of support 
to a surviving same-sex life partner whose deceased same-sex life partner 
had undertaken a contractual duty to support him.  
 
In Gory v Kolver and Others151 section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 
of 1987 was declared invalid and unconstitutional. Section 1(1) afforded rights 
of intestate succession to heterosexual spouses but not to permanent same-
sex life partners. Van Heerden AJ held that the failure of section 1(1) of the 
Act to include a surviving same-sex life partner in which the partners have 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support was inconsistent with the applicants‟ 
rights to equality and dignity and that the limitation on these rights could not 
be justified.152 The defect was corrected by the reading in of the words „or 
partner in a permanent same-sex life partnership in which the partners have 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support‟ after the word „spouse‟. 
 
In the above cases benefits and rights were extended to same-sex life 
partners but only in instances where they had undertaken a contractual duty 
to support each other. In each case where same-sex life partners seek to 
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apply one of these decisions to their situation one would therefore have to 
determine whether the life partners have undertaken a reciprocal duty to 
support. 
 
2.7.2.3  THE RECOGNITION OF SAME-GENDERED FAMILIES 
 
The traditional nuclear family has been the norm in society for as long as one 
can remember. Any discourse in heteronormativity was regarded as contrary 
to public policy or intended to be a destruction of society and religious beliefs. 
The constitutional recognition of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground for 
discrimination created ample opportunity for a new approach and the 
development of family law and family life.  
 
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 
and Others153 the applicants brought an application in the high court for an 
order, inter alia, declaring section 25 of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution on the basis that the Act discriminated 
against partners in permanent same-sex life partnerships. Section 25(5) made 
provision for the issuing of immigration permits to the „spouse‟ of a person 
who is permanently and lawfully resident in the Republic. It therefore denied 
the exemption to partners in permanent same-sex life partnerships. 
 
Ackermann J held that „spouse‟ as used in section 25(5) was not reasonably 
capable of a broad construction to include partners in permanent same-sex 
life partnerships.154 The word „spouse‟ was not defined in the Act, but the 
ordinary meaning implied that it referred to a „married person; a wife, a 
husband‟.155 Furthermore, the context in which „spouse‟ was used in section 
25(5) did not suggest a wider meaning.156 Section 25(5) accordingly only 
afforded protection to conjugal relationships between heterosexuals and 
denied protection and exemption to a life partnership, which was the only form 
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of conjugal relationship available to same-sex life partners.157 The court held 
that the impact of section 25(5) was to reinforce harmful and hurtful 
stereotypes of homosexuals158 and that it constituted a crass, blunt, cruel and 
serious invasion of their dignity.159  
 
Ackermann J emphasised that over the past decades an accelerating process 
of transformation had taken place in family relationships, as well as in societal 
and legal concepts regarding the family and what it comprised.160 He 
concluded that: 
„gays and lesbians in same-sex life partnerships are as capable as 
heterosexual spouses of expressing and sharing love in its manifold 
forms, including affection, friendship, eros and charity; they are likewise 
as capable of forming intimate, permanent, committed, monogamous, 
loyal and enduring relationships; of furnishing emotional and spiritual 
support; and of providing physical care, financial support and assistance 
in running the common household; they are individually able to adopt 
children and in the case of lesbians to bear them; in short they have the 
same ability to establish a consortium omnis vitae; finally…they are 
capable of constituting a family, whether nuclear or extended, and of 
establishing, enjoying and benefiting from family life which is not 
distinguishable in any significant respect from that of heterosexual 
spouses.‟161 
 
The court held that the invasion of the right to equality and dignity was not 
justifiable and ordered that the constitutional defect in section 25(5) be 
corrected by the reading in, after the word „spouse‟, of the following words: „or 
partner in a permanent same-sex life partnership‟.162  
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In Farr v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 163 the applicant had been 
insured by the respondents since 1987 against loss or damage to the 
applicant‟s motor vehicle and liability to third parties. The insurance policy 
excluded liability for death or bodily injury to a member of the policy holder‟s 
family normally resident with him. The applicant and his same-sex life partner 
collided with another motor vehicle. The applicant‟s same-sex life partner 
sustained injuries and claimed damages arising from his injuries from the 
applicant. The respondent repudiated the claim on the ground that the 
claimant was a member of the applicant‟s family normally resident with him. 
 
The court held that the phrase „a member of the policy holder‟s family‟ in an 
insurance policy clause included the long-term same-sex partner of the policy 
holder. The consequences of the inclusion of the policy holder‟s same-sex life 
partner in the phrase was that the respondent was not obliged to indemnify 
the applicant against claims by his same-sex life partner which arose out of 
injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle collision where the motor vehicle was 
driven by the applicant.  
 
2.7.2.4  ACQUIRING PARENTAL AUTHORITY IN A SAME-SEX LIFE 
PARTNERSHIP 
 
Parental authority refers to the rights, duties, powers and responsibilities 
parents have in respect of their children and those children‟s property.164 In 
the past, the acquisition of parental authority by same-sex life partners 
seemed impossible but with the enactment of the Constitution, the 
achievement of human rights and the development of reproductive technology 
it all became a reality. 
 
In Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and 
Others165 the applicants, partners in a long-term lesbian relationship, wanted 
to adopt two children jointly but were prohibited from doing so by the Child 
                                               
163
  2000 3 SA 684 (C). 
164
  Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 265. 
165
  2002 10 BCLR 1006 (CC), 2003 2 SA 198 (CC). 
 40 
Care Act 74 of 1983 and the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993.166 Sections 17(a), 
17(c) and 20(1) of the Child Care Act and section 1(2) of the Guardianship Act 
provided for the joint adoption and guardianship of children by married 
persons only. Consequently, the second applicant alone became the adoptive 
parent. 
 
The applicants brought an application in the Pretoria high court challenging 
the constitutionality of the relevant provisions. They argued that these 
provisions violated their rights to equality and dignity and further violated 
section 28(2) of the Constitution which states: 
 
„A child‟s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child.‟ 
 
The applicants further argued that the non-recognition of the first applicant as 
a parent, in the context of her relationship with the second applicant and their 
relationship with the adopted children, perpetuated the fiction of family 
homogeneity based on the mother/father model and accordingly disregarded 
developments that had taken place in the country, including the enactment of 
the Constitution.167  
 
Kgomo J, who presided in the high court, found that the provisions of the Child 
Care Act and Guardianship Act violated the Constitution and ordered that the 
unconstitutionality be corrected by the reading in of words into the impugned 
provisions to allow for joint adoption and guardianship of children by same-sex 
life partners.168 This judgement was confirmed by the constitutional court. 
 
Skweyiya AJ, who delivered the constitutional court‟s judgement, held that the 
exclusion of same-sex life partners from adopting children where they would 
otherwise be suitable to do so did not serve the best interests of the children. 
Thus the exclusion was in direct conflict with section 28(2) of the 
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Constitution.169 The exclusion also deprived children of the possibility of 
acquiring a loving and stable family life as required by section 28(1)(b).170 The 
court further held that the failure of the law to recognise the value and worth of 
the first applicant as a parent to the adoptive children was demeaning and 
limited her right to dignity and equality and that this limitation was not 
justifiable.171  
 
These findings are a true reflection of democratic values where equal 
protection and recognition are afforded to all irrespective of diversities. This 
judgement can be seen as a rejection of the view that exposure to a lesbian 
relationship will be detrimental to a child‟s well-being. 172 
 
In J v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs173 lesbian life partners 
had twins as a result of artificial insemination using the ova of the first 
applicant and the sperm of an anonymous male donor. The fertilised ova were 
implanted into the second applicant who gave birth to the twins. The 
applicants wanted to be registered and recognised as the parents of the twins 
but their registration was refused by the Department of Home Affairs. The 
applicants thereupon successfully applied to the Durban high court for an 
order directing the respondent to issue the applicants with a birth certificate for 
each child reflecting the second applicant as their mother and the first 
applicant as their parent with their surname being the surname of the first 
applicant. 
 
Magid J, presiding in the high court, inter alia, declared regulation 5 of the 
regulations issued under the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 
unconstitutional as it did not make provision for the registration of same-sex 
life partners as the parents of children born to them and provided for the 
registration of one male and one female parent only. Magid J also declared 
that the first applicant was a natural parent and guardian of the children. He 
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held that the circumstances required that the first applicant‟s right to human 
dignity in terms of section 10 of the Constitution and the twin‟s right to family 
and parental care in terms of section 28(1)(b) demanded that her rights as the 
genetic mother of the twins and the twin‟s right to have a claim against her 
had to be recognised by the law. The court further declared section 5 of the 
Children‟s Status Act 82 of 1987174 to be inconsistent with the Constitution. 
This section differentiated between married and unmarried couples in that 
children born to a married couple as a result of artificial insemination would be 
regarded as their legitimate child while in the case of an unmarried couple the 
child would be regarded as extra-marital.175 
 
The constitutional court confirmed the unconstitutionality of section 5 of the 
Children‟s Status Act. The court held that section 5 unfairly discriminated 
between married persons and same-sex life partners and was inconsistent 
with section 9(3) of the Constitution which prohibits discrimination of the 
ground of sexual orientation.176 Furthermore, the differentiation between 
children born by artificial insemination to married and unmarried parents 
amounted to unfair discrimination on the grounds of social origin and birth. 
 
The result of this decision is that a child who is born as a result of artificial 
insemination of a woman in a same-sex life partnership is deemed to be the 
legitimate child of the same-sex life partners.177 Very importantly in my view, 
this decision changed the concept of the traditional nuclear family by 
confirming the existence of a different type of family which is entitled to equal 
respect and full protection under the law. 
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2.7.2.5  AFFORDING MARRIAGE RIGHTS TO SAME-SEX COUPLES  
 
The common-law definition of marriage excludes same-sex life partners from 
entering into marriage. The common-law definition expressly makes provision 
for a voluntary union for life between one man and one woman, to the 
exclusion of all others while it lasts.178 Although the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 
does not define marriage it contains a marriage formula which only makes 
provision for persons of the opposite sex to declare that they accept each 
other as husband and wife.179 In Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs180 the 
applicants, both women, had approach the Transvaal provincial division for an 
order declaring their marriage to be recognised as legally valid under the 
Marriage Act  and to direct the respondents to register their marriage in terms 
of the provisions of the Marriage Act and the Identification Act 68 of 1997. The 
same-sex couple based their argument on the fact that the common law had 
developed in such a manner that it could recognise marriage between 
persons of the same-sex as  a legally valid marriage in terms of the provisions 
of the Marriage Act. The application was dismissed by the Transvaal 
provincial division on the ground that the relief sought was incompatible with 
the Marriage Act. 
 
On appeal to the supreme court of appeal181 the decision of the high court 
was reversed. The supreme court of appeal held that refusal of the Transvaal 
provincial division to develop the common law in accordance with the spirit, 
purport and objectives of the Constitution amounted to non-compliance with 
sections 8(3), 36(1), 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution which places courts 
under a general obligation to develop the common law appropriately should 
the common law be deficient.182 The supreme court of appeal concluded that 
the common-law definition of marriage deprived same-sex couples of the 
option of getting married and therefore denied gays and lesbians the option of 
solemnising their union and further denied them the opportunity to gain certain 
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benefits, protections and duties.183 The exclusionary definition of marriage 
injured gays and lesbians because it implied a judgement on them and 
suggested that their relationships and commitments were inferior. It excluded 
them from a community of moral equals that the Constitution promised to 
create for all.184 Although the Marriage Act contains no definition of marriage, 
the Act was enacted on the assumption that the common-law definition of 
marriage applied to heterosexual marriages only and it was this definition that 
underlined the Act.185 The supreme court of appeal developed the common-
law definition of marriage to embrace same-sex partners by defining 
„marriage‟ as „the union of two persons to the exclusion of all others for life‟. 
 
The Marriage Act presented a further impediment to the relief sought by the 
appellants. Section 30(1) of the Act contains a default marriage formula which 
requires a marriage officer to put the default formula to the couple during the 
marriage ceremony. The default formula requires the couple to declare 
whether they accept each other as „lawful wife (or husband)‟.186 The formula 
therefore makes provision for the declaration by opposite sex couples only 
and excludes same-sex couples. Only the Minister of Home Affairs has the 
authority to approve a formula that differs from the default formula. Cameron 
JA, delivering the majority judgement, held that the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the default formula could not be corrected by the reading in of 
words to include same-sex partners as had been done in many other cases. 
He held that the development of the common-law definition of marriage would 
take practical effect as soon as the Minister of Home Affairs approved another 
formula which encompassed same-sex marriage.187 The supreme court of 
appeal therefore reversed the decision of the Transvaal provincial division 
replacing it with an order declaring that the intended marriage between the 
appellants would be capable of being recognised as a legally valid marriage, 
provided that the formalities as set out by the Marriage Act were complied 
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with.188 Cameron JA importantly emphasised that neither this decision, nor the 
ministerial grant of a formula which would encompass same-sex couples 
would in any manner compel any religious organisation or minister of religion 
to condone or perform same-sex marriages.189  
 
The decision of the supreme court of appeal was set aside and replaced by 
the constitutional court in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life 
International and Others, Amicus Curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project 
and Others v Minister of Home Affairs.190 The constitutional court held that the 
failure of the common law and the Marriage Act to provide for means whereby 
same-sex couples could enjoy the same status, entitlements and 
responsibilities that are afforded to heterosexual couples through marriage 
constituted an unjustifiable violation of their right to equal protection under the 
law under section 9(1) of the Constitution, their right not to be unfairly 
discriminated against in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution, and their 
right to dignity in terms of section 10 of the Constitution.191 
 
The constitutional court declared the common-law definition of marriage to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it does not 
permit same-sex couples to enjoy the benefit coupled with the responsibilities 
it accords to heterosexual couples. The court also declared the omission from 
section 30(1) of the Marriage Act after the words „or husband‟ of the word „or 
spouse‟ unconstitutional. The declarations of invalidity were suspended for 12 
months to allow Parliament to correct the unconstitutionality. 
 
In delivering the majority judgement, Sachs J referred to Dawood and Another 
v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others192 where O‟Regan J had pointed out that: 
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„It would be inappropriate for this Court to seek to remedy the 
inconsistency in the legislation under review. The task of determining 
what guidance should be given to decision-makers and, in particular, the 
circumstances in which a permit may justifiably be refused is primarily a 
task for the Legislature and should be undertaken by it. There is a range 
of possibilities that the Legislature may adopt to cure the 
unconstitutionality‟.193 
 
Sachs J concluded that it was the duty of Parliament to restructure the 
institution of marriage. He therefore concluded that the constitutional court 
had to suspend the order of invalidity to give Parliament the opportunity to 
correct the defect itself.194 If Parliament failed to cure the defect within 12 
months, the words „or spouse‟ would automatically be read into section 30(1) 
of the Marriage Act and then the Marriage Act would become the legal vehicle 
enabling same-sex couples to achieve the status and benefits afforded by 
marriage.195  
 
Although the order of invalidity was suspended for a period of 12 months the 
case embraced the right to be different and still be entitled to equal respect, 
protection and self-worth. With this judgement South Africa became the first 
country in Africa to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples. The Civil 
Union Act 17 of 2006 was enacted as a result of the Fourie judgement. This 
Act affords marriage rights to same-sex couples and will be discussed in 
chapter 3. 
 
2.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The oppression and marginalisation of homosexual persons were relegated to 
a past era as a result of the political transition that took place with the 
acceptance of a new constitutional democracy. The Bill of Rights guarantees 
every one the right to be equally treated, respected and protected irrespective 
                                               
193
  At par 134. 
194
  2006 1 SA 524 (CC) at pars 135 and 136. 
195
  At par 161. 
 47 
of diversities. The Fourie judgement was the logical outcome of the growing 
body of progressive judgements regarding the rights of same-sex couples. 
The deference to the legislature by the constitutional court based on the moral 
and religious sensitivities of the case is, however, illogical if one takes into 
account that the majority norm is predominantly against the recognition of 
same-sex marriage. The legislature sought to give effect to the decision in 
Fourie by enacting the Civil Union Act. The following chapter will consist of an 
in-depth discussion of the legal consequences of the enactment of the Civil 
Union Act.  
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‗The strength of the nation envisaged by the Constitution comes from its capacity to embrace 
all its members with dignity and respect. In the words of the Preamble, South Africa belongs 
to all who live in it, united in diversity. What is at stake in this case, then, is how to respond to 
legal arrangements of great social significance under which same-sex couples are made to 
feel like outsiders who do not fully belong in the universe of equals.‘
1
 
 
 
 
3  THE CIVIL UNION ACT 17 OF 2006 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter consists of a comprehensive discussion of the Civil Union Act 
(hereinafter the Act) that came into operation on 30 November 2006 as a 
result of the Fourie judgement handed down by the constitutional court on 1 
December 2005. A short overview will be given on the legislative process that 
eventually led to the enactment of the Act with reference to the 
recommendations made by the South African Law Reform Commission and 
the draft Civil Union Bill. Thereafter a general description of the Act will be 
given. It will be indicated who has the capacity to enter into a civil union and 
the requirements for the solemnisation and registration of a civil union as set 
out by the Act will be discussed. This will be followed by a critical discussion 
on the shortcomings of the Act.  
 
3.2 THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS THAT LED TO THE ENACTMENT 
OF THE CIVIL UNION ACT 
 
3.2.1 THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
LAW REFORM COMMISSION (SALRC) TO EXTEND MARRIAGE 
RIGHTS TO SAME-SEX COUPLES 
 
In the Discussion Paper on domestic partnerships, the SALRC raised the 
possibility of the extension of marriage rights to same-sex couples in 1998.2 
The Commission‘s final report in its study of domestic partnerships was 
published in March 2006. The Commission made certain recommendations 
that it submitted would satisfy the equality provision of the Constitution.3 As a 
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 As per Sachs J in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International and 
Others, Amicus Curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) at par 61.  
2
 Discussion Paper 104 (Project 118) (2003) Domestic Partnerships. 
3
 Report on Project 118 (2006) Domestic Partnerships at par 5.6. 
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first choice, the Commission recommended the amendment of the Marriage 
Act of 1961 by the insertion of a definition of marriage that extends marriage 
in terms of the Act to same-sex and opposite-sex couples; the amendment of 
the Marriage Act by the insertion of a definition of the word ‗spouse‘; and the 
amendment of the marriage formula in the Marriage Act to include the words 
‗or spouse‘.4 To accommodate the religious and moral objections that were 
raised against the recognition of same-sex marriage, the Commission 
recommended a second choice, the enactment of the ‗Orthodox Marriage Act‘ 
(the so-called Dual Act option) that would only be available to opposite-sex 
couples.5 The amended Marriage Act would be called the ‗Reformed Marriage 
Act‘.6  
 
Both proposals of the Commission were all-encompassing, considering the 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law by same-sex couples and 
taking into account religious and moral objections that were raised against the 
recognition of same-sex marriage. 7 
 
3.2.2  DRAFT CIVIL UNION BILL 
 
The legislature, however, discarded the reformative options recommended by 
the SALRC.8 When the Civil Union Bill9 (hereinafter the Bill) was presented to 
Parliament at the end of August 2006 it was received with much disapproval. 
Much debate revolved around the procedural issue as to whether the Bill had 
been properly tabled to the Home Affairs Portfolio Committee and whether it 
                                               
4
 Idem, at pars 5.6.6 and 5.6.7. 
5
 Idem, at pars 5.6.17 and 5.6.23. 
6
 The SALRC recommended a different name for the amended Marriage Act in order to 
differentiate between ‗orthodox marriages‘ and ‗reformed marriages‘. 
7
 In the Fourie judgement, Sachs J held that is was necessary to take cognisance of the 
reform process recommended by the SALRC in determining the appropriate remedy to 
be ordered. He further held the reform process was conducted in a ‗holistic, systematic, 
structured and consultative‘ manner and of value to the Legislature in drafting the 
appropriate legislation (at par 125). His decision to afford Parliament the opportunity to 
correct the legal position with regard to same-sex marriage was largely based on the 
research initially conducted by the SALRC. 
8
 Sinclair ‗A new definition of marriage: gay and lesbian groups may marry‘ (2008) The 
International Survey of Family Law 397 at 402. 
9
 Draft Civil Union Bill, published in the Government Gazette 29169 of 13 August 2006. 
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had been properly certified by the State Law Advisors.10 The Bill proposed the 
implementation of a separate institution for same-sex couples — civil 
partnerships.11 However, the legal consequences of marriage would apply 
mutatis mutandis to civil partnerships.12 The proposed civil partnership 
differed from traditional marriage in three fundamental ways: it would not be 
called a marriage (except if the parties prefer to refer to their civil partnership 
as a marriage but this would be allowed only during the solemnisation of the 
civil partnership);13 marriage officers employed by the state would have the 
right to refuse to solemnise a civil partnership on the grounds of conscience;14 
and it would only be available to same-sex couples, not to heterosexual 
couples.15  
 
Activists and members of the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgendered and 
Intersex (LGBTI) community were displeased with the Bill, arguing that it 
represented an attempt to create a ‗separate but equal‘ marriage institution 
that would ‗protect‘ ‗real marriage‘ from ‗contamination‘ and ‗defilement‘ by 
same-sex couples, while pretending to afford same-sex couples with equal 
marriage rights.16 They further argued that the Bill contradicted the 
instructions set out in the Fourie judgement where the constitutional court 
expressly stated that Parliament should avoid implementing a remedy that 
would provide for ‗separate but equal‘ rights to same-sex couples that would 
in their context and application create new forms of oppression.17 It was 
argued that the Bill created a separate and inferior institution which failed to 
recognise both tangible legal consequences and intangible benefits that flow 
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 Smith and Robinson ‗The South African Civil Union Act 2006: progressive legislation 
with regressive implications?‘ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 356 at 358. 
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 Clause 2(a) of the Civil Union Bill. A ‗civil partnership‘ is defined as ‗the voluntary union 
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 De Vos ‗A judicial revolution? The court-led achievement of same-sex marriage in 
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―inevitability‖ of same-sex marriage‘ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 
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from entering into marriage.18 Accordingly, the Bill deprived same-sex couples 
of the right to access the status associated with traditional marriage and 
endorsed the view that same-sex couples are somehow immoral and impure 
and that heterosexual marriage must be protected from this revulsion.19  
 
Gay and lesbian activists launched a sustained attack on the draft Bill stating 
that it was insulting and humiliating towards people who would prefer to marry 
a member of their own sex.20 The fact that the Bill did not provide same-sex 
life partners with marriage rights but with a mere second-class institution 
called a ‗civil partnership‘ affirmed the view that the legislature was reluctant 
to grant equal marriage rights to same-sex couples and expressed an 
intolerance for the plurality of the South African society.21 This view of gay and 
lesbian activists resonated with some members of the ANC because it 
reminded them of similarities associated with apartheid. Therefore, the ANC 
members of the Home Affairs Portfolio Committee came to the conclusion that 
it was necessary to amend the draft Bill.22 In early November 2006 the 
National Assembly adopted a substantially amended Civil Union Bill which 
provides for same-sex couples and heterosexual couples to enter into a civil 
union. The Civil Union Act came into operation on 30 November 2006. 
 
3.3 GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE CIVIL UNION ACT  
 
3.3.1  DEFINITION AND FORMULATION OF A CIVIL UNION 
 
The Act defines a civil union as ‗the voluntary union of two persons who are 
both 18 years or older, which is solemnised and registered by way of either a 
marriage or a civil partnership, in accordance with the procedures prescribed 
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 De Vos ‗A judicial revolution? The court-led achievement of same-sex marriage in 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid.  
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 Barnard ‗Totalitarianism, (same-sex) marriage and democratic politics in post-apartheid 
South Africa‘ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 500 at 516. 
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in this Act, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others‘.23 The Act therefore 
applies to civil union partners joined in a civil union.24 It is important to note 
that the Act applies to both same-sex and opposite couples in a monogamous 
relationship.  
 
The objectives of the Act are: 
 
(a) to regulate the solemnisation and registration of civil unions, 
by way of either a marriage or a civil partnership; and 
(b) to provide for the legal consequences of the solemnisation 
and registration of civil unions.25 
 
3.3.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SOLEMNISATION AND  
REGISTRATION OF A CIVIL UNION 
 
3.3.2.1  GENERAL 
 
Prospective civil union partners may enter into a contract of engagement, 
variously referred to as a ‗betrothal‘ or ‗espousal‘. By entering into this 
contract sui generis the civil union partners promise to enter into a civil union 
on a particular or determinable future date. However, an engagement contract 
is not a prerequisite for the conclusion of a legally recognised civil union.26  A 
civil union provides for only two persons27 who are 18 years28 or above to 
conclude either a marriage or a civil partnership. A person in a civil union may 
not conclude a marriage under the Marriage Act or the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 199829 and a person married under the 
Marriage Act or Recognition of Customary Marriages Act is not allowed to 
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 S 1. 
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 S 3. 
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 S 2. 
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 See Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
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 S 8(2). 
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register a civil union.30 A civil union is therefore monogamous, may only be 
entered into by adults and may not co-exist with a civil or customary marriage. 
A prospective civil union partner, who has previously entered into a civil or 
customary marriage or a registered civil union under the Civil Union Act, must 
present the marriage officer with a certified copy of the divorce order or death 
certificate of the former spouse or civil partner as proof that the previous 
marriage or civil union has been terminated.31 A marriage officer may not 
solemnise or register a civil union if the certified copy is not in his or her 
possession.32  
 
Apart from being of the same-sex, the prospective civil union partners may not 
be prohibited by law from concluding a civil or customary marriage.33 
Accordingly, the same requirements as to capacity that apply in civil and 
customary marriages apply to civil unions. Thus, for example, mentally ill 
persons are absolutely incapable of entering into a civil union; there must be 
consensus between the parties to enter into a civil union; and the civil union 
must be lawful, for example, the partners to a civil union must not be within 
the prohibited degrees of relationship.34 
 
3.3.2.2  THE PRESCRIBED FORMALITIES 
 
A civil union must be solemnised by a marriage officer35 in accordance with 
the provisions and requirements set out in the Act.36 Among these 
requirements are that religious denominations or organisations must apply in 
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writing to the Minister37 for approval to conduct civil unions.38 Only after 
approval has been granted by the Minister may a minister of religion or any 
person holding a responsible position in that religious organisation submit a 
written request to the Minister or any officer in the public service authorised 
thereto by the Minister to be designated as a marriage officer for the purposes 
of solemnising civil unions in accordance with the provisions of the Act and 
further in accordance with the rites of that specific religious institution.39  It is 
clear from the provisions of the Act that religious marriage officers are not 
allowed to submit individual written requests to be designated as marriage 
officers to conduct a civil union under the Act. In order to solemnise a civil 
union both the religious institution and religious official must apply for the 
required approval.40  
 
It is important to note that an ex officio marriage officer41 is not compelled to 
solemnise a same-sex civil union if he or she objects on the ground of 
conscience, religion or belief.42 This provision amounts to possible sexual 
orientation discrimination by a state organ which will probably be 
unconstitutional if challenged. This issue will be discussed below under the 
heading: Particular problems arising from the Civil Union Act. A marriage 
officer may solemnise and register a civil union on any day of the week 
between 8h00 and 16h00.43 The civil union must be solemnised and 
registered in a public office or private dwelling house with open doors or on 
any premises used for such purposes by the marriage officer. However, a civil 
union may be solemnised elsewhere if one or either of the parties is incapable 
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 The Minister of Home Affairs. See the definition of ‗Minister‘ in s 1 of the Act. 
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of being present at the abovementioned places due to serious, longstanding 
illness or serious bodily injury.44 
 
The requirements for the solemnisation of a civil union are very similar to 
requirements for the solemnisation of a civil marriage in terms of the Marriage 
Act. Before solemnisation of a civil union can take place the prospective civil 
union partners must furnish the marriage officer with their identity 
documents45 or identity affidavits.46 Alternatively, one party may furnish his or 
her identity document while the other party submits an identity affidavit.47 
 
Both parties and at least two competent witnesses are required to be 
personally present during the civil union ceremony.48 The conclusion of a civil 
union through a representative on behalf of either party is therefore not 
allowed.49  
 
At the commencement of the ceremony the marriage officer must ask the 
parties whether their civil union should be known as a marriage or a civil 
partnership.50 The marriage officer must put the prescribed questions to each 
party separately, and each of them must reply in the affirmative: 
 
'Do you, A.B., declare that as far as you know there is no lawful 
impediment to your proposed marriage/civil partnership with C.D. here 
present, and that you call all here present to witness that you take C.D. 
as your lawful spouse/civil partner?‘ 
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     Issued under the provisions of the Identification Act 68 of 1997. 
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   S 7 of Act 17 of 2006. In terms of reg 3 of the regulations issued under the Act on 29 
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After each party has replied in the affirmative the parties must give each other 
the right hand and the marriage officer must declare the marriage/civil 
partnership solemnised in the following words: 
 
'I declare that A.B. and C.D. here present have been lawfully joined in a 
marriage/civil partnership‘.51 
 
When this declaration is made by the marriage officer the civil union legally 
comes into existence. If an error, omission or oversight is committed with 
regard to the questions or the declaration or the requirement that the parties 
must give each other the right hand, the marriage/civil partnership is 
nevertheless valid if the error, omission or oversight occurred in good faith or 
due to the physical disability of one or both of the parties, if the solemnisation 
of the civil union in all other respects complied with the provisions of the Civil 
Union Act.52 
 
3.3.2.3 REGISTRATION OF A CIVIL UNION 
 
Prior to entering into the civil union the prospective civil union partners must 
separately and in writing declare their willingness to enter into a civil union 
with one another by signing the prescribed document53 in the presence of two 
witnesses.54 The marriage officer and the two witnesses must sign the written 
declaration to certify that it was made in their presence.55  
 
Once the civil union has been solemnised, the marriage officer must issue the 
civil union partners with a registration certificate stating that they have entered 
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into either a marriage or a civil partnership depending on the decision they 
made as to the term they wish their union to be known by.56 The registration 
certificate serves as prima facie proof that a valid civil union exists between 
the parties.57 
 
3.4 LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CIVIL UNION 
 
Section 13(1) of the Act provides that the legal consequences of marriage as 
contemplated in the Marriage Act apply mutatis mutandis to a civil union. In 
other words the Act provides for the application of the necessary changes to 
contextualise the reference to marriage in any other law including the common 
law so that they can operate in respect of a civil union.58 The Act further 
dictates that, with the exception of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 and 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, any reference to 
husband, wife or spouse in any other law including the common law includes 
a civil union partner.59 
 
3.4.1  INVARIABLE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CIVIL UNION 
 
The most important invariable legal consequences of a civil union include the 
change in the partners‘ status; the creation of a consortium omnis vitae and a 
reciprocal duty of support between the partners; the acquisition of a right to 
occupy the matrimonial home and use the household assets; and automatic 
acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of children born of 
the union.60 Some particular problems arising from the acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights will be discussed below under the heading: 
Particular problems arising from the Civil Union Act. 
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3.4.2   VARIABLE CONSEQUENCES OF A CIVIL UNION 
 
3.4.2.1   MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIME 
 
The variable consequences of a civil union relate to the matrimonial property 
regime that exists during the subsistence of a civil union. The common law 
and the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 provide civil union partners who 
are domiciled in South Africa with the option of entering into a civil union 
which is either in community of property or out of community of property with 
the inclusion or exclusion of the accrual system.  
 
In South Africa the primary matrimonial property regime is the system of 
universal community of property. Thus, as in a civil marriage, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that when parties enter into a civil union they do so in 
community of property.61 The characteristics of universal community of 
property entail that both partners to a civil union become co-owners in equal 
undivided shares of all the assets and liabilities they have at the time of 
entering into a civil union as well all the assets and liabilities they obtain 
during the subsistence of their civil union.62 Upon entering into a civil union 
the individual estates of the partners unite into one joint estate for the duration 
of the civil union and both partners enjoy equal powers with regard to the 
administration of the joint estate.63 Upon the dissolution of a civil union all the 
liabilities/debts are first paid from the joint estate and the residue of the joint 
estate is then distributed equally between the partners.64 
 
Should the prospective civil union partners choose to deviate from a civil 
union in community of property, they have to enter into an antenuptial contract 
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  Edelstein v Edelstein 1952 3 SA 1 (A); Brummund v Brummund’s Estate 1993 2 SA 
494 (NmHC). 
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  See Estate Sayle v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1945 AD 388 at 395. 
63
  S 14 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. For a general discussion of the 
variable consequences of a civil marriage entered into in community of property see eg 
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also apply to a civil union. 
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  De Wet v Jurgens 1970 3 SA 38 (A) at 46.  
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prior to solemnisation and registration of their civil union to regulate the 
matrimonial consequences of their civil union. The antenuptial contract must 
comply with the formalities and requirements as set out in section 87 of the 
Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. If the contract does not comply with these 
requirements it is valid only as between the civil union partners inter partes 
and is not binding on any third party who is not a party to the informal 
contract.65  
 
There are three variations of civil unions out of community of property namely: 
 
1. Civil unions out of community of property and community of 
profit and loss without the accrual system (complete 
separation of property). 
2. Civil unions out of community of property with retention of 
community of profit and loss. 
3. Civil unions out of community of property with the accrual 
system.66 
 
It must be noted that section 21(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act allows civil 
union partners to apply jointly to a court to change their applicable matrimonial 
property system. They must comply with the statutory requirements and 
provide the court with sound reasons for the intended change, give notice of 
the intended change to all creditors and prove that no other person will be 
prejudiced by the intended change.67 
 
If a civil union partner is not domiciled in South Africa a problem arises in 
determining the applicable matrimonial property system. According to our law 
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  S 86 of Act 47 of 1937. See also Ex parte Spinazze 1985 3 SA 650 (A); Odendaal v 
Odendaal 2002 2 All SA 94 (W). S 88 of Act 47 of 1937, however, provides for 
postnuptial execution and registration of an antenuptial contract that did not comply 
with the formalities of notarial execution and registration. 
66
  For a general discussion of the variable consequences of a civil marriage entered into 
out of community of property see Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 
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 ed 
Chapter 15,16 and 17; Visser and Potgieter Introduction to family law (1998) 2
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 ed 
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   S 21(1)(a)-(c) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
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the patrimonial consequences of a marriage are regulated by the law of the 
place where the husband is domiciled at the time of marriage (also known as 
the husband‘s lex loci domicilii). In terms of section 13(1) and 13(2) of the Civil 
Union Act this rule applies to civil unions too. The drafters of the Civil Union 
Act should have made provision for a matrimonial property system based on 
the choice-of-law rule as it will be problematic to determine the ‗husband‘ in a 
same-sex civil union in order to establish the applicable matrimonial property 
system. This problematic issue will be discussed below under the heading: 
Particular problems arising from the Civil Union Act. 
 
3.4.2.2 THE DISSOLUTION OF A CIVIL UNION 
 
Civil unions can be dissolved by way of death or divorce. The Divorce Act 70 
of 1979, which regulates divorce and its consequences, applies mutatis 
mutandis to a civil union concluded under the Civil Union Act. Section 3 of the 
Divorce Act as read with section 13(2) of the Civil Union Act provides for two 
no-fault grounds of divorce, namely: 
 
1. the irretrievable breakdown of the civil union as contemplated 
in section 4 of the Divorce Act; 
2. the mental illness or the continuous unconsciousness of a 
partner to a civil union, as contemplated in section 5 of the 
Divorce Act. 
 
Upon the dissolution of the civil union the patrimonial consequences of the 
civil union will be regulated by the matrimonial property regime the partners 
chose upon entering into the civil union.68 However, it is accepted practice to 
regulate the consequences of divorce by means of a settlement agreement 
entered into between the partners which may be incorporated into the divorce 
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  For a general discussion of the dissolution of a civil marriage by divorce see eg Cronjé 
and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed Chapter 11; Hahlo The South 
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th
 ed Chapter 21; Visser and Potgieter 
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order.69 If the civil union partners did not enter into a settlement agreement 
regarding the payment of maintenance by one of the partners to the other 
partner a court may, in terms of section 7(2) of the Divorce Act, make a 
maintenance order in favour of one partner until the death or remarriage of the 
partner who is entitled to maintenance. When making a maintenance order 
the court must consider the factors listed in section 7(2) and make a 
maintenance order that will be fair according to the merits and circumstances 
of each case.70 
 
In terms of section 9(1) of the Divorce Act as read with section 13(2) of the 
Civil Union Act a court may order complete or partial forfeiture by one party in 
favour of the other of benefits acquired during the subsistence of the civil 
union.71  
 
The court will take the following factors into account in respect of granting a 
forfeiture order: 
 
1. The duration of the civil union. 
2. The circumstances which led to the breakdown of the civil 
union 
3. Any substantial misconduct on the part of either party.72 
 
All three factors need not be alleged and proved73 and a court will only grant a 
forfeiture order if it is satisfied that in the absence of such an order, ‗the one 
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party will in relation to the other party be unduly benefited‘.74 The effect of a 
forfeiture order is that a party never loses his or her own assets but only the 
right to share in the patrimonial benefits he or she has derived from the civil 
union.75  
 
Section 7(3) to (6) which allows a court to transfer one party‘s assets or a part 
thereof to the other party as the court may deem just is not applicable to civil 
unions. These provisions apply only to spouses who were married with 
complete separation of property prior to the coming into operation of the 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 on 1 November 1984 or the Marriage and 
Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 on 2 December 1988. As 
civil unions were first permitted in 2006, all civil unions fall outside the ambit of 
section 7(3) to (6) of the Divorce Act. 
 
In terms of section 6(1)(a) of the Divorce Act a decree of divorce shall not be 
granted if a court is not satisfied that the interests of the minor or dependant 
children born of the civil union are not satisfactorily provided for or  that the 
provisions for the children are not the best that can be achieved in the specific 
situation. The court must further, in terms of section 6(1)(b), consider the 
report and recommendations made by the family advocate in terms of section 
4(1)(a) of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 in order to 
assist the court to make an order regarding maintenance, care and contact 
that will promote the best interests of the children born of the civil union. 
 
Although the Civil Union Act formally affords same-sex couples the same 
rights and responsibilities the Marriage Act affords heterosexual couples some 
inequalities and differentiations still exist and are discussed next. 
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  Wijker at 726. 
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3.5  PARTICULAR PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE CIVIL UNION 
ACT 
 
The Civil Union Act represents the legislature‘s response to the constitutional 
court‘s findings in the Fourie76 case that same-sex couples must be provided 
with the same ‗status, rights and responsibilities‘ the law accords to 
heterosexual couples. To determine whether the Act complies with the 
constitutional court order it is necessary to investigate whether the Civil Union 
Act is a mere substandard product of a failed conciliation between social and 
political issues or in fact represents a transformation of South African family 
law that acknowledges the existence of a diverse range of family forms.  
 
3.5.1  EX OFFICIO MARRIAGE OFFICERS NOT COMPELLED TO 
SOLEMNISE SAME-SEX CIVIL UNIONS 
 
3.5.1.1 ANOMALIES BETWEEN MARRIAGE OFFICERS CREATED BY 
THE MARRIAGE ACT AND CIVIL UNION ACT 
 
Marriages and civil unions can be solemnised by either religious marriage 
officers or civil servants (ex officio marriage officers) appointed to fulfil this 
task. In terms of the Marriage Act77 a civil servant appointed as a marriage 
officer must solemnise all marriages placed before him or her and is not 
allowed to object to solemnising a marriage on the grounds of conscience, 
religion or belief.78 For example, an ex officio marriage officer with Christian 
beliefs cannot refuse to solemnise the marriage of a Jewish couple. In order to 
accommodate certain religious beliefs, the Marriage Act makes provision for 
the solemnisation of marriages by religious marriage officers according to the 
rites of Christian, Jewish or Mohammedan beliefs and the rites of any Indian 
religion.79 These religious marriage officers are not compelled to solemnise a 
marriage which does not conform to the rites or beliefs of their chosen 
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     2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
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  Act 25 of 1961. 
78
  S 2. 
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  S 3(2). 
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religion.80 For example, a Christian marriage officer cannot be compelled to 
solemnise a Jewish marriage.   
 
The provisions of the Civil Union Act which regulate the solemnisation of civil 
unions by marriage officers differ from the provisions of the Marriage Act as 
discussed above. Section 5 of the Civil Union Act regulates the designation of 
ministers of religion and persons attached to religious organisations as 
marriage officers. As indicated above under the heading ‗Prescribed 
Formalities‘81 the Act requires written approval for both religious organisations 
and religious officials to conduct civil unions, while in terms of the Marriage 
Act only one application suffices.82 The reason for this requirement is probably 
to elicit any objections that may arise on the grounds of conscience or 
religious beliefs to solemnise a same-sex civil union. This section, however, 
contains no provision for a religious marriage officer to object, on the grounds 
of his or her conscience or religious belief, to the solemnisation of a civil union 
which does not conform to the rites, tenets or doctrines of his or her religious 
beliefs. This is in contrast with the position in terms of section 31 of the 
Marriage Act which does empower religious marriage officers to object to 
conducting civil marriages which do not conform to the rites, tenets or 
doctrines of their religious beliefs. The effect of the omission in section 5 of 
the Civil Union Act is that, for example, a Christian marriage officer cannot 
refuse to conduct the civil union of a same-sex couple with Jewish beliefs.83 
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  Bilchitz and Judge ‗The Civil Union Act: messy compromise or giant leap forward?‘ in 
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  A further consequence of this provision that needs briefly to be mentioned due to the 
limited scope of this study is the fact that religious marriage officers‘ individual beliefs 
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religion who wish to solemnise same-sex unions on the basis of their own beliefs but 
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In terms of section 6 of the Civil Union Act an ex officio marriage officer is not 
compelled to solemnise a civil union between same-sex parties if he or she 
objects thereto on the grounds of conscience, religion and belief. An ex officio 
marriage officer is therefore allowed to refuse to solemnise a same-sex civil 
union. This means that an ex officio marriage officer with Christian beliefs will 
not be allowed to object to solemnising a civil union on the grounds of 
conscience, religion or belief of a heterosexual couple who are, for example, 
Hindu. The only ground for objection is therefore based on a person‘s 
homosexual orientation. Thus, the conscience provision in the Civil Union Act 
accommodates the right to freedom of conscience, religion and belief of civil 
servants who are marriage officers and who object to the solemnisation of a 
civil union by same-sex parties but on the other hand limits the constitutional 
rights of same-sex couples who wish to marry in terms of the Civil Union 
Act.84 The constitutionality of this section will be discussed below. 
 
3.5.1.2   RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION VERSUS SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION  
 
It can be argued that the Fourie85 judgement provided an escape route for ex 
officio marriage officers with religious objections to conduct same-sex civil 
unions by stating (as per Sachs J) that: 
 
‗The principle of reasonable accommodation could be applied by the 
State to ensure that civil marriage officers who had sincere religious 
objections to officiating at same-sex marriages would not themselves be 
obliged to do so if this resulted in a violation of their conscience‘.86 
 
                                                                                                                                      
who are prohibited from solemnising same-sex civil unions in terms of s 5(4) of the Civil 
Union Act because the ministers‘ associated religious institutions do not condone 
same-sex civil unions and did not apply to the Minister for approval to conduct civil 
unions as required by s 5(1) of the Civil Union Act. 
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  Bonthuys ‗Irrational accommodation: conscience, religion and same-sex marriage in 
South Africa‘ (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 473 at 478. 
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  2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
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  Fourie at par 159. 
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The constitutional court has developed and applied the concept of reasonable 
accommodation in various cases.87 The main issue is whether a specific 
person can be exempted from complying with general rules in order to 
accommodate that person‘s religious beliefs. In the context of the present 
research it is therefore necessary to establish whether the religious 
accommodation provided for by the Civil Union Act is reasonable and whether 
the limitation placed on same-sex couples‘ ability to conclude a civil union is 
justifiable. 
 
I submit that the accommodation of the religious beliefs of ex officio marriage 
officers violates a same-sex couple‘s right to equality before the law and equal 
protection and benefit of the law and not to be discriminated against on the 
ground of sexual orientation in terms of sections 9(1) and (3) of the 
Constitution and the right to dignity in terms of section 10 of the Constitution. 
In order to determine whether a violation of the equality clause is present the 
guidelines as set out by the constitutional court in Harksen v Lane NO88 must 
be applied.89 
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When applying the guidelines as set out in the Harksen case it must firstly be 
determined whether section 6 of the Civil Union Act differentiates between 
categories or groups of people and if so, whether the differentiation bears a 
rational connection to a legitimate governmental purpose. The provision 
differentiates between same-sex and opposite sex couples in that it allows ex 
officio marriage officers to exercise a discretion not to officiate at a same-sex 
union on the grounds of a religious/conscientious objection. This objection 
applies to same-sex couples only. The religious accommodation of ex officio 
marriage officers is clearly an attempt by the legislature to establish 
conciliation between the conflicting right of religion, conscience and belief on 
the one hand and the right to be free from sexual orientation discrimination on 
the other hand. I submit that in view of the legal and social history of gay men 
and lesbian women this is not a legitimate governmental purpose. Thus, the 
religious accommodation violates the equality clause.  
 
‗Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected‘.90 
Section 6 of the Civil Union Act limits same-sex couples‘ access to general 
public services and accordingly impairs the ability of same-sex couples to 
conclude a civil union and to enjoy family life. This provision constitutes an 
infringement of the right to dignity which includes the right to family life as 
interpreted by the constitutional court in Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs.91 
The Constitution provides for the limitation of the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights but requires that the limitation must be in terms of a law of general 
application and must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account 
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certain relevant factors.92 It is therefore necessary to determine whether the 
limitations of the rights to equality and dignity can be justified in terms of the 
limitation clause.  
 
Only a ‗law of general application‘ can legitimately limit a right in the Bill of 
Rights.93 The ‗law of general application‘ requirement illustrates the basic 
principle of ‗liberal political philosophy and of constitutional law known as the 
rule of law‘.94 In order to qualify as a ‗law of general application‘ the legislation 
must be clear and accessible and phrased in a specific manner so that those 
who are affected by it can determine the extent of their liberties and 
responsibilities.95 Importantly, the law must apply impersonally and uniformly 
in the whole of South Africa and not just to particular groups or people, it must 
apply equally to all and it must not be arbitrary in its application.96 I argue that 
section 6 of the Civil Union Act dictates a personal and unequal application 
directed towards specific individuals, namely same-sex couples, on the basis 
of their sexual orientation and is therefore not a ‗law of general application‘ for 
the purposes of section 36 of the Constitution. Ackermann J has given a 
detailed formulation why legislation which does not constitute a law of general 
application has no room in a constitutional state by stating that: 
 
‗In reaction to our past, the concept and values of the constitutional 
State, of the ―regstaat‖, and the constitutional right to equality before the 
law are deeply foundational to the creation of the  'new order' referred to 
in the preamble. The detailed enumeration and description in s 33(1) of 
the criteria which must be met before the Legislature can limit a right 
entrenched in chap 3 of the Constitution emphasise the importance, in 
our new constitutional State, of reason and justification when rights are 
sought to be curtailed. We have moved from a past characterised by 
much which was arbitrary and unequal in the operation of the law to a 
present and a future in a constitutional State where State action must be 
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such that it is capable of being analysed and justified rationally. The idea 
of the constitutional State presupposes a system whose operation can 
be rationally tested against or in terms of the law. Arbitrariness, by its 
very nature, is dissonant with these core concepts of our new 
constitutional order. Neither arbitrary action nor laws or rules which are 
inherently arbitrary or must lead to arbitrary application can, in any real 
sense, be tested against the precepts or principles of the Constitution. 
Arbitrariness must also inevitably, by its very nature, lead to the unequal 
treatment of persons. Arbitrary action or decision-making is incapable of 
providing a rational explanation as to why similarly placed persons are 
treated in a substantially different way. Without such a rational justifying 
mechanism, unequal treatment must follow‘.97 
 
In order for a limitation to be ‗reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom‘ the 
limitation created by the specific law must serve a constitutionally tenable 
purpose. In other words, there must be an acceptable proportionality between 
the detriments created by the law and the benefits it is designed to achieve.98 
It necessitates the weighing up of competing interests and ultimately an 
assessment based on proportionality.99 In terms of section 36(1)(a)-(e) of the 
Constitution the following factors must be taken into account to determine the 
justifiability of the limitation of a constitutional right: 
 
(a) The nature of the right. 
(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation. 
(c) The nature and the extent of the limitation. 
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose. 
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
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According to section 1 of the Constitution, the Republic of South Africa is 
based on the values of ‗human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms‘. The importance of the rights to 
equality and dignity cannot be overemphasised in a country based on 
democratic values. Human dignity is a core value of the ‗objective, normative 
value system‘ established by the Constitution.100  The origin of the right to 
human dignity has been linked to Kantian moral philosophy, where human 
dignity is considered to be what gives a person their intrinsic worth;101 in other 
words, it ‗requires us to acknowledge  the value and worth of all individuals as 
members of society‘.102 Every person possesses human dignity in equal 
measure and everyone must be treated as equally worthy of respect and 
concern.103 The right to dignity together with the right to life are the most 
important human rights in the Bill of Rights and we are required to value these 
two rights above all others.104 
 
Equality is a complex and deeply contentious social ideal when one considers 
the process of transformation from a government which dictated discrimination 
to a government where the achievement of equality is the most important 
priority.105 Equality embraces the ‗right to be different‘ and affirms that 
difference should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation and stigma ─ 
at best it celebrates the vitality that difference brings to any society.106 Section 
9 of the Constitution guarantees that the law will protect and benefit people 
equally and prohibits unfair discrimination directed towards categories of 
people who have been disadvantaged by past discrimination. 
 
When considering the nature and importance of the right to dignity and 
equality and not to be discriminated against on the ground of sexual 
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orientation it is necessary to take cognisance of the history of the individuals 
who are affected by section 6 of the Civil Union Act. Homosexuals suffered a 
harsh fate during apartheid where homosexual behaviour was punished by 
religion and imposed by the law. In National Coalition for Lesbian and Gay 
Equality v Minister of Justice107 (sodomy case) the constitutional court 
acknowledged and confirmed that gay men and lesbian women are a 
permanent minority in society and have in the past suffered from patterns of 
disadvantage,108 and emphasised that discrimination directed towards 
homosexual persons occurred at a ‗deeply intimate level of human existence 
and rationality‘.109 Given the historical and current resentment of the majority 
of religious institutions of homosexual behaviour it is only logical that gay and 
lesbian couples are more reliant on the State for conducting their same-sex 
civil unions.110 
 
The effect of the limitation imposed by the religious accommodation of ex 
officio marriage officers is that it limits same-sex couples‘ access to basic 
state administrative services that are freely available to heterosexual 
couples.111 Public officials, who include ex officio marriage officers, are 
obliged to uphold the law in an objective manner and may not cast judgement 
on individuals who approach them to fulfil an official function.112 From a state 
perspective, the institution of marriage is of a civil nature and not a religious 
ceremony at all. By allowing ex officio marriage officers to refuse to solemnise 
same-sex civil unions the state consents to a ‗religious veto‘ exercised by a 
public official: a ‗veto‘ which the state itself is prohibited from exercising.113 
The impact, both practical and symbolic, on members of the gay community 
can be dramatic because these individuals are required to accept the 
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disadvantages imposed upon them by the religious faith of ex officio marriage 
officers. Section 7(2) of the Constitution dictates that the state must respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. It can 
therefore be argued that allowing an ex officio marriage officer – a servant 
representing the state – to refuse to solemnise a same-sex civil union is 
inconsistent with section 7(2) of the Constitution in that it fails to respect and 
promote the rights to dignity and equality.  
 
The social impact of the religious accommodation principle represents an 
oblique statement by the law that same-sex relationships are in some sense 
inherently more controversial than heterosexual relationships.114 The principle 
further affirms that same-sex couples may still be treated like outcasts not 
worthy of equal treatment and not entitled to the benefits and responsibilities 
associated with marriage and therefore disregards same-sex couples‘ right to 
self-definition in a most profound way. The practical effect of this 
accommodation of religious beliefs is that same-sex couples will find it 
tremendously difficult to find marriage officers willing to conduct their same-
sex civil unions given the fact of wide-spread homophobia in South Africa.115  
 
In a democratic society as contemplated by the Constitution the secular and 
sacred must co-exist in a mutually respectful manner. In the Fourie116 case 
the constitutional court acknowledged the important function religion fulfils in 
our society.117 The constitutional court, however, emphasised that it would be 
out of order to employ the religious sentiments of some institutions to 
determine the constitutional rights of others. The constitutional court held that 
the majoritarian opinion (in this instance the religious beliefs of individuals) is 
in most instances harsh towards minorities (homosexual individuals) who do 
not conform to majority beliefs or thoughts, and added that in order to 
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determine whether majoritarian and minoritarian positions are involved, the 
measures under scrutiny which promote or degrade the achievement of 
human dignity, equality and freedom must be evaluated.118 According to Lenta 
there is a presumption that favours the accommodation of religious 
sentiments.119 This presumption is rebuttable ‗in the event that religious 
groups claim that their religion commands them to violate fundamental rights 
of individuals‘.120 This argument is confirmed by section 15(1) of the 
Constitution which reads: ‗Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, 
religion, thought, belief and opinion‘. Section 31(2) dictates that the right to 
freedom of religion ‗may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision of the Bills of Rights‘. It can therefore be argued that ex officio 
marriage officers are allowed to hold homophobic beliefs but are prevented by 
section 31(2) of the Constitution from exercising these beliefs in a manner that 
amounts to unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.121  
 
The scope of section 6 of the Civil Union Act is so wide that it not only 
accommodates the religious beliefs of ex officio marriage officers but provides 
for objections on the grounds of conscience and belief. Bonthuys argues that 
the grounds of conscience and belief are problematic in the sense that neither 
the Civil Union Act nor the Constitution requires that these beliefs must be 
rational or that they must be a central part of a system of religious beliefs.122 It 
is therefore possible for an ex officio marriage officer with no religious beliefs 
to impose a moral judgement based on irrational and homophobic beliefs on a 
same-sex couple and object to solemnising a civil union on any absurd 
ground.123 Based on the abovementioned submissions I argue that the 
accommodation of the rights of conscience and belief is too broad and that it 
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confers rights upon ex officio marriage officers to reinforce marginalisation 
directed towards gay and lesbian couples.124  
 
The primary purpose of the Civil Union Act is to protect the rights to dignity 
and equality of same-sex couples and to remedy the intentional discrimination 
the unreformed South African family imposed upon them.125 The preamble of 
the Civil Union Act acknowledges that the family law dispensation that existed 
after the commencement of the Constitution failed to ‗provide for same-sex 
couples to enjoy the status and benefits coupled with the responsibilities that 
marriage accords heterosexual couples‘. Section 6 is clearly in direct conflict 
with the objectives of the Civil Union Act and undermines the purpose of the 
Act to remove discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation and to uphold 
the constitutional rights to equality and dignity. 
 
3.5.1.3 TO SUMMARISE 
 
The state does not have an unlimited duty to accommodate religious beliefs. 
Where there is a compelling need for a service, for example, the 
solemnisation of same-sex civil unions and where undue hardship will be 
incurred if the service is not provided the state needs not to accommodate 
religious and other beliefs.126 It is a known fact that gay men and lesbian 
women incurred undue hardship in the past. Such undue hardship will still 
prevail if the availability of same-sex marriage is subjected to the religious and 
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other beliefs of ex officio marriage officers. Section 6 of the Civil Union Act 
creates the impression that the state accepts the moral and religious 
characterisation of homosexuality by ex officio marriage officers and that, 
although the state and judiciary acknowledge that same-sex marriage is 
constitutionally necessary, it still remains morally questionable. It is therefore 
recommended that section 6 of the Act must be repealed and that only 
religious marriage officers must be allowed to object to the solemnisation of 
same-sex civil unions if homosexuality is condoned by the specific religious 
institution and that only one application by a religious marriage officer suffices. 
Only then will it be possible for the conflicting rights of religion and sexual 
orientation to co-exist in a constitutional dispensation that will advance the 
accommodation of diversity in a pluralistic society.  
 
3.5.2 MARRIAGEABLE AGE 
 
Only a person of 18 years or older is permitted to enter into a civil union.127 A 
minor can therefore not enter into a civil union even if he or she is assisted by 
his or her guardian. This differs from the legal position in terms of the 
Marriage Act and Recognition of Customary Marriages Act. 
 
In terms of section 24(1) of the Marriage Act read with section 18(3)(c) and (5) 
of the Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 a minor may enter into a civil marriage if he or 
she has the consent of all his or her guardians. If the minor is a boy below the 
age 18 years or a girl below the age of 15 years the consent of the Minister of 
Home Affairs must be obtained in addition to the consent of the minors‘ 
guardians. It must be noted that children below the age of puberty128 are not 
permitted to enter into a civil marriage, and that the Minister‘s authority to 
                                               
127
  See the definition of ‗civil union‘ in s 1 of the Act. A further implication of the age 
requirement in the Civil Union Act (which will not be discussed due to the limited scope 
of this study) is that minors who concluded either a customary or civil marriage and 
thereby attained majority will not be allowed to conclude a civil union if the civil or 
customary marriage is dissolved by either death or divorce while the person is still 
below the age of 18 years. This is so because s 1 of the Civil Union Act expressly 
requires that the partners to a civil union must be ‗18 years of age or older‘. 
128
  At common law the age of puberty is 12 years for girls and 14 years for boys. 
 76 
grant consent therefore applies only to civil marriages of girls between the 
ages of 12 and 15 years and boys between the ages of 14 and 18 years.129   
 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act requires that both prospective 
spouses must be above the age of 18 years.130 However, section 4(a) 
authorises the Minister or any officer in the public service authorised in writing 
thereto by the Minister, to grant written permission to a person under the age 
of 18 years to enter into a customary marriage if the Minister or the said officer 
is of the view that such marriage is desirable and in the interests of the parties 
in question. Thus, in the case of civil and customary marriages minors may 
marry if they obtain certain persons‘ consent. 
 
In terms of section 7(1) of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights ‗. . . enshrines the 
rights of all people in our country . . .‘ and therefore most of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights are afforded to ‗everyone‘. Children enjoy protection and rights in 
terms of the general provisions of the Bill of Rights (that is, rights afforded to 
everyone) and in terms of section 28 which affords protection to children only. 
The supremacy of the Constitution131 demands that all laws and conduct must 
be consistent with the provisions of the Bill of Rights and that all the 
obligations set out by the Constitution must be fulfilled. Any inconsistency (law 
or conduct) with the Constitution will be declared invalid to the extent of the 
inconsistency.132 The Civil Union Act completely excludes minors from 
entering into a civil union. The question that has to be answered is whether 
the blanket ban on a civil union by minors is constitutionally tenable.  
 
3.5.2.1 IS THE BLANKET BAN IN CONFLICT WITH THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF MINOR CHILDREN? 
 
It can be argued that the blanket ban is in conflict with section 28(2) of the 
Constitution which dictates that ‗a child‘s best interests are of paramount 
                                               
129
  Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 22; see also Sinclair assisted 
by Heaton The law of marriage (1996) 367 and Hahlo The South African Law of 
Husband and Wife (1985) 5
th
 ed 90. 
130
  S 3(1)(a)(i) of Act 120 of 1998. 
131
  S 2 of the Constitution, 1996. 
132
  S 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, 1996. 
 77 
importance in every matter concerning a child‘.133 The Children‘s Act also 
promotes the best interests of the child134 and sets out general principles 
which must guide the implementation of all legislation and guide all 
proceedings, actions and decisions by any organ of state in any matter 
concerning a child or children in general.135 Importantly, subject to any lawful 
limitation, all proceedings, actions or decisions in a matter concerning a child 
must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the child‘s rights in terms of the Bill of 
Rights, the best interests of the child standard and all other rights and 
principles as set out in terms of the Children‘s Act.136 
 
The best interests of the child standard137 has been described as ‗[a] golden 
thread which runs throughout the whole fabric of our law relating to 
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speculation (Heaton 96).  Another obstacle in determining the best interests of a child is 
whether a child‘s interests must be evaluated from a short-term, medium-term or long-
term perspective (Heaton 96-97). It is submitted that a child‘s interests must be 
determined by taking into account the short, medium and long term implications and 
that the desired outcome must reflect a decision that promotes the child‘s physical, 
emotional and intellectual well-being and, importantly, that the child‘s autonomy was 
maintained in such a manner that the decision promotes the child‘s social relationships 
(ibid). Another aspect that needs to be addressed is whether a child‘s best interests 
must be determined from a subjective or objective approach. The objective approach 
entails that the view of the particular community of which the child forms part must be 
taken into account to determine what will be in a child‘s best interests, while the 
 78 
children‘.138 For this reason the Constitution dictates that a child‘s best 
interests are of paramount importance in every matter relating to a child: the 
principle is not limited to decisions relating to guardianship, care or contact.139 
It can be argued that the definition of a civil union in its current form, which 
excludes minors from entering into a civil union where they would otherwise 
be permitted to do so in terms of the Marriage Act and Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act, is in conflict with the requirement that the child‘s 
best interests must be paramount. A child‘s best interests cannot be served if 
a child is prohibited from performing a certain juristic act (in this instance from 
entering into a civil union) without taking into account the age, maturity, stage 
of development and any other relevant characteristics or surrounding 
circumstances of a minor child as required by sections 7(g)(i) and (iv) of the 
Children‘s Act. The Civil Union Act fails to promote the interests of minor 
children to achieve the social status and financial stability a civil union can 
afford minor children.  
 
3.5.2.2 A VIOLATION OF MINORS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO 
EQUALITY AND DIGNITY  
 
I submit that the blanket ban on a civil union by a minor violates the minor‘s 
constitutional rights to equality and dignity.140 The blanket ban further amounts 
to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, age and marital status 
and is presumed to be unfair discrimination in terms of section 9(5) of the 
                                                                                                                                      
subjective approach only takes cognisance of the opinion of the child, his or her 
parents and interested parties on the particular matter. What is suggested is that a 
combination of both the subjective and objective approaches must be followed (Heaton 
97). However, in instances were it must be decided whether minors must be allowed to 
enter into a same-sex civil union the matter becomes more complex due to widespread 
homophobic views. I submit that the child‘s maturity and emotional development must 
be the main consideration and that in this particular regard the subjective approach 
must prevail. 
138
  Kaiser v Chambers 1969 4 SA 224 (C) at 228. 
139
  The application of the best interest of the child standard is not limited to rights provided 
for only by s 28 of the Constitution, 1996. See Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights 
Handbook (2005) 5
th
 ed at par 27.1. 
140
   See ‗Religious Accommodation versus Sexual Orientation‘ at par 3.5.1.2 for a 
comprehensive discussion of the violation of the constitutional rights of equality and 
dignity of same-sex couples by the Civil Union Act that allows for refusal by an ex 
officio marriage officer to solemnise a same-sex civil union on the grounds of religion, 
conscience and belief. This discussion also applies to the violation of minors‘ rights to 
equality and dignity imposed by the age requirement. 
 79 
Constitution. The following discussion of the abovementioned violation of 
minors‘ constitutional rights will focus on minors who are attracted to members 
of their own sex. 
 
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.141 By 
excluding minors who are attracted to members of their own sex from entering 
into a civil union while permitting opposite sex minors to enter into marriage 
(which is governed by alternative legislation), amounts to unequal treatment. 
This exclusion deprives a specific group of minors – minors who are attracted 
to members of their own sex – of the opportunity to enjoy the same status, 
entitlements and responsibilities the Marriage Act and Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act accord minors who are allowed to either enter into a 
civil or customary marriage if they obtain the necessary consent. The 
legislation that regulates the legal capacity of minors to conclude either a 
marriage or a civil union clearly differentiates between minors according to 
their sexual orientation and age. Accordingly, minors who are attracted to 
members of their own sex have no legal means to enter into a relationship 
recognised by law. The age restriction militates against compliance with 
section 9(1) of the Constitution which guarantees the right to equality before 
the law and equal protection and benefit of the law. 
 
Setting the age requirement at 18 years further violates a minors‘ right to 
inherent dignity. Although the Constitution does not contain an express right to 
family life the constitutional court interpreted the right to dignity in a purposive 
manner in order for the right to dignity to encompass the right to family life.142 
The exclusion of minors from the option of ‗entering an honourable and 
profound estate that is adorned with legal and social recognition, rewarded 
with many privileges and secured by many automatic obligations‘143 
perpetuates a sense of inferiority and signifies that minors who are attracted 
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to members of their own sex lack the inherent humanity to have their family 
life respected and protected: this constitutes a serious invasion of their dignity.  
 
3.5.2.3 ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS 
 
The blanket ban on minors‘ entering into a civil union is also in conflict with the 
constitutional court judgement in the Fourie144 case. In the majority judgement 
as per Sachs J key principles were laid down to guide the legislative process 
to amend existing marriage laws. Sachs J held that the ‗law concerned with 
family formation and marriage requires equal celebration‘145 and that the 
required remedy must amount to equal treatment, but he acknowledged that 
differential treatment may be required in order to overcome past 
discrimination.146 Sachs J, however, emphasised that it was crucial that 
differential treatment must enhance dignity and promote the achievement of 
equality and that the remedy in its context and application must provide equal 
protection and must not create new forms of marginalisation.147 It is submitted 
that restricting civil unions to adults creates a new form of marginalisation. 
 
Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution dictates the consideration of international 
law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. It is therefore clear that the 
Constitution allows reference for purposes of interpretation to international 
human rights law in general, for example, international conventions.148 South 
Africa is a Contracting State to the International Convention on Consent to 
Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriages and Registration of Marriage of 1962 
which requires Contracting States to incorporate legislative measures to 
indicate a minimum age for marriage but authorises a ‗competent authority‘ to 
‗grant a dispensation as to age, for serious reasons, in the interest of the 
intending spouses‘. It can therefore be argued that the age qualification for 
entering into a civil union is in conflict with the Convention because the 
Convention dictates that minors‘ respective interests must be taken into 
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account when setting a minimum age requirement. The legislature failed to 
take cognisance of the Convention when it drafted the Civil Union Act.  
 
3.5.2.4 TO SUMMARISE 
 
The sexual orientation provision protects a particular group of individuals: 
individuals who are attracted to members of their own sex. The main reason 
for the inclusion of this provision in the Constitution was to provide protection 
to a group of people who experienced humiliation, stigmatisation and 
prejudice. The constitutional court described the impact of discrimination on 
gays and lesbians as serious and characterised them as a group of people 
with ‗vulnerability increased by the fact that they are a political minority not 
able on their own to use political power to secure favourable legislation for 
themselves‘.149 Minors who are attracted to members of their own sex 
experience this ‗increased vulnerability‘ at a more extensive level because of 
their sexual orientation and age. The impact of the exclusion of minors from 
the ambit of the Civil Union Act is severe, because it creates the impression 
that an individual must first reach majority and attain a certain degree of 
maturity in order to establish his or her sexual orientation. Accordingly, minor 
children who are attracted to members of their own sex have no available 
option to enter into a relationship recognised by law. Based on the grounds of 
their sexual orientation, age and marital status they are denied the privileges 
associated with marriage. 
 
Based on the abovementioned submissions I conclude that the violation of the 
rights to human dignity and equality and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, age and marital status cannot be justified in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution. The definition of a civil union is inconsistent with the values 
that our Constitution aspires to and must be amended to allow minors below 
the ages of 18 years to enter into a civil union if it will promote the minors‘ best 
interests. 
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3.5.3 THE PATRIMONIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A SAME-SEX CIVIL 
UNION 
 
In terms of section 13(1) and (2) of the Civil Union Act the Matrimonial 
Property Act 88 of 1984 is applicable to civil unions. Before entering into a civil 
union the prospective civil union partners must indicate whether they prefer to 
enter into a civil union in community of property or out of community of 
property with the inclusion or exclusion of the accrual system. In other words 
they must indicate the applicable matrimonial property system that will 
regulate the proprietary consequences of their civil union. Upon dissolution of 
the civil union, by either death or divorce, the patrimonial consequences of the 
civil union will be governed by their chosen matrimonial property system. 
 
However, if one of the same-sex civil union partners is domiciled in a foreign 
country the regulation of the proprietary consequences becomes problematic.  
The civil union partners may enter into an antenuptial agreement to indicate a 
choice of law (lex causae) that will govern the proprietary consequences of 
their civil union. The choice of law specified in the antenuptial agreement must 
be applied to the full, subject, however, to relevant considerations of public 
policy. 150  Other matrimonial issues, for example, maintenance, custody and 
forfeiture of benefits151 will be regulated by the lex fori.152 This view is 
confirmed by section 2(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
 
In the absence of an express antenuptial agreement the patrimonial 
consequences of marriage are governed by the husband‘s lex loci domicilii at 
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the time of marriage.153 However, in a same-sex civil union it is impossible to 
determine who the ‗husband‘ is and which legal system will regulate the 
patrimonial consequences of a same-sex civil union. The lex loci domicilii rule 
cannot be applied to same-sex civil unions and it can be argued that it violates 
same-sex couples‘ right to equality in terms of section 9 of the Constitution 
because it, inter alia, unfairly discriminates against same-sex civil union 
partners on the ground of their sexual orientation in terms of section 9(3) and 
(5) of the Constitution.154 
 
Reform regarding the lex loci domicilii rule is inevitable in order to regulate the 
patrimonial consequences of same-sex civil union partners domiciled in 
foreign countries. A further argument in favour of reform is the abolition of the 
wife‘s domicile of dependence by section 1 of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992. The 
determination of the matrimonial property regime with exclusive reference to 
the husband‘s domicile is in conflict with the equality provision of the 
Constitution and probably unconstitutional. Even after several suggestions by 
various academic authors that the lex domicilii matrimonii rule should be 
reassessed, South African private international law still has no other 
replacement available to fill the void. The reality of increased global migration, 
the protection of the justified expectation of spouses/civil union partners 
together with the demands of conflict justice and legal certainty require that 
the legislature should enact an appropriate rule as a matter of urgency.155 
 
3.5.3.1  PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE LEX DOMICILII MATRIMONII 
RULE 
 
The introduction of ‗new‘ connecting factors, as an alternative to the use of 
domicile as the connecting factor, to regulate the patrimonial consequences of 
marriage and now also civil unions requires comparative research because it 
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is an unfamiliar territory for conflict lawyers in South Africa and because it 
should take cognisance of international trends in the field.156  
 
After a detailed comparative research study by Schoeman it was suggested 
that German private international law presents itself as an excellent system to 
assist with the reform of the lex domicilii matrimonii rule because this field of 
law faced the same difficulties some time ago. The proprietary consequences 
of marriage before German private international law was reformed were 
governed by the husband‘s nationality to the exclusion of that of the wife. 
However, with the enactment of a written constitution in Germany which 
included a gender equality provision the husband‘s nationality as the 
connecting factor was declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany known as the Bundesverfassungsgericht.157 The reference 
to the law of the husband‘s nationality as the governing law to determine the 
patrimonial consequences of the marriage was replaced with the principle of 
common nationality of both spouses at the time of marriage. If the spouses do 
not share a common nationality their common habitual residence at the time 
of marriage is considered as the next connecting factor. If the spouses do not 
share a common nationality or common habitual residence at the time of 
marriage the country with which the spouses are, in any other way,158 most 
closely jointly connected at the time of marriage is reverted to as a last resort. 
In the case of immovable property the spouses may choose the lex situs of 
such property as the governing system.159 Accordingly, the spouses are 
prevented from selecting a completely ‗unconnected‘ legal system as the 
                                               
156
  Idem, at 117. 
157
  Idem, at 122. 
158
  Although the German legislator did not provide a list of factors to be taken into 
consideration the following important factors were mentioned: ‗common social ties of a 
couple to a country through descent, culture, language, occupation or trade; common 
ordinary or simple residence which is not of a mere fleeting nature; the intended 
acquisition of a common nationality; the intended acquisition of a first common habitual 
residence; the place of the conclusion of the marriage provided that is not merely 
fortuitous, but strengthened by the nationality or habitual residence of one of the 
spouses or another factor‘ (Schoeman 132).  
159
  Art 15 of the Introductory Act to the German Civil Code (EGBGB) as cited by 
Schoeman in ‗The South African conflict rule for proprietary consequences of marriage: 
learning from the German experience‘ (2004) 1 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
115 at 127. 
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governing law.160 The proprietary consequences of marriage are still governed 
by the immutability principle (limited to the time of marriage) and the retention 
of this principle in South African private international law can also be justified 
on the basis that it will lead to havoc if the lex causae for proprietary 
consequences changes every time the spouses attain dissimilar nationalities 
or change their habitual residence.161 In the supreme court of appeal 
judgement in the Fourie162 case Farlam JA in his minority judgement 
emphasised the impossibility of applying the lex domicilii matrimonii to same-
sex couples but held it was not an insoluble problem and referred to the 
suggestions made by Schoeman as the most probable solution. 
 
A five-step model was proposed by Stoll and Visser163 in the absence of an 
express or tacit antenuptial agreement. In this instance the proprietary 
consequences of the couple‘s marriage must be governed by the law of the 
country of the common domicile of the spouses at the time of the marriage. If 
the spouses do not have a common domicile, the law of the common habitual 
residence of the spouses at the time of the marriage applies.  In the absence 
of a common habitual residence, the law of the common nationality of the 
spouses applies. Lastly, if the spouses do not have a common nationality, the 
law of the state with which both spouses are most closely connected will 
govern the proprietary consequences of the marriage.164 The latter proposal is 
supported by Neels and Wethmar-Lemmer165 especially with reference to the 
connecting factors of habitual residence and nationality because both these 
factors are increasingly employed as connecting factors in South African 
private international law mostly under the influence of international conflicts 
conventions.166 A perfect example of such an international convention, to 
which South Africa is not a Contracting State, is the Hague Convention on the 
                                               
160
  Idem, at 132. 
161
  Idem, at 132-133. 
162
  2005 3 BCLR 241 (SCA); 2005 3 SA 429 (SCA). 
163
  Stoll and Visser ‗Aspects of the reform of German (and South African) private 
international family law‘ (1989) De Jure 330. 
164
  Idem, at 335. 
165
  Neels and Wethmar-Lemmer ‗Constitutional values and the proprietary consequences 
of marriage in private international law – introducing the lex causae proprietatis 
matrimonii‘ (2008) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 587 
166
  Idem, at 588. 
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Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes (hereinafter the Convention) 
which came into operation on 1 September 1992.  
 
The Convention establishes common provisions concerning the law applicable 
to matrimonial property regimes167 and provides a suitable solution to spouses 
who are domiciled in different jurisdictions. Article 3 of the Convention governs 
the position where spouses entered into an antenuptial agreement before 
entering into marriage and allow spouses to select only one of the following 
laws to regulate their matrimonial property regime: the law of any state of 
which either spouse is a national at the time of designation; the law of the 
state in which either spouse has their habitual residence at the time of 
designation; or the law of the first State where one of the spouses establishes 
a new habitual residence after marriage. The spouses‘ choice of law will be 
applied in full to all their property. The Convention, however, provides for an 
exception with respect to immovable property in that the spouses have the 
option to apply the national law of the place where the immovables are 
situated (lex situs). 
 
Article 4 of the Convention governs the position where the spouses have 
failed to enter into an antenuptial agreement before marriage. In this instance 
the matrimonial property regime is governed by the law of the state in which 
both spouses establish their first habitual residence after marriage or by the 
law of the state of the common nationality of the spouses. If the spouses do 
not have a habitual residence after marriage in the same state, nor have a 
common nationality, their matrimonial property regime will be governed by the 
internal law of the state the spouses are most closely connected to.  
 
The term lex domicilii matrimonii is no longer suitable to indicate the 
applicable matrimonial property regime to regulate the proprietary 
consequences of marriage. This is due to the fact that the abovementioned 
proposals refer to connecting factors other than only domicile. After a 
                                               
167
  The Convention does not apply to maintenance obligations between the spouses, 
succession rights of surviving spouses or the capacity of spouses: art 1 of the 
Convention. 
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comprehensive study into Latin terminology Neels and Wethmar-Lemmer 
came to the conclusion that the term lex causae proprietatis matrimonii (in 
English one could utilise the phrase ‗the proper law of the proprietary 
consequences of marriage‘ or in Afrikaans ‗die lex causae van die 
vermoënsregtelike gevolge van die huwelik‘) will be the most proper concept 
to indicate the legal system applicable to the proprietary consequences of 
marriage.168  
 
3.5.3.2  TO SUMMARISE 
 
It is recommended that South Africa accede to the Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes 1992 in order to achieve 
conflict justice and legal certainty. This will promote the purpose of conflicts 
justice which is the ‗correct and proper ordering of relationships among private 
parties‘ or ‗a just ordering of private life‘169 and this can be achieved through 
the connecting factors provided for by the Convention. As far as private 
international law is concerned, a constitutional equality clause impacts upon 
the connecting factor itself, which implies that the conflict rule must conform to 
the constitutional guarantee of equality.170 I submit that the Convention will 
provide spouses/civil union partners with equal opportunities on the private 
international law level and, importantly, it will reform the current position of 
inequality imposed upon spouses/civil union partners by the lex domicilii 
matrimonii rule.  
 
3.6 THE ACQUISTION OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
RIGHTS BY SAME-SEX CIVIL UNION PARTNERS 
 
Before the coming into operation of the Children‘s Act 38 of 2005, children 
were categorised as either legitimate or illegitimate but, with the enactment of 
                                               
168
  Neels and Wethmar-Lemmer ‗Constitutional values and the proprietary consequences 
of marriage in private international law – introducing the lex causae proprietatis 
matrimonii‘ (2008) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 587 at 592. 
169
  Schoeman in ‗The South African conflict rule for proprietary consequences of marriage: 
learning from the German experience‘ (2004) 1 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
115 at 123. 
170
  Idem, at 124. 
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the Children‘s Act ‗the law shifted its emphasis from labelling children to 
labelling the marital status of their parents‘.171 A child is now referred to as a 
‗child born of married parents‘ or a ‗child born of unmarried parents‘.172 The 
acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights is now also determined by 
the marital status of the parents.173 Because it is impossible for same-sex civil 
union partners to conceive children by way of natural means the acquisition of 
parental responsibilities and rights is mostly achieved through adoption and 
artificial fertilisation.  
 
3.6.1 FEMALE CIVIL UNIONS 
 
The adoption of children by female civil union partners is currently regulated 
by section 17(a) and (c) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. The effect of 
adoption is that an adopted child must for all purposes in law be regarded as 
the child of the adoptive parents as if the adopted child was born to the civil 
union partners.174 Both the adoptive parents acquire full parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of their adoptive child. The position as 
regards acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights by same-sex civil 
union partners through adoption will remain the same when the provisions of 
the Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 on adoption come into operation.175 
 
Partners to an all-female civil union may also wish to become the parents of a 
naturally conceived child. In this instance one of the partners must commit an 
adulterous act with a male person willing to assist with the conception.176 Only 
the partner who is the biological mother and gives birth to the child has full 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child.177 The other partner 
will only acquire full responsibilities and rights in respect of the child if she 
                                               
171
  Heaton South African law of persons (2008) 3
rd
 ed 49. 
172
  Ibid. However, the biological mother of a child whether married or unmarried has full 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child: s 19(1) of the Children‘s Act. 
173
  See ss 19-21 of the Children‘s Act. 
174
  S 20(2) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. 
175
  Chapter 15 of the Children‘s Act will regulate adoption procedures. This chapter did not 
come into operation on 1 July 2007 when some sections of the Act were brought into 
force: See Government Gazette 30030 of 27 June 2007. 
176
  Louw ‗The acquisition of shared parental responsibility by same-sex civil union 
partners‘ (2007) Obiter 324 at 325. 
177
  S 19 of the Children‘s Act. 
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applies for the adoption of the child in a joint application with the partner who 
gave birth to the child.178  
 
Section 40(1) of the Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 regulates the status of a child 
who is born as a result of artificial fertilisation.179 A child born as a result of 
artificial fertilisation of one of the civil union partners using the gametes180 of 
any person other than a civil union partner will be regarded as a child born 
from married parents, provided that both civil union partners consented to the 
artificial fertilisation.181 Prior to the coming into operation of section 40 of the 
Children‘s Act, a child born as a result of artificial fertilisation of a partner in a 
same-sex life partnership was considered a child born of married parents. 
This was the result of the constitutional court decision in J v Director General, 
Department of Home Affairs182 where the court declared section 5 of the 
Children‘s Status Act 82 of 1987 unconstitutional to the extent that it denied a 
child born as a result of artificial fertilisation the same status as a child born of 
married parents. However, the Children‘s Status Act was repealed by the 
Children‘s Act. The unamended section 5 of the Children‘s Status Act was re-
enacted by section 40 of the Children‘s Act. In respect of civil union partners 
the re-enactment of the unamended version is not a problem, because section 
13 of the Civil Union Act equates civil unions and civil marriages. A child who 
is born as a result of the artificial fertilisation of a same-sex civil union partner 
therefore qualifies as a child born of married parents. However, a child who is 
born to same-sex life partners who have not entered into a civil union is 
deemed to be a child born of unmarried parents because such same-sex life 
partners are not covered by the wording of section 40 of the Children‘s Act. 
Section 40 of the Children‘s Act may lead to a constitutional challenge on the 
                                               
178
  S 17(c) of the Child Care Act read with s 13(2) of the Civil Union Act. See also s 
231(1)(c) of the Children‘s Act.  
179
  ‗Artificial fertilisation‘ means the introduction, by means other than natural means, of a 
male gamete into the internal reproductive organs of a female person for the purpose of 
human reproduction. Artificial fertilisation includes the bringing together of a male and 
female gamete outside the human body with the view of placing the product of a union 
of such gametes in the womb of the female person as well as the actual placing of the 
such product in the woman‘s womb (in vitro fertilisation): s 1(1) of the Children‘s Act. 
180
  ‗Gamete‘ means either of the two generative cells essential for human reproduction: s 
1(1) of the Children‘s Act. 
181
  S 40(1)(a) of the Children‘s Act read with s 13(2) of the Civil Union Act. 
182
  2003 5 BCLR 463 (CC). 
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same grounds that led to the declaration of unconstitutionality of section 5 of 
the Children‘s Status Act. This particular problem will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 
3.6.2 MALE CIVIL UNION PARTNERS 
 
The discussion of adoption under the previous heading ‗Female civil union 
partners‘ apply mutatis mutandis to male civil union partners.  
 
Surrogate motherhood is the only option available for male civil union partners 
who wish to conceive a child who is genetically related to at least one of the 
partners. Surrogacy refers to the ‗situation where the surrogate mother183 
undertakes to be artificially fertilised for the purposes of bearing a child for the 
commissioning parents184 and handing over that child to the commissioning 
parents upon the birth or within a reasonable time thereafter so that the child 
will become the commissioning parents‘ child as if he or she were born from 
the commissioning parents‘.185 The provisions of the Children‘s Act regarding 
surrogate motherhood are not yet in operation. At present, surrogacy is 
therefore unregulated by statute. The effect is that only the woman who gives 
birth to a child who was conceived as a result of artificial fertilisation is for all 
purposes regarded as the child‘s mother and only she acquires rights and 
duties in respect of the child,186 while the male gamete donor has no parental 
responsibilities and rights, unless he as an unmarried father who qualifies for 
full parental responsibilities and rights in terms of section 21 of the Children‘s 
Act. The other male civil union partner who did not donate his gametes will 
have no parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child unless the 
                                               
183
  ‗Surrogate mother‘ means an adult woman who enters into a surrogate motherhood 
agreement with the commissioning parent: s 1 (1) of the Children‘s Act. 
184
  ‗Commissioning parent‘ means a person who enters into a surrogate mother agreement 
with a surrogate mother: s 1 (1) of the Children‘s Act. 
185
  Heaton South African law of persons (2008) 3
rd
 ed 50. 
186
  This is so because she is the child‘s biological mother (s 19 of the Children‘s Act) and 
because there is no surrogate motherhood agreement in existence between the 
surrogate mother and commissioning parents. 
 91 
woman who gives birth consents to the joint adoption of the child by both civil 
union partners.187 
 
3.7 EXCLUSION OF GAY IDENTITY IN AFRICAN COMMUNITIES 
FROM THE AMBIT OF THE CIVIL UNION ACT 
 
The Civil Union Act has been criticised on the ground that it caters only for 
gays and lesbian who identify themselves openly as homosexual and who 
profess to have a fixed sexual orientation which they cannot change.188 
Bonthuys points out that many African people who are involved in same-sex 
relationships do not fit this profile.189 In some instances their same-sex 
conduct coincides with heterosexual relationships or is associated with 
particular life stages.190 Importantly, Africans do not necessarily identify 
themselves as exclusively lesbian or gay, but often take on the gender identity 
of the opposite sex.191 Bonthuys argues that the Civil Union Act fails to reflect 
a perception or understanding of the complexities and nuances of same-sex 
relationships in African communities and that the Act only represents the civil 
law model of marriage characterised by monogamy and moral values based 
on Judaeo-Christian beliefs.192 This is undoubtedly true. The Act has to be 
understood in its historical context. As was explained in chapter 2, the 
enactment of the Civil Union Act was the result of the decision in Minister of 
Home Affairs v Fourie.193 The focus of that case was the exclusion of same-
sex life partners whose relationship closely resembles a civil marriage but who 
were denied the rights, privileges and benefits associated with a civil 
marriage. The object of the Act was not the regulation of all types of same-sex 
                                               
187
  S 17(a) and (c) of the Child Care Act read with s 13(2) of the Civil Union Act. See also s 
231(1)(a)(i) and (c) of the Children‘s Act. 
188
  Bonthuys ‗Race and gender in the Civil Union Act‘ (2007) 23 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 526 at 536. 
189
  Ibid. See also Pantazis et al in Bonthuys and Albertyn (ed) in Gender, Law and Justice 
(2007) at par 5.1.2 for a historical overview of gay African men and par 5.3.1 of the 
same source for a discussion of African lesbians. 
190
  Bonthuys ‗Race and gender in the Civil Union Act‘ (2007) 23 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 526 at 537. 
191
  See Pantazis et al in Bonthuys and Albertyn (ed) in Gender, Law and Justice (2007) at 
par 5.1.4.  
192
  Bonthuys ‗Race and gender in the Civil Union Act‘ (2007) 23 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 526 at 531 and 537. 
193
  2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
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relationships. Additional legislation may be necessary to regulate these 
relationships. Because the present research is of limited scope and the 
present chapter focuses specifically on the Civil Union Act, the issue of the 
need for further legislation to govern other types of same-sex relationships will 
not be investigated in this dissertation. 
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Some academic authors argue that the Civil Union Act is a badly-drafted piece 
of legislation: the product of a rushed legislative process that will only promote 
the existence of ‗an already disjointed legal landscape‘.194 I submit that certain 
provisions of the Civil Union Act are unacceptable and must be challenged, 
but in its broader context the Act represents a giant leap forward for South 
African family law. Importantly, the Act provides equal status for same-sex 
relationships and acknowledges the existence of a diverse range of family 
forms. Unfortunately, formal legal equality will only gradually transform into 
social equality, with the result that continued discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is inevitable.195 Continued activism, public engagement and 
education are necessary to ensure that the Civil Union Act‘s potential is 
indeed realised not only in the legal sphere but in the wider social arena.196 ‗At 
issue is a need to affirm the very character of our society as one based on 
tolerance and mutual respect. The test of tolerance is not how one finds space 
for people with whom, and practices with which, one feels comfortable, but 
how one accommodates the expression of what is discomforting‘.197  
 
Before the coming into operation of the Civil Union Act, rights and benefits 
were extended to same-sex life partners because they were excluded from 
the institution of civil marriage. Marriage rights are now provided by the Civil 
                                               
194
  Smith and Robinson ‗The South African Civil Union Act 2006: progressive legislation 
with regressive implications?‘ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 356. 
195
  Bilchitz and Judge ‗For whom does the bell toll? The challenges and possibilities of the 
Civil Union Act for family law in South Africa‘ (2007) 23 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 466 at 498. 
196
  Idem, at 499. 
197
  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) at par 60. 
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Union Act. However, the current legal position of same-sex life partners who 
fall outside the ambit of the Act is uncertain. The next chapter will investigate 
the current legal recognition and protection afforded to the latter types of 
same-sex relationships by our law. 
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„The importance of the family unit for society is recognised in international human rights 
instruments . . . [T]hey state that family is the “natural” and “fundamental” unit of our 
society. However, families come in many shapes and sizes. The definition of family also 
changes as social practices and traditions change. In recognising the importance of the 
family, we must take care not to entrench particular forms of family at the expense of 
other forms‟.
1
 
 
 
 
4 RECOGNITION AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF SAME-SEX 
LIFE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter consists of a discussion on the recognition and legal 
consequences of same-sex life partnerships. A life partnership can be 
described as a living arrangement where two people live together in a 
relationship analogous to a marriage2 which produces a „sense of 
responsibility and commitment and creates dependence between the 
parties‟.3 Various terms are used to define these relationships, for 
example, shacking-up, de facto marriage, quasi marriage or domestic 
partnerships,4 but for the purposes of this study the term same-sex life 
partnership is used. According to statistics there are more than one million 
South Africans who are in non-marital relationships with their intimate 
partners.5 According to Goldblatt one of the main reasons for the 
prevalence of such relationships in South Africa is the „extent of migrancy 
in our country‟.6  
 
Before the coming into operation of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 the 
common-law definition of marriage and certain exclusionary statutory 
                                                             
1
  Dawood and another v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home 
Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) at 960.  
2
  Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 227; Sinclair assisted by 
Heaton The law of marriage (1996) 268. 
3
  Goldblatt „Regulating domestic partnerships – a necessary step in the development 
of South African family law‟ (2003) 120 South African Law Journal 610 at 611. 
4
  Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 227; Schwellnus in Clark 
(ed) Family law service (1988) at par N2; Sinclair assisted by Heaton The law of 
marriage (1996) 268. 
5
  Goldblatt „Regulating domestic partnerships – a necessary step in the development 
of South African family law‟ (2003) 120 South African Law Journal 610. 
6
  Ibid. 
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provisions had the result that a same-sex life partnership was the only 
option available to same-sex life partners who wanted some form of legal 
recognition for their relationship. This chapter will give an overview of 
current legal mechanisms at the disposal of same-sex parties who do not 
enter into a civil union. The regulation of these relationships by means of 
the ordinary rules of the law will be dealt with first. This will be followed by 
a discussion of the legal recognition that has been conferred on same-sex 
life partnerships which are not solemnised and registered under the Civil 
Union Act. The essential criteria for the establishment of a permanent 
same-sex life partnership will also be discussed. The chapter will conclude 
with a brief mention of the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill, 2008. 
 
4.2 PROTECTION OF LIFE PARTNERS BY MEANS OF THE 
ORDINARY RULES OF THE LAW 
 
4.2.1 GENERAL 
 
The legal consequences of a civil union do not automatically apply if a 
couple choose not to make their relationship official but decide merely to 
cohabit as life partners. Same-sex life partners may use contracts to 
regulate the legal consequences of their relationship and to create some 
financial security between the partners themselves and third parties.7 They 
may, for example, purchase assets jointly, or jointly enter into lease 
agreements and credit agreements. The terms and conditions of each 
agreement will determine each partner‟s individual rights and obligations.8 
In most instances both life partners are „joint owners of the assets 
acquired and joint debtors in respect of the obligations incurred‟.9 The 
acquisition of property prior to and during the subsistence of the life 
partnership will be discussed below under the heading „Financial 
consequences of same-sex life partnerships‟.  
 
                                                             
7
  Beukes Lewensverhoudings: enkele juridiese aspekte (2006) 84; Cronjé and 
Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 234. 
8
  Ibid. 
9
  Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 234 fn 52. 
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The same-sex life partners may also enter into a life partnership contract 
or a universal partnership to regulate the consequences of their 
relationship. These contracts will be discussed first. 
 
4.2.2 LIFE PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS 
 
Same-sex life partners may enter into a life partnership contract (also 
known as a cohabitation or domestic partnership contract) to determine 
the rights and duties of each partner during the subsistence of the life 
partnership and to regulate the financial and proprietary consequences 
upon termination of the life partnership. A life partnership contract may 
contain any provision which is not impossible, against the law or 
immoral.10 The contract may, for example, contain provisions relating to 
the occupation and ownership of the common home, the procedure for the 
division of household goods after the termination of the life partnership, 
deal with ownership of assets owned before the inception of the life 
partnership and during its subsistence and provide for maintenance 
liability during the subsistence of the life partnership and after its 
termination.11 It is recommended that a life partnership contract be in 
writing, signed and if possible witnessed.12 
 
It must be noted that in the past it was uncertain whether life partnership 
contracts were valid as they were branded as contracts upholding sexual 
immorality and consequently being contrary to public policy. According to 
Hahlo it is illogical to argue that public morals are served in declaring such 
a contract immoral13 and Heaton comments that the growing recognition of 
                                                             
10
  Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 236; Heaton „An 
overview of the current legal position regarding heterosexual life partnerships‟ 
(2005) 68 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 662 at 666. 
11
  Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N22; Sinclair assisted by 
Heaton The law of marriage (1996) 281 fn 54. 
12
  Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N22. 
13
  Idem, at par N21. 
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life partnerships necessitates recognition of the validity of contracts to 
regulate the legal consequences of life partnerships.14  
 
Importantly, the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the ground of 
marital status15 and it can therefore be argued that declaring a life 
partnership contract contrary to public policy will be unconstitutional when 
one considers the permissive decisions regarding the recognition and 
protection of same-sex life partnerships under a constitutional 
dispensation based on human rights. 
 
4.2.3 CONTRACTS OF UNIVERSAL PARTNERSHIP 
 
Same-sex life partners may also enter into a universal partnership either 
expressly or tacitly.16 A universal partnership is a partnership sui generis17 
which comes into existence when the following requirements for formation 
are complied with namely, each party must contribute to the enterprise by 
bringing something into the partnership or undertake to bring something 
into it in future; the aim of the partnership must be to make a profit; the 
partnership must operate for the parties‟ joint benefit and the contract 
between the parties must be legitimate.18 
 
Where the partners fail to enter into an express agreement the existence 
of a tacit agreement is determined with reference to the partners‟ conduct; 
in other words, the factual situation and the objectives of the parties are 
considered, taking into account the circumstances and facts of each 
                                                             
14
  Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 236. See also Heaton 
„An overview of the current legal position regarding heterosexual life partnerships‟ 
(2005) 68 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 662 at 666-667. 
15
   S 9(3) of the Constitution, 1996. 
16
  V (also known as L) v De Wet 1953 1 SA 612 (O); Ally v Dinath 1984 2 SA 451 (T). 
17  Van Niekerk (ed) A practical guide to patrimonial litigation in divorce actions (1999) 
at par 2.7.2. 
18
  Mühlmann v Mühlmann 1981 4 SA 632 (T) and confirmed by the appellate division: 
1984 3 SA 102 (A); See also Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 
2
nd
 ed 234; Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A 
comparative approach (1994) 8; Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service 
(1988) at par N5; Van Niekerk (ed) A practical guide to patrimonial litigation in 
divorce actions (1999) at par 3.5.2. See also Heaton „An overview of the current 
legal position regarding heterosexual life partnerships‟ (2005) 68 Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 662 at 665. 
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case.19 For example, „to provide for the livelihood and comfort of the 
parties, and their children, including the proper education of the latter‟ has 
been regarded as compliance with the making-a-profit object and therefore 
as being sufficient for partnership purposes.20 
 
Two classes of universal partnerships can be distinguished namely, 
societas universorum bonorum (partnership of all property) and societas 
universorum quae ex quaestu veniunt (partnership of all profits).21 The 
societas universorum bonorum is more suitable for same-sex life partners 
because it encompasses all property owned by each partner at the time of 
entering into the life partnership and property acquired during the 
subsistence of the life partnership. This includes donations, inheritances 
and acquisitions from commercial undertakings.22 This type of universal 
partnership establishes a type of community of property between the 
partners, debt liability on a pro rata basis and the equal division of assets 
upon termination of the life partnership.23 In terms of the societas 
universorum quae ex quaestu veniunt the partners share only in the profit 
of commercial undertakings acquired during the subsistence of the 
universal partnership. This form of universal partnership is therefore 
inadequate to regulate the financial consequences of a same-sex life 
partnership.24  
 
If the life partners formed a universal partnership, the partnership property 
is co-owned by the partners as the common owners of the property in 
                                                             
19  Ally v Dinath 1984 2 SA 451 (T) at 454. See also Schwellnus The legal implications 
of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative approach (1994) 8 and Schwellnus 
in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N5. 
20
  Isaacs v Isaacs 1949 1 SA 952 (C) at 956; According to De Groot 3.12.1 as cited 
by Eloff J in Ally v Dinath 1984 2 SA 451 (T) at 455 the aim should be „gemene 
baat te trekken‟. In this case the court held that „the objective of the accumulation 
of an appreciating joint estate . . . is sufficient‟. 
21
  Isaacs v Isaacs 1949 1 SA 952 (C); Benade et al Ondernemingsreg (2008) 4
th
 ed 
at par 2.33.  
22
  Benade et al Ondernemingsreg (2008) 4
th
 ed at par 2.34. See also Schwellnus The 
legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative approach (1994) 7 
and Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N5. 
23
  Benade et al Ondernemingsreg (2008) 4
th
 ed at par 2.36. 
24
  Idem, at pars 2.37-2.39.  
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undivided shares.25 During the subsistence of the universal partnership 
one of the partners may not use the property in such a manner as to 
exclude the other partner entirely from controlling the partnership property, 
may not pledge the partnership property for a personal debt and may not 
alienate partnership property without the other partner‟s consent.26 The 
partnership agreement determines which assets fall into the partnership. 
In the absence of an express agreement all partnership property at the 
date of dissolution of the universal partnership falls to be divided between 
the partners.27 The ratio in which they own the property respectively is 
determined in accordance with their agreement. In the absence of an 
agreement the shares of each partner should accord with the contributions 
made by each individual partner.28 It has been held that maintaining the 
common household qualifies as a contribution.29 The partners share 
equally in the assets only if their respective contributions are equal or if the 
ratio of their contributions cannot be determined with some degree of 
certainty.30 
 
The universal partnership can be terminated by agreement between the 
partners, by the death of one of the partners or by insolvency of one of the 
partners or the partnership.31 Partnership debts still outstanding after the 
dissolution of the partnership can be claimed from the former partners 
individually.32 
 
                                                             
25
  Muller v Pienaar 1968 3 SA 195 (A) at 202. See also Schwellnus The legal 
implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative approach (1994) 7. 
26
  Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N5. 
27
  For a discussion on which property forms part of a universal partnership and to 
what extent see V (also known as L) v De Wet 1953 1 SA 612 (O); Ally v Dinath 
1984 2 SA 451 (T). See also Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in 
South Africa: A comparative approach (1994) 9. 
28
  Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative 
approach (1994) 9. 
29
  Isaacs v Isaacs 1949 1 SA 952 (C) at 954. 
30  V (also known as L) v De Wet 1953 1 SA 612 (O) at 615. See also Schwellnus The 
legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative approach (1994) 
9. 
31
  Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative 
approach (1994) 9. 
32
  Herbst v Solo Boumateriaal 1993 1 SA 397 (T) at 399. 
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The actio pro socio is a personal remedy which arises from the partnership 
agreement. This remedy entitles a partner to institute an action for specific 
performance or fulfilment of certain obligations arising from the partnership 
agreement and may be instituted either during the subsistence of the 
partnership or after the dissolution of the partnership. One of the partners 
may further institute the actio communi dividundo after the dissolution of 
the partnership for the division of partnership assets which have not yet 
been divided.33 
 
Although the existence of a universal partnership is sometimes difficult to 
prove it provides both partners with the opportunity to share in all property 
and profit acquired during the subsistence of the partnership and, in some 
instances, even property acquired before the commencement of the 
partnership. It therefore establishes a type of community of property 
without entering into marriage. 
 
4.2.4 FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SAME-SEX LIFE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
 
4.2.4.1 PROPERTY ACQUIRED PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 
SUBSISTENCE OF THE SAME-SEX LIFE PARTNERSHIP 
 
If the same-sex life partners did not enter into a life partnership contract or 
universal partnership, private property acquired prior to the 
commencement of the life partnership is the partners‟ individual property 
and is not co-owned by them.34 In other words, no community of property 
is created. The same principle applies if property is purchased by one of 
                                                             
33
  For a complete discussion on the actio pro socio and actio communi dividundo see 
Robson v Theron 1978 1 SA 841 (A). See also Benade et al Ondernemingsreg 
(2008) 4
th
 ed at pars 4.34-3.37. See also Van Niekerk (ed) A practical guide to 
patrimonial litigation in divorce actions (1999) at par 3.5.4. 
34
   Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative 
approach (1994) 10; Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N6. 
See also Hahlo „The law of concubinage‟ (1972) 89 South African Law Journal 321 
at 326. 
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the same-sex life partners during the life partnership; ownership of the 
purchased property vests solely in the purchaser.35 
 
4.2.4.2 THE COMMON HOME 
 
In instances where life partners jointly enter into a lease agreement to rent 
their common home the rights and duties of the partners and the landlord 
are governed by the lease agreement and the common law.36 According to 
the common law each same-sex life partner is liable only for his or her 
share of the rent.37 However, in instances were the lease agreement 
states that the parties are jointly and severally liable for the rent either 
partner may be held accountable for the full amount of the rent.38 In the 
case of a joint lease, both same-sex life partners have „security of tenure‟ 
in the sense of having the right to reside in the leased property for the 
duration of the lease.39 If it is a sole tenancy, the non-tenant partner has 
no legal responsibilities and rights with regard to the leased property and 
is for that reason not liable to pay rent. A non-tenant also has no „security 
                                                             
35
  Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative 
approach (1994) 10; Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N7; 
See also Schwellnus „The legal position of cohabitees in South African law‟ (1995) 
Obiter 133 at 139. 
36
  See Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A 
comparative approach (1994) 16-19 for a discussion of joint and sole tenancy by 
cohabitants. 
37
  Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N10. 
38
  See Roelou Barry (Edms) Bpk v Bosch 1967 1 SA 54 (C) at 59 where the court 
referred to the general principle in our common law that where parties to a lease 
agreement have joint liability each party will only be liable for his or her equal share 
of rent unless it can be proved that they are liable in solidum and then only can 
each of them be held liable for the full amount of rent. 
39
  Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N10; See also 
Schwellnus „The legal position of cohabitees in South African law‟ (1995) Obiter 
133 at 145. If the life partners terminate their relationship before the lease 
agreement expires and they are unable to decide who will remain in the leased 
home the partners will have a „deadlock‟. And if the partners decide who will 
remain in the leased home and the lease agreement creates joint and several 
liability and the remaining partner defaults payment, the landlord has the right to 
claim the full payment from the other partner even if he or she does not live in the 
leased home anymore. If the partner pays the rent he or she will have a legal claim 
against the remaining partner who defaulted. This is so because any agreement 
between the partners to indemnify the partner who leaves the leased home from 
paying rent is only binding inter partes: see Schwellnus The legal implications of 
cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative approach (1994) 17. 
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of tenure‟ and can be evicted by the tenant partner upon termination of the 
life partnership.40 
 
If the same-sex life partners are joint legal co-owners of the common 
home, their respective shares are reflected on the title deed of the 
registered property.41 Both partners, as the co-owners of the common 
home, are entitled to share in the profits generated from their home in 
accordance with their respective shares and are also liable to share 
expenses relating to the maintenance of property.42 If there is a mortgage 
bond over the common home, it will be in both partners‟ names with the 
result that both partners are jointly and severally liable for payment of the 
mortgage bond irrespective of their individual shares in the property.43 If 
one of the same-sex life partners defaults in the repayment of his or her 
share of the mortgage bond, the creditor can obtain summary judgement 
against both same-sex life partners for the full outstanding mortgage loan 
or a court may order that the property be sold in execution to cover the 
debt.44 
 
As joint owners, both same-sex life partners have the right to occupy the 
common home. Neither partner may evict the other partner from or 
exclude him or her from controlling the joint property45 or compel the other 
partner to sell the property after the termination of their relationship.46  In 
                                                             
40
  Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N10; See also 
Schwellnus „The legal position of cohabitees in South African law‟ (1995) Obiter 
133 at 146. 
41
  See Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A 
comparative approach (1994) 19-21 for a discussion of property co-owned by life 
partners. See also Schwellnus „The legal position of cohabitees in South African 
law‟ (1995) Obiter 133 at 147. 
42
  Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N11. 
43
  Ibid. 
44
  The life partners as joint owners of the common home are liable in solidum (jointly 
and severally) until the mortgage is paid-up in full. See Schwellnus in Clark (ed) 
Family law service (1988) at par N11 fn 8. 
45
  See Rosenbuch v Rosenbuch 1975 1 SA 181 (W) at 183 where Colman J held that 
the remedy of the mandament van spolie would be applicable where a partner has 
been wrongfully deprived of possession. The purpose of the mandament van spolie 
is to restore possession to the possessor; the relationship status between the 
parties is irrelevant in this regard. 
46
  Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative 
approach (1994) 20. 
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the event of any dispute between the joint owners either partner can 
approach a competent court which has jurisdiction in the matter for relief 
by instituting the actio communi dividundo for the immediate division of the 
joint property or in the alternative an adjustment claim.47 
 
Same-sex life partners are allowed to sell their respective shares in the 
joint property to a third party without obtaining the other partner‟s consent 
but only in instances where the partners have not entered into a life 
partnership contract or universal partnership regulating the alienation of 
their joint property.48 In the event of the death of one of the co-owners his 
or her share in the property forms part of his or her deceased estate.49 A 
deceased same-sex partner may bequeath his or her share in the joint 
property to the other partner, who will then acquire full ownership of the 
property, or to a third party with the effect of establishing co-ownership 
between the third party and the surviving partner.50 
 
If the property is registered in the name of only one of the same-sex life 
partners, the non-owner partner has no rights to the property.51 The 
registered owner may sell the property without the other partner‟s consent 
or knowledge and may even evict the non-owner partner from the common 
home after the termination of the relationship.52 It seems that the non-
owner partner does, however, have a right to reasonable notice to leave 
the property.53 
 
                                                             
47
  Ibid. The court has a wide discretion to make any order which it deems to be fair 
and equitable in the circumstances and may, for example, order one joint owner to 
pay a certain sum to the other owner in order to equalise division and if the 
property is indivisible the court may award the property to one of the joint owners 
subject to the payment of compensation to the other owner. See Bennett NO v Le 
Roux 1984 2 SA 134 (ZH) at 136. 
48
  See Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N11. 
49
  Ibid. 
50
  Ibid. 
51
  See Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A 
comparative approach (1994) 21-22 for a discussion of the position if the property 
is owned by only one of the life partners. See also Schwellnus „The legal position 
of cohabitees in South African law‟ (1995) Obiter 133 at 149. 
52
  See Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N12. 
53
  This principle applies with regard to precario habens in general. See Theron v 
Joynt 1950 3 SA 758 (O) at 762. 
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4.2.4.3 JOINT BANK ACCOUNT 
 
Same-sex life partners are not allowed to open a joint bank account but an 
account can be opened in the name of one of the same-sex life partners 
with the non-account holder having signing power to use the account.54 
The liability for repayment to the bank, for example, in the case of a bank 
overdraft is solely the responsibility of the account holder.55 
 
4.2.4.4 MAINTENANCE 
 
A reciprocal duty of support is one of the ex lege consequences of a valid 
civil union56 and does not apply to same-sex life partners who do not make 
their relationship official in terms of the Civil Union Act. During the 
subsistence of the same-sex life partnership and after its termination no 
right to claim maintenance exists between the same-sex life partners.57 A 
same-sex life partner is not entitled to reclaim any monies spent on 
maintaining the other same-sex life partner, unless such a partner can 
prove a claim on the ground of unjustified enrichment.58 
  
The courts have, however, recognised the existence of a voluntary (that is, 
a contractual) assumption of a reciprocal duty of support, either expressly 
or tacitly, between same-sex life partners in order to extend some spousal 
benefits to same-sex life partners. For example, in Langemaat v Minister 
of Safety and Security59 the court held that where a same-sex life 
partnership has existed for many years in a common home the parties to 
                                                             
54
  Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative 
approach (1994) 12 and also Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at 
par N8. 
55
  Ibid. 
56
  See Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 52 for a general 
discussion of the reciprocal duty of support between spouses. The reciprocal duty 
of support applies to civil unions too. 
57
  Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par N9. 
58
  Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 236-237. See also 
Schwellnus The legal implications of cohabitation in South Africa: A comparative 
approach (1994) 13 and Schwellnus in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par 
N9. 
59
  1998 3 SA 312 (T). 
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that union must owe each other a duty of support.60 The Maintenance Act 
99 of 1998 also recognises the legal duty of any person to maintain any 
other person irrespective of the nature of the relationship between those 
persons.61 The Act therefore applies to the enforcement of a contractual 
duty of support between same-sex life partners.62 
 
4.2.5 AGENCY 
 
The capacity to purchase household necessaries is one of the invariable 
consequences of a civil union.63 In order for a same-sex life partner to 
have the capacity to conclude a contract for household necessaries in 
both same-sex partners‟ names the other same-sex life partner must 
appoint the latter as his or her agent. 64 
 
4.2.6 WILL 
 
Life partners may appoint each other in their wills or in a joint will as their 
respective heirs.65 
 
Now that the protection of same-sex life partners by means of the ordinary 
rules of the law have been discussed it is necessary to deal with the legal 
recognition that has been afforded to a same-sex life partnership which 
has not been solemnised and registered under the Civil Union Act. 
 
 
 
                                                             
60
  Langemaat at 316. See also Clark „Families and domestic partnerships‟ (2002) 119 
South African Law Journal 634 at 639. On this case, see also par 2.7.2.2 above. 
61
   S 2(1). 
62
   See also Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 58. 
63
  See Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 55 for a discussion 
of the requirements for the capacity to incur debts for household necessaries. 
These requirements apply to civil unions too. 
64
  Ibid. See also Hahlo „The law of concubinage‟ (1972) 89 South African Law Journal 
321 at 326. 
65
  Beukes Lewensverhoudings: enkele juridiese aspekte (2006) 85; Cronjé and 
Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 236. 
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4.3 THE LEGAL RECOGNITION WHICH HAS BEEN AFFORDED 
TO SAME-SEX LIFE PARTNERSHIPS WHICH HAVE NOT 
BEEN SOLEMNISED AND REGISTERED UNDER THE CIVIL 
UNION ACT 
 
4.3.1 GENERAL 
 
Before the coming into operation of the Civil Union Act two primary 
sources conferred limited legal recognition on same-sex relationships. 
Firstly, various constitutional court judgements extended some of the 
benefits and rights associated with marriage to the parties to a „same-sex 
life partnership‟. Secondly, there are several statutes that include same-
sex partners in the ambit of their provisions to the extent that these 
partners comply with certain factual criteria.66 Although same-sex life 
partnerships have attracted some rights, these types of non-marital 
relationships do not enjoy any specific legal status.67 „Status‟ in this sense 
refers to „peculiar rights and duties, capacities and incapacities‟ which the 
law ascribes to members of a certain class or group.68 
 
4.3.2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The concept of a „same-sex life partnership‟ was first recognised by the 
constitutional court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs (hereafter National Coalition).69 In this case the 
court restructured the conformist social order of intimate monogamous 
relationships and acknowledged the existence of „another form of life 
partnership which is different from marriage as recognised by law. This 
form of life partnership is represented by a conjugal relationship between 
two people of the same sex‟.70 The court found that same-sex life 
partnerships may perhaps differ with regard to duration and content but in 
                                                             
66
  Schäfer in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par R1. 
67
  Schäfer „Marriage and marriage-like relationships: Constructing a new hierarchy of 
life partnerships‟ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 626. 
68
  Ibid. 
69
  2000 2 SA 1 (CC). On this case, see also par 2.7.2.3 above. 
70
  National Coalition at par 36. 
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essence these life partnerships represented an „intimate and mutually 
interdependent‟ relationship.71 This judgement introduced the concept of a 
„same-sex life partnership‟ in „our legal vocabulary as a term of art‟ and 
conferred a sense of status upon gay and lesbian relationships.72 In this 
case the court held that the constitutional rights to equality and dignity 
dictated the recognition and extension of spousal benefits (here, 
immigration rights) to gay and lesbian partners in a permanent same-sex 
life partnership.73 
 
In order to determine whether a same-sex life partnership is  in existence, 
the court in National Coalition suggested a non-exhaustive list of factors to 
serve as „threshold criteria‟, namely „the respective ages of the partners; 
the duration of the partnership; whether the partners took part in a 
ceremony manifesting their intention to enter into a permanent 
partnership, what the nature of that ceremony was and who attended it; 
how the partnership is viewed by the relations and friends of the partners; 
whether the partners share a common abode; whether the partners own or 
lease the common abode jointly; whether and to what extent the partners 
share responsibility for living expenses and the upkeep of the joint home; 
whether and to what extent one partner provides financial support for the 
other; whether and to what extent the partners have made provision for 
one another in relation to medical, pension and related benefits; whether 
there is a partnership agreement and what its contents are; and whether 
and to what extent the partners have made provision in their wills for one 
another‟.74 
 
The court emphasised that none of these criteria is indispensable for 
establishing a same-sex life partnership; what is important is the totality of 
                                                             
71
 National Coalition at par 17. 
72
  Schäfer „Marriage and marriage-like relationships: Constructing a new hierarchy of 
life partnerships‟ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 626 at 628. 
73
  National Coalition at par 97. 
74
  National Coalition at par 88. See also Goldblatt „Regulating domestic partnerships 
– a necessary step in the development of South African family law‟ (2003) 120 
South African Law Journal 610 at 625 for a further discussion of the criteria for a 
life partnership. 
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the facts presented by the partners and the intention of the same-sex life 
partners to form a permanent same-sex relationship.75 
 
The concept was further developed by subsequent judgements by the 
constitutional court and the supreme court of appeal. However, the 
development was inconsistent, with the courts employing a diverse range 
of definitions and criteria.76 The most telling example of inconsistency is 
created by the required presence of a reciprocal duty of support or the 
voluntary assumption of a contractual duty of support between same-sex 
life partners in some cases. 
 
In Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa,77 a case 
regarding pension benefits, the constitutional court required the presence 
of a reciprocal duty of support between partners in order to extend benefits 
under the Judge‟s Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 
1989 to a judge‟s same-sex life partner. The court further emphasised that 
section 9 of the Constitution does not require that spousal benefits be 
extended to same-sex partners who have not undertaken a reciprocal duty 
of support.78 In a subsequent case, Gory v Kolver,79 the constitutional 
court declared section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 
unconstitutional because it failed to include in its ambit the surviving 
partners to permanent same-sex life partnerships in which the partners 
had undertaken reciprocal duties of support. In Gory the requirement of 
proof of the undertaking of reciprocal duties of support was imposed as a 
matter of course without the court undertaking any assessment of whether 
                                                             
75
  National Coalition at par 88. 
76
  See Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC), 2003 
4 SA 266 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 
SA 198 (CC); J v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 621 
(CC); Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Minister of Home 
Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) and Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC). 
77
  2002 6 SA 1 (CC). On this case, see also par 2.7.2.2 above. 
78
  Satchwell at par 24. 
79
  2007 4 SA 97 (CC). On this case, see also par 2.7.2.2 above. 
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it was an appropriate sine qua non for establishing the right to inherit on 
intestacy.80  
 
The courts have taken the following factors into account to establish the 
existence of a reciprocal duty to support: the duration of the relationship; 
its exclusive nature; whether the partners shared family responsibilities 
and pooled their sources and income; the acknowledgement by friends 
and family of their life partnership; and the extent to which they have made 
provision for financial support for the surviving partner.81 It is evident from 
the above-mentioned cases that the undertaking of a reciprocal duty of 
support is a sine qua non in instances where recognition of a same-sex 
relationship has financial implications.82   
 
In instances where, for example, recognition is sought for the extension of 
immigration rights83 to same-sex life partners or for the acquisition of 
parental responsibilities and rights by same-sex life partners84 the 
presence of a proven reciprocal duty of support is not required.85 This 
approach of constructing a hierarchy of same-sex life partnerships was 
recognised in J v Director General, Department of Home Affairs86 where 
Goldstein J held that: 
         
                                                             
80
  Gory at par 19. See also Wood-Bodley „Establishing the existence of a same-sex 
life partnership for the purposes of intestate succession‟ (2008) 125 South African 
Law Journal 259 at 271. Wood-Bodley argues that it is illogical to link the right to 
inherit on intestacy with the requirement of a proven reciprocal duty of support. He 
submits, and correctly so, that in many cases partners to a same-sex life 
partnership may not be in need of financial support and therefore exclude the duty 
of support and that this exclusion should not deprive a same-sex life partner of the 
right to inherit on intestacy.  
81
  See, for example, Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2003 11 BCLR 1220 (SCA), 
2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) pars 12 and 13. See also Schäfer in Clark (ed) Family law 
service (1988) at par R5. 
82
  Schäfer in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par R7. See also Wood-Bodley 
„Establishing the existence of a same-sex life partnership for the purposes of 
intestate succession‟ (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 259 at 271 and 
Schäfer „Marriage and marriage-like relationships: Constructing a new hierarchy of 
life partnerships‟ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 626 at 630. 
83
  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 
SA 1 (CC). 
84
  Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); J 
v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 621 (CC). 
85
  Schäfer in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par R7. 
86
  2003 5 SA 621 (CC). On this case, see also par 2.7.2.4 above. 
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„Where a statute is challenged on the ground that it is under-inclusive 
and for that reason discriminates unfairly against gays and lesbians 
on the grounds of their sexual orientation, difficult questions may 
arise in relation to the determination of the particular relationships 
entitled to protection, and the appropriate relief. The precise 
parameters of relationships entitled to constitutional protection will 
often depend on the purpose of the statute‟ (emphasis added).87 
 
The result of the differentiation on the ground of the presence or absence 
of a reciprocal duty of support is that it establishes two sets of same-sex 
life partnerships. The effect of the hierarchy is that some gay en lesbian 
couples may find themselves in an undesirable situation of being able to 
enjoy some rights but denied the benefit of others.  
 
4.3.3 STATUTORY RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION  
 
Several statutes include same-sex partners within the parameters of their 
provisions.88 For example, in section 1 of Employment Equity Act 55 of 
1998 „family responsibility‟ is defined as „the responsibility of employees in 
relation to their spouse or partner, their dependant children or other 
members of their immediate family who need their care and support‟. 
„Partner‟ is not defined by the Act but can be interpreted to include a 
same-sex life partner. Section 27 of the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act 75 of 1997 requires an employer to give an employee three days‟ paid 
leave in the event of death of the employee‟s „spouse or life partner‟. 
Although it is not defined by the Act, „life partner‟ in this regard can also 
include a same-sex life partner. Since the coming into operation of the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act 5 of 2001 same-sex life partners have also 
been included in the definition of „spouse‟ in the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 
1949, the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 and the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
                                                             
87
  J at par 24. 
88
  For a detailed discussion of statutory recognition see Schäfer in Clark (ed) Family 
law service (1988) at pars R11-R36. See also.par 2.7.1 above. 
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4.3.4 CONTINUED PROTECTION AND RECOGNITION UNDER 
LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE 
ENACTMENT OF THE CIVIL UNION ACT 2006 
 
4.3.4.1 GENERAL 
 
The Civil Union Act did not alter or displace the pre-existing rights 
extended to same-sex life partners by legislation and judicial 
developments. Importantly, the constitutional court in Gory v Kolver89 
confirmed that any change in the law pursuant to Minister of Home Affairs 
v Fourie90 did not automatically amend those statutes where the reading-in 
of words was used as a remedy to give effect to gay men and lesbian 
women‟s constitutional rights to equality and dignity.91 This includes, for 
example, the right of same-sex couples to adopt children jointly, to enjoy 
immigration rights, pension benefits and the right to inherit intestate from 
each other.92 South African law, therefore, attributes limited legal 
consequences to same-sex life partnerships which impersonate civil 
marriage although the life partnerships are not solemnised and registered 
under the Civil Union Act.  
 
However, the legal position relating to the acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights by permanent same-sex life partners by means 
of artificial fertilisation has been amended by section 40 of the Children‟s 
Act 38 of 2005. Section 40(1)(a) of the Children‟s Act excludes same-sex 
life partners from its ambit because it only makes provision for married 
persons to be regarded as the parents of a child born as a result of 
artificial fertilisation. The legal consequences of section 40 of the 
Children‟s Act on same-sex life partners and children born as a result of 
artificial fertilisation from a permanent same-sex life partnership will be 
discussed next. 
                                                             
89
  2007 4 SA 97 (CC). 
90
  2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
91
  Gory at par 28. 
92
  See Chapter 2 pars 2.7.2.2 - 2.7.2.4 for a comprehensive discussion of the 
extension of spousal benefits and rights to same-sex life partners in a same-sex 
life partnership. 
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4.3.4.2 CHILDREN BORN FROM A PERMANENT SAME-SEX LIFE 
PARTNERSHIP  AS A RESULT OF ARTIFICIAL 
FERTILISATION 
 
In J v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs93 the constitutional 
court declared section 5 of the Children‟s Status Act 82 of 1987 
unconstitutional because this section differentiated between married and 
unmarried couples in that a child born to a married couple as a result of 
artificial fertilisation was regarded as their legitimate child while in the case 
of unmarried parents the child was regarded as extra-marital. The court 
held that section 5 unfairly discriminated between married couples and 
same-sex life partners and amounted to unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of marital status and sexual orientation in terms of section 9(3) of 
the Constitution. Furthermore, the differentiation between children born 
through artificial fertilisation to married and unmarried parents constituted 
unfair discrimination on the grounds of social origin and birth.94 The 
unconstitutionality was corrected by the reading in of the words „or 
permanent same-sex life partner‟ in various parts of section 5.  
 
The amended Children‟s Status Act was repealed as a whole by the 
Children‟s Act.95 Section 40 of the latter Act re-enacted section 5 of the 
unamended Children‟s Status Act which excluded permanent same-sex 
life partners from its ambit. Section 40(1)(a) of the Children‟s Act states 
that: 
 
„Whenever the gamete96 or gametes of any person other than a 
married person or his or her spouse have been used with the 
consent of both such spouses for the artificial fertilisation97 of one 
spouse, any child born of that spouse as a result of artificial 
fertilisation must for all purposes be regarded to be the child of 
                                                             
93
  2003 5 SA 621 (CC). On this case, see also par 2.7.2.4 above. 
94
  J at par 27. 
95
  S 313 read with Schedule 4 of the Children‟s Act.  
96
  For a definition of „gamete‟ see fn 180 of Chapter 3. 
97
  For a definition of „artificial fertilisation‟ see fn 179 of Chapter 3.  
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those spouses as if the gamete or gametes of those spouses had 
been used for such artificial fertilisation‟. 
 
The effect of this provision is that a child who is born of same-sex life 
partners as a result of artificial fertilisation is regarded as a child born of 
„unmarried parents‟.98 In terms of section 40(2) of the Children‟s Act, the 
same-sex life partner who gives birth to the child is regarded as the child‟s 
parent if her ovum was used for the artificial fertilisation and only she 
acquires full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child in 
terms of section 19(1) of the Children‟s Act.99 Section 40(3) expressly 
provides that no right, responsibility, duty or obligation arises between a 
child born of a woman as a result of artificial fertilisation and the gamete 
donor unless the donor is the child‟s birth mother.100 Thus, only the birth 
mother is deemed to be the child‟s parent. She, inter alia, has an 
obligation to maintain the child and the child has a claim against her for 
maintenance to the exclusion of the birth mother‟s permanent same-sex 
life partner.  
 
Unlike section 40(1)(a) of the Act which disregards the biological 
contribution of the gamete donor in the case of artificial fertilisation of a 
married person, section 40(2) does not deem an unmarried woman‟s 
gametes to have been used for her artificial fertilisation.101 The effect of 
this provision is that in the cases where a same-sex life partner is 
artificially inseminated using the ova (in vitro fertilisation) of the other 
same-sex life partner the latter might qualify as the child‟s biological 
                                                             
98
   With the enactment of the Children‟s Act „the law shifted its emphasis from labelling 
children to labelling the marital status of their parents‟. A child is now referred to as 
„a child born of married parents‟ and „a child born of unmarried parents‟. See ss 19-
21, 38, 40 and 233 of the Children‟s Act. See also Heaton South African law of 
persons (2008) 3
rd
 ed 49. 
99
   „The biological mother of a child, whether married or unmarried, has full parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of the child‟: s 19(1). Parental responsibilities 
and rights consist of the responsibility and the right to care for the child; to maintain 
contact with the child; to act as the guardian of the child; and to contribute to the 
maintenance of the child: s 19(2). 
100
  S 40(3)(a). 
101
  See Heaton „Parental responsibilities and rights‟ in Davel and Skelton (eds) 
Commentary on the Children’s Act (2007) 3-7. 
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parent,102 „for biological motherhood is not a right, responsibility, duty or 
obligation as envisaged by section 40(3)‟; it is a biological fact.103 Although 
the ovum donor may qualify as the biological mother of the child, she does 
not acquire any parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child 
because the definition of „parent‟ in section 1 of the Act excludes any 
person who is biologically related to a child by reason only of being a 
gamete donor for purposes of artificial fertilisation. 
 
The same-sex life partner who did not give birth to the child will only 
acquire full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child if she 
adopts the child.104 A further possibility for the acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights is entering into a parental responsibilities and 
rights agreement with the mother of the child. A person having an interest 
in the care, well-being and development of the child may enter into a 
parental responsibilities and rights agreement with the mother.105 The 
mother‟s same-sex life partner qualifies as such a person. A same-sex life 
partner can further apply for the court-ordered assignment of care, contact 
and guardianship.106 
 
The constitutionality of section 40 of the Children‟s Act can be challenged 
on the same grounds that led to the declaration of unconstitutionality of 
section 5 of Children‟s Status Act in the J case.107 It can be argued that 
section 40 of the Children‟s Act differentiates between married and 
unmarried couples and constitutes discrimination on the grounds of marital 
                                                             
102
  The Act does not define the term „biological parent‟ but in the absence of surrogacy 
or artificial fertilisation using a donor‟s ovum the term clearly refers to the child‟s 
birth mother: see in this regard Heaton „Parental responsibilities and rights‟ in 
Davel and Skelton (eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act (2007) 3-6. 
103
  Heaton „Parental responsibilities and rights‟ in Davel and Skelton (eds) Commentary on 
the Children’s Act (2007) 3-43. 
104
  S 17(c) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. See also s 231(1)(c) of the Children‟s 
Act.  
105
   S 22 of the Children‟s Act. This section did not come into operation on 1 July 2007 
when some sections of the Act were brought into force: see Government Gazette 
30030 of 27 June 2007. 
106
  S 23 and 24 of the Children‟s Act. These sections also did not come into operation 
on 1 July 2007 when some sections of the Act were brought into force: see 
Government Gazette 30030 of 27 June 2007. 
107  For a discussion of J see the first paragraph above under this heading and Chapter 
2 at par 2.7.2.4. 
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status and sexual orientation108 which is presumed to be unfair in terms of 
section 9(5) of the Constitution. On the other hand it can be argued that 
same-sex couples now have the option to enter into a legally recognised 
civil union under the Civil Union Act and that any discrimination that 
section 40 may constitute can be justified on the ground that the partners 
chose not to make their relationship official.109  
 
I argue that section 40 ignores the existence and development of other 
family forms as recognised by the constitutional court in various cases. 
„Family means different things to different people, and the failure to adopt 
the traditional family form of marriage may stem from a multiplicity of 
reasons ─ all of them equally valid and all of them equally worthy of 
concern, respect, consideration, and protection under the law‟.110 The 
failure to include same-sex life partners in the ambit of section 40 clearly 
amounts to a violation of section 9(1) of the Constitution, which 
guarantees everyone equality before the law and equal protection and 
benefit of the law.  
 
Families come in different shapes and sizes and the definition of what a 
family encompasses changes as social practices and traditions change.111 
„In recognising the importance of the family, we must take care not to 
entrench particular forms of family at the expense of other forms‟.112 
Section 40 entrenches two particular forms of family life, namely a civil 
marriage and a civil union,113 and denies the same-sex life partner who did 
not give birth to the child as a result of artificial fertilisation a right to family 
life, which constitutes a violation of the inherent dignity of such a same-
sex life partner in terms of section 10 of the Constitution.114 
                                                             
108
  S 9(3) of the Constitution, 1996. 
109
   Heaton South African law of persons (2008) 3
rd
 ed 51. See also Louw „The 
acquisition of shared parental responsibility by same-sex civil union partners‟ 
(2007) Obiter 324 at 327. 
110
  Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC) at par 11. 
111
  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) at par 31. 
112
  Dawood at par 31. 
113
  S 13(2) of the Civil Union Act which equates a civil union and a civil marriage. 
114
  See fn 91 Chapter 3 for a discussion of the right to dignity, which encompasses the 
right to family life. 
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I further submit that the exclusion of permanent same-sex life partners 
from the joint acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights of a child 
born as a result of artificial fertilisation is illogical. This submission is 
based on the extension of joint adoption rights to permanent same-sex life 
partners115 and the provision for the conclusion of a surrogate motherhood 
agreement116 by permanent same-sex life partners. Both adoption and 
surrogacy confer full parental responsibilities and rights upon permanent 
same-sex life partners. 
 
I recommend that section 40 of the Children‟s Act must be amended to 
include permanent same-sex life partners in its ambit. Such an 
amendment is further necessary because the Children‟s Act only makes 
provision for the acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights by the 
child‟s biological mother and married or unmarried fathers; the position of 
same-sex parents is therefore unsatisfactory. This amendment will provide 
a child born from a permanent same-sex life partnership as a result of 
artificial fertilisation with parental care as required by section 28(1)(b) of 
the Constitution and will be a true reflection of the democratic values of 
equality and dignity which our Constitution aspires to. 
 
4.4  ESSENTIAL CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A SAME-
SEX LIFE PARTNERSHIP 
 
Same-sex life partnerships fall outside the ambit of the Civil Union Act but 
still remain a legally recognised family form because the latter Act did not 
displace or alter pre-existing rights extended to same-sex life partners. 
Permanent same-sex life partnerships have not been defined in a 
comprehensive manner. It is submitted that in order for such a life 
partnership to exist and to confer entitlements to certain spousal benefits 
on the parties the presence of following criteria is essential.  
 
                                                             
115
  S 17 (a) the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. See also s 231(1)(a)(ii) Children‟s Act. 
116
  See Chapter 19 of the Children‟s Act. This chapter also did not come into operation 
on 1 July 2007 when some sections of the Act were brought into force: see 
Government Gazette 30030 of 27 June 2007. 
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4.4.1 CONSORTIUM OMNIS VITAE 
 
Under South African common law only a civil marriage (and now also a 
civil union)117 „creates a physical, moral and spiritual community of life‟118 – 
a consortium omnis vitae. This community of life includes „reciprocal 
obligations of cohabitation, fidelity and sexual intercourse‟.119 The concept 
„consortium omnis vitae‟ has not been defined in a comprehensive manner 
but it consists of various personality rights emanating from marriage and 
civil unions.120  It has been described as: 
 
„An abstraction comprising the totality of a number of rights, duties 
and advantages accruing to spouses of a marriage . . . These 
embrace intangibles, such as loyalty and sympathetic care and 
affection, concern, as well as the more material needs of life, such 
as physical care, financial support, the rendering of services in the 
running of the common household or in support-generating 
business‟.121 
 
In Grobbelaar v Havenga122 it was held that „companionship, love, 
affection, comfort, mutual services, sexual intercourse – all belong to the 
married state. Taken together, they make up the consortium’.  It can be 
concluded that „consortium‟ is termed „as an umbrella word for all the legal 
rights of one spouse to the company, affection, services and support of the 
other‟.123 
 
In National Coalition, Ackermann J, emphasised the accelerating process 
of transformation that has taken place in family relationships and 
specifically the reform relating to the societal and legal concept of family 
                                                             
117
  Cronjé and Heaton South African family law (2004) 2
nd
 ed 49. A civil union now 
also creates a consortium omnis vitae as one of its invariable consequences. 
118
  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) at par 33. See also 
Sinclair assisted by Heaton The law of marriage (1996) 422. 
119
  Dawood at par 33; Sinclair assisted by Heaton The law of marriage (1996) 423. 
120
  Wiese v Moolman 2009 3 SA 122 (T) 126. 
121
  Peter v Minister of Law and Order 1990 4 SA 6 (E) at 9G-H. 
122
  1964 3 SA 522 (N). 
123
  Peter at 9F. 
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and what it encompass.124 He referred to submissions made by Sinclair 
and Heaton125 that the South African „heterogeneous society is  fissured 
by difference of language, religion, race, cultural habit, historical 
experience and self-definition and, consequently, reflects widely varying 
expectations about marriage, family life and the position of women in 
society‟.126 In response to the pluralism and diversity of our society, 
Ackermann J acknowledged and confirmed the ability of gay men and 
lesbian women to establish a consortium omnis vitae.127  
 
I argue that the presence of a consortuim omnis vitae is a sine qua non for 
a same-sex life partnership to qualify for the extension of certain benefits 
associated with the institution of marriage. The onus rests on the same-
sex life partners to prove on a balance of probabilities that they have 
created a consortium. 
 
4.4.2 THE INTENTION OF CREATING A PERMANENT SAME-SEX 
LIFE PARTNERSHIP 
 
It is impossible to determine the exact moment at which a same-sex 
relationship becomes a permanent same-sex life partnership.128 In all the 
cases where constitutional protection and recognition were requested 
same-sex partners had to prove the existence of a permanent life 
partnership. The meaning of „permanence‟ in this context refers to „an 
established intention of the parties to cohabit with one another 
                                                             
124
  National Coalition at par 47.  
125
 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The law of marriage (1996) 7 citing Ken Owen „One 
nation or several? Radical oligarchy or hodgepodge of tribes? Is diversity the glory 
of South Africa, or its cross?‟ Business Day 26 June 1990. 
126
  National Coalition at par 47. 
127
  National Coalition at par 53. 
128
  Schäfer in Clark (ed) Family law service (1988) at par R6. See also Wood-Bodley 
„Establishing the existence of a same-sex life partnership for the purposes of 
intestate succession‟ (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 259 at 261 and 
Schäfer „Marriage and marriage-like relationships: Constructing a new hierarchy of 
life partnerships‟ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 626 at 629. 
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permanently‟.129 The partners must therefore have the intention of being in 
a permanent life partnership as opposed to a temporary one.130  
 
The intention of permanence must not be confused with the duration of the 
same-sex life partnership. In most of the cases concerning the recognition 
of same-sex life partnerships the partners had cohabitated for lengthy 
periods. For example, in Farr v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd131 
the partners cohabitated for 10 years; in Satchwell v President of the 
Republic of South Africa132 the partners cohabitated for 15 years; in Du 
Toit v Minister for Welfare and Population Development133 the partners 
cohabitated for 12 years. However, in Gory v Kolver134 the partners 
cohabited for a period of only about 10 months before the relationship was 
ended by the death of one of the partners. Although the partners 
cohabited for a short period the court found that, based on the evidence 
adduced, the partners had committed themselves in a „permanent 
partnership in which the partners had undertaken reciprocal duties of 
support‟.135 A long period of cohabitation is therefore not an essential 
requirement for a permanent same-sex life partnership. The existence of a 
permanent same-sex life partnership is a question of fact which must be 
determined in light of the intention of the partners as established by the 
facts and circumstances of each case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
129
  National Coalition at par 86. 
130
  Wood-Bodley „Establishing the existence of a same-sex life partnership for the 
purposes of intestate succession‟ (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 259 at 
261. 
131
  2000 3 SA 684 (C). On this case, see also par 2.7.2.3 above. 
132
  2002 6 SA 1 (CC), 2003 4 SA 266 (CC). On this case, see also par 2.7.2.2 above. 
133
  2003 2 SA 198 (CC). On this case, see also par 2.7.2.4 above. 
134
  2007 4 SA 97 (CC). On this case, see also par 2.7.2.2 above. 
135
  Gory at par 51. 
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4.5 DRAFT DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP BILL 2008 
 
In 2001 the South African Law Reform Commission undertook an 
investigation into the recognition of domestic partnerships.136 In 2003 the 
Commission published a Discussion Paper 104 which contained 
recommendations to regulate the legal consequences of domestic 
partnerships.137 The Commission‟s investigation led to the Draft Domestic 
Partnership Bill, 2008138 which makes provision for the regulation of both 
registered139 and unregistered domestic partnerships.140 
 
The objectives of the Draft Bill are to ensure the rights of equality and 
dignity of the partners in domestic partnerships and to reform family law to 
comply with the applicable provisions of the Bill of Rights.141 The Draft Bill 
makes provision for the recognition of the legal status of domestic 
partners, regulation of the rights and obligations of domestic partners, 
protection of the interests of both domestic partners and interested parties 
on the termination of domestic partnerships, and final determination of the 
financial relationship between the domestic partners and between 
domestic partners and interested parties when the domestic partnership 
terminates.142  
 
In respect of registered domestic partnerships the Draft Bill sets out the 
registration procedure,143 the applicable property regime,144 the duty of 
support145 and the termination procedure.146 It further makes provision for 
the welfare of minor children147 born of the registered domestic partnership 
                                                             
136
  Issue Paper 17 (Project 118) (2001) Domestic Partnerships. 
137
  Report on Project 118 (2006). Domestic Partnerships  
138
  See Government Gazette 30663 of 14 January 2008. 
139
  Chapter 3 of the Draft Bill. 
140
  Chapter 4 of the Draft Bill. 
141
  Clause 2. 
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  Clause 2. 
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  Clause 6. 
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  Clause 7. 
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  Clause 9. 
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  Clause 12. 
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  Clause 16. 
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and maintenance obligations after termination or in the event of the death 
of one of the domestic partners.148 
 
In respect of an unregistered domestic partnership the Draft Bill makes 
provision for the division of property upon termination149 and liability for 
maintenance after the termination of the domestic partnership or in the 
event of the death of one of the domestic partners.150  
 
4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The legal recognition of a form of a conjugal relationship other than a civil 
marriage or a civil union – a permanent same-sex life partnership – is the 
result of constitutional jurisprudence in family law and the transformation 
of the concept „family‟ and what it encompasses. Rights and duties 
continue to accrue to same-sex partners by virtue of their permanent 
same-sex life partnership even after the coming into operation of the Civil 
Union Act. However, the constitutional court judgment in Volks NO v 
Robinson151 will most probably have an impact on future claims by 
permanent same-sex life partners. In this case, the constitutional court 
reassessed the objective model of choice and confirmed that certain rights 
and duties which are attached by law to marriage need not be extended to 
non-marital life partners since they have chosen not to make their 
relationship official. The next chapter will address the constitutional aspect 
of the continued protection of same-sex life partnerships which are not 
solemnised and registered under Civil Union Act and will further deal with 
the constitutionality of the Civil Union Act as a separate measure to 
regulate same-sex marriage.  
 
                                                             
148
  Clauses 18 and 19. 
149
  Clause 28. 
150
  Clauses 28 and 29. 
151
  2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC). 
 122 
„By its very nature, the quality of fairness, like that of the mercy of justice, is not strained. The 
enquiry as to what is fair in our new constitutional democracy accordingly does not pass 
easily through the eye of the needle of black-letter law. Judicial dispassion does not exclude 
judicial compassion; the question of fairness must be rigorously dealt with, in a people-
centred and not a rule-centred way‟.
1
 
 
 
 
5 CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS PERTAINING TO SAME-SEX LIFE 
PARTNERSHIPS THAT FALL OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE CIVIL 
UNION ACT OF 2006 AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
CIVIL UNION ACT AS A SEPARATE MEASURE TO REGULATE 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter, firstly, consists of a critical discussion of the continued 
conferment of „spousal‟ benefits on partners in permanent same-sex life 
partnerships since the coming into operation of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
on 30 November 2006 and in view of the reassessment of the objective model 
of choice by the constitutional court in Volks NO v Robinson.2 It will be 
submitted that the social reality of homophobic hate crimes within our society 
together with generated „felt stigma‟ and „internalized homophobia‟ of certain 
gay men and lesbian women require continued conferment of spousal benefits 
on those couples who are unable to make their relationship official. It will 
further be submitted that continued recognition of same-sex life partnerships 
is supported by the notion of substantive equality which encompasses a 
restitutionary concept of equality. Substantive equality further requires a more 
transformatory approach in order to achieve a society based on equality.  A 
transformatory approach places emphasis on a more radical understanding of 
society within its social and historical contexts. In essence, transformative 
change dictates a rejection of legal formalism and requires an understanding 
of law as a product of social relations.3  
                                               
1
  As per Sachs J in his minority judgement in Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) 
at par 152. 
2
  2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC). 
3
  Albertyn „Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa‟ (2007) 23 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 235 at 258. 
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The second main constitutional issue that is dealt with in this chapter is the 
constitutionality of the Civil Union Act as a separate measure to regulate 
same-sex marriage. In order to determine whether the Act is constitutionally 
tenable it is, firstly, necessary to ascertain if the Act complies with the guiding 
principles as set out by the constitutional court in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fourie.4 This will be followed by a critical discussion of the enactment of a civil 
union regime for same-sex couples as an alternative to civil marriage 
available to heterosexual couples only. The chapter will conclude with an 
analysis of the implication of the judicial deference to the legislature by the 
constitutional court in Fourie. 
 
5.2 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CONTINUED CONFERMENT 
OF SPOUSAL BENEFITS ON SAME-SEX LIFE PARTNERS AFTER 
THE COMING INTO OPERATION OF THE CIVIL UNION ACT 
 
5.2.1 A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF VOLKS NO V ROBINSON AND ITS 
RELEVANCE FOR SAME-SEX LIFE PARTNERS 
 
5.2.1.1 DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO 
 
In this case, the court a quo,5 the Western Cape high court, Cape Town, 
declared section 2(1) of the Maintenance of the Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 
19906 read together with the definition of the word „survivor‟ in section 1 of the 
Act7 unconstitutional. The declaration of unconstitutionality was based on the 
finding that the omission from the provisions of the Act of partners in a 
permanent life partnership constituted a violation of the right to dignity in terms 
of section 10 of the Constitution and also the right to equality in terms of 
section 9 of the Constitution. It, in particular, constituted unfair discrimination 
on the ground of marital status in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution. In 
                                               
4
 2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
5
  Robinson v Volks 2004 6 SA 288 (C). 
6
  „If a marriage is dissolved by death after the commencement of this Act the survivor 
shall have a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse for the provision of his 
reasonable maintenance needs until his death or remarriage insofar as he is not able to 
provide therefore from his own means and earnings‟: s 2(1). 
7
  A survivor is defined as „the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by death‟: s 1. 
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delivering his judgement, Davis J emphasised that „one of the core 
commitments of our constitutional society is the recognition of the dignity of 
difference‟.8 Davis J further acknowledged that domestic partnerships are an 
important part of South African family law and that the effect of the failure to 
take cognisance of its existence „is to undermine the dignity of difference and 
to render the guarantee of equality somewhat illusory insofar as a significant 
percentage of the population is concerned‟.9 He then ordered the amendment 
of section 1 of the Maintenance of the Surviving Spouses Act to include 
partners in a permanent life partnership within the provisions of the Act. The 
declaration of unconstitutionality was then referred to the constitutional court 
for confirmation in terms of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution.  
 
5.2.1.2 THE MAJORITY JUDGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT 
 
In delivering the majority judgement of the constitutional court, Skweyiya J 
found that the relevant provisions of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act did not constitute a violation of the rights to equality and dignity of partners 
in a permanent life partnership. Skweyiya J held that the purpose of the 
provisions of the Act is clear in that it intends to provide for the reasonable 
maintenance needs of parties to a marriage that is dissolved by the death of 
one of the parties.10 „The aim is to extend an invariable consequence of 
marriage beyond the death of one of the parties‟.11 Skweyiya J concluded that 
the only sensible interpretation of „marriage‟ when viewed within the context of 
the Act is that it refers to a marriage that is either recognised by law or by 
religion and that it is illogical to include survivors of permanent life 
partnerships within the provisions of the Act.12 
 
He did, however, acknowledge that the Act distinguishes between married 
and unmarried couples, which amounts to discrimination on the ground of 
                                               
8
  Robinson at 299D. 
9
  Robinson at 299H-I. 
10
  Volks at par 39. 
11
  At par 39. 
12
  At pars 41 and 43. 
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marital status.13 In order to justify the marital status discrimination, Skweyiya J 
held that section 15(3)(a)(i) of the Constitution recognises the social 
importance of marriage in our society and that marriage creates one of the 
most important bases for family life in our society. He held that the law may in 
appropriate cases extend benefits to married couples to the exclusion of 
unmarried couples.14 Skweyiya J concluded that the Constitution does not 
require a duty to be imposed upon the deceased‟s estate unless such a duty 
arose by operation of the law during the deceased‟s lifetime. To place such a 
burden on the deceased estate would be „incongruous, unfair, irrational and 
untenable‟.15 
 
With regard to the question of whether the provisions of the Act constituted a 
violation of the right to dignity of a life partner, the court held that the dignity of 
a life partner is not less worthy than the dignity of someone who is married 
and that the right to dignity of a life partner is not violated by merely informing 
him or her that there is a fundamental difference between a marriage and a 
life partnership in relation to maintenance.16 Married couples are obliged to 
maintain each other by operation of the law but life partners are not in that 
position and accordingly „it is not appropriate that an obligation that did not 
exist before death be posthumously imposed‟.17 
 
In his concurring judgement, Ngcobo J emphasised marriage‟s being „a matter 
of choice‟. „Marriage is a manifestation of that choice and more importantly, 
the acceptance of the consequences of a marriage‟.18 Ngcobo J further held 
that the law places no legal impediment on the capacity of heterosexual life 
partners to enter into marriage. By choosing not to enter into a marriage they 
deny themselves the rights and duties associated with marriage.19 He 
concluded that an extension of legal consequences to life partners under 
                                               
13
  At par 50. 
14
  At pars 52 and 54. 
15
  At par 60. 
16
  At par 62. 
17
  At par 62. 
18
  At par 93. 
19
  At pars 91 and 92. 
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these circumstances would undermine the right freely to marry and would 
accordingly be unacceptable.20 
 
5.2.1.3 THE MINORITY JUDGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
In their minority judgement, Mokgoro and O‟Regan JJ disagreed strongly with 
the views expressed in the majority judgement. Both judges acknowledged 
marriage as an institution of great legal significance21 but argued that the 
views expressed by the majority ignored the current position in South African 
society where a significant part of the population described themselves as 
„living together like married partners‟ although they were not married.22 The 
approach by the majority defeats the important constitutional objective of 
section 9(3) of the Constitution to prohibit discrimination on the ground of 
marital status. It further fails to take cognisance of the historical position in our 
country in which only certain marriages were recognised as deserving of legal 
regulation and protection to the exclusion of vulnerable groups, for example, 
permanent life partners. The effect of the majority decision is that only 
„marriage will inevitably remain privileged‟.23  
 
Mokgoro and O‟Regan JJ held that: 
 
 „It is . . . a constitutional prescript that families that are established 
outside of civilly recognised marriages should not be subjected to unfair 
discrimination‟.24 
 
They further held that the unfairness of discrimination in this case is not 
primarily based on the fact that life partners are not afforded equivalent rights 
as opposed to married couples in terms of section 2(1) of the Act. The 
discrimination is created by the fact that neither section 2(1) of the Act nor any 
other legal rule regulates the rights of surviving partners in a life partnership 
                                               
20
  At par 94.   
21
  At par 118. 
22
  At par 119. 
23
  At par 118. 
24
  At par 107. 
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which is socially and functionally similar to marriage when that life partnership 
is terminated by death and the surviving partner is in financial need.25 
Mokgoro and O‟Regan JJ concluded that although marriage plays an 
important role in our society and is valued by most religions, the Constitution 
forbids the limitation of rights solely to advance certain religious views and 
that the unfair discrimination on the ground of marital status was not 
justifiable.26   
 
Sachs J agreed with the minority judgement of Mokgoro and O‟Regan JJ but 
his approach was based on a different legal landscape. Sachs J held that the 
question of fairness of excluding surviving life partners from the benefits of the 
Act cannot be assessed by the constricted rules established by matrimonial 
law, but should rather be viewed within the „broader and more situation-
sensitive framework of the principles of family law, principles that are evolving 
rapidly in our new constitutional era‟.27 Under the stimulus of a new 
constitutional dispensation, family law represents a definite change from a 
definitional approach to marriage to a functional approach to the family.28  
 
According to the definitional approach only those individuals who comply with 
the current definition of marriage are entitled to the rights and obligations 
attached by law to marriage, with the result that only a legally valid marriage 
can create a family worthy of legal protection.29 The functional approach on 
the other hand proposes that the definition of marriage must reflect the 
function it performs within society. In other words, such an approach 
dispenses with the legal requirements of marriage and focuses solely on the 
way in which a group of people functions.30 This functional approach is also 
endorsed by the South African Law Reform Commission. According to the 
Commission‟s Discussion Paper 104 Project 118 the exclusive nature of the 
common-law definition of marriage disregards the social reality that is 
experienced by most members of our society. The Commission states that it 
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has become inevitable to define family in accordance with the functional 
approach in order to extend benefits to individuals who do not fit the traditional 
family form.31 Sachs J held that such an approach displays greater fairness 
and brings the law in line with social reality and furthermore harmonises the 
law with the values underlying the Constitution.32  
 
Sachs J emphasised that a flexible and evolutionary approach to family life is 
essential in our democratic society in which pluralism and diversity are 
acknowledged.33 Domestic partnerships as a form of family life provide mutual 
support and promote respect for stable family life and should not be subjected 
to moral prejudice because they are unconventional.34 Sachs J concluded that 
if a „familial nexus of such proximity and intensity‟ is established, rights must 
be extended to permanent unmarried life partners.35 
 
5.2.1.4 REPERCUSSIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S MODEL 
OF CHOICE 
 
The view of the majority judgement in the Volks case is clearly based on the 
freedom of choice principle. This principle demands that the law must not 
intervene or attach consequences to relationships where parties choose not to 
enter into a legally valid marriage.36 This approach assesses the availability of 
„choice‟ by merely focusing on the presence or absence of legal impediments 
to marriage. Choice is viewed as an „all or nothing concept‟ which is based on 
the understanding that choices are exercised by free, autonomous 
individuals.37  
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  Wood-Bodley „Intestate succession and gay and lesbian couples‟ (2008) 125 South 
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This essentially libertarian view is in conflict with the notion of substantive 
equality which requires an understanding of choice that reflects the 
„constraints as coming from history, from the operation of power and 
dominance, from socialisation, or from class, race and gender‟. This notion of 
choice accordingly fails to take cognisance of the oppressive legal system 
which had a severe impact on the way many families were formed. 38 The 
majority judgement is unsatisfactory because it ignores the context in which 
choices are made and the impact thereof on individuals; it privileges the 
institution of marriage only and fails to embrace a contextual or progressive 
idea of cohabitation.39  
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, spousal benefits continue to accrue to 
partners in a permanent same-sex life partnership even after the enactment of 
the Civil Union Act which confers marital rights upon same-sex couples. The 
social and legal impact of the Volks judgement together with the enactment of 
the Civil Union Act on same-sex unions is twofold. Firstly, certain spousal 
benefits continue to accrue to partners in a same-sex life partnership to the 
exclusion of partners in a heterosexual life partnership, which amounts to 
differential treatment. Secondly, based on the view of the majority in Volks, 
the continued extension of spousal benefits to same-sex life partners can no 
longer be justified because such life partners have exercised a choice not to 
enter into a civil union and must therefore forfeit the rights and obligations 
associated with a civil union just as heterosexual life partners forfeit the rights 
and obligations associated with a civil marriage or civil union.  
 
The extension of marriage rights to same-sex couples provides legal 
protection and social affirmation to same-sex couples whose relationships 
mimic the traditional heterosexual institution of marriage, but it ignores the 
social and economic reality of many individuals who are not in a position to 
„choose‟ to formalise their relationship by entering into a civil union: for many 
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  Ibid. 
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the purported „choice‟ is no choice at all.40 I argue that in view of ongoing 
homophobia in our society it will be unwise to force same-sex life partners to 
formalise their relationship. Furthermore, the notion of substantive equality 
dictates the protection and recognition of family forms that differ from the 
traditional nuclear family which initially generated the framework which 
excluded „deviant‟ family forms. The impact of homophobia as a social reality 
will be discussed next and will be followed by a discussion of the notion of 
substantive equality to justify the continued recognition of same-sex life 
partnerships. 
 
5.2.2 HOMOPHOBIA: A SOCIAL REALITY  
 
The freedom-of-choice principle fails to consider the context within which 
same-sex couples make choices whether or not to enter into a civil union. 
According to Wood-Bodley the extent of homophobic views in our society 
should not be „underestimated or discounted‟.41 For example, research has 
revealed that gays and lesbians are still being refused treatment by health-
care practitioners because of their sexual orientation; it has been reported that 
several same-sex couples have been turned away by or insulted by members 
of the Department of Home Affairs when they wanted to enter into a civil 
union; discrimination at the workplace has been reported as well as difficulty 
in finding work if the applicants professed to be gay or lesbian.42 
 
The increased occurrences of homophobic hate crimes are one of the most 
profound reasons for not being openly gay or lesbian. According to the 
Southern Africa Report, the South African Police Services have struggled to 
create a culture of rights awareness within their ranks with the result that 
victims of homophobic hate crimes cannot be reassured of a sympathetic 
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 De Vos „Same-sex sexual desire and the re-imagining of the South African family‟ 
(2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 179 at 199; Goldblatt „Regulating 
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law‟ (2003) 120 South African Law Journal 610 at 616. 
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reception by the police.43 Murder, sexual assault, rape and verbal abuse are 
mostly associated with homophobic hate crimes.44  
 
Wood-Bodley emphasises the fact that gays and lesbians need not personally 
be victim of homophobic hate crimes or hate speech in order to be affected by 
it.45 Homosexual individuals who are indirectly affected by homophobic 
conduct experience what some psychologists describe as „felt stigma‟, which 
refers to „an individual‟s subjective experience of stigma against her or his 
group, including her or his awareness of the stigma‟s prevalence and 
manifestations even without having directly experienced enacted stigma‟.46  
„Felt stigma‟ often motivates individuals with a stigmatised condition to engage 
in pre-emptive, protective behaviours in order to avoid enactments of stigma. 
For example, these individuals may avoid contact with groups of people with 
homophobic views or may even attempt to conform to heterosexual behaviour 
in order to avoid enacted stigma.47 
 
The condition of „internalized homophobia‟ must also be mentioned. 
„Internalized homophobia‟ becomes apparent when gays and lesbians 
internalise society‟s negative dogma about sexual minorities. It results, inter 
alia, in an unwillingness to disclose one‟s homosexuality to others and the 
acceptance of societal stereotypes about homosexuality.48   
 
From the above discussion it is clear that many gay men and lesbian women 
may find it difficult or even impossible to choose to enter into a civil union. As 
De Vos correctly points out: 
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 „In a sexist, patriarchal and homophobic society, a society in which many 
individuals depend on others for their social and economic survival, it will 
often be difficult or even impossible for individuals to “choose” to marry 
their same-sex sweethearts. Such a “choice” would require an individual 
in some form of same-sex intimate relationship to come out of the closet 
and to openly live the life of a “homosexual”, thus inviting rejection, 
hatred and violence.‟49  
 
5.2.3 THE APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY TO 
ERADICATE SYSTEMIC INEQUALITIES  
 
Continued protection and recognition of permanent same-sex life partnerships 
are further supported by the notion of substantive equality. Substantive 
equality requires the law to guarantee the outcome of equality and to endure 
differential treatment to achieve this goal.50 A substantive conception of 
equality further requires an examination of the actual social and historical 
treatment of groups in order to establish whether the Constitution‟s 
commitment to equality is being upheld.51 The concept of substantive equality 
encompasses a conception of „restitutionary equality‟52 as envisaged by 
section 9(2) of the Constitution which states that: 
 
„Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.‟ 
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Section 9(2) of the Constitution is also known as the affirmative action clause. 
Affirmative action entails preferential treatment for all groups of people who 
were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination and therefore includes gay men 
and lesbian women, who where historically subjected to unfair discrimination 
on the grounds of their sexual orientation and marital status.53 Segregation 
and apartheid created a social and economic imbalance in society that 
favoured people who conformed to the heterosexual norm of behaviour and 
unfairly discriminated against homosexuals, who were branded as outcasts 
and deviants. The right to equality dictates more than mere prohibition of 
discrimination or unequal treatment by the state or private individuals; it 
imposes a positive obligation on the government to enact certain measures to 
ensure that everyone fully and equally enjoys all rights and freedoms.54 
Affirmative action must therefore be viewed as a „substantive and composite 
part‟ of the right to equality.55  
 
The retention of spousal benefits for permanent same-sex life partners by 
means of judicial developments and statutory provisions may therefore qualify 
as „measures‟ aimed at achieving substantive equality within the context of 
section 9(2) of the Constitution.56 In Minister of Finance v Van Heerden57 the 
constitutional court held that the enquiry to determine whether a „measure‟ 
falls within the ambit of section 9(2) is threefold: 
 
 „The first yardstick relates to whether the measure targets persons or 
categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination; the second is whether the measure is designed to 
protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; and the 
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third requirement is whether the measure promotes the achievement 
of equality.‟58 
 
The continued conferment of „spousal‟ benefits on same-sex life partners is 
based on the social reality that gays and lesbians are members of a 
vulnerable group who have been persecuted and marginalised by unfair 
discrimination in the past. The continued extension of „spousal‟ benefits 
amounts to measures designed to advance the social and economic status of 
gays and lesbians in society with the objective of eliminating the historical 
burden of inequality in order to promote the achievement of equality in our 
society.  
 
Based on a substantive approach to equality, the differentiation between 
homosexual and heterosexual couples does not amount to unfair 
discrimination on the ground of marital status. Discriminatory actions which 
are unfair in one context may not automatically be unfair in a different 
context.59 We need to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which 
recognises „that although a society which affords each human being equal 
treatment on the basis of equal worth . . . is our goal, we cannot achieve that 
goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before that goal 
is achieved‟.60 What is required in the circumstances is a conscientious 
understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action upon the particular 
group of people concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one 
which promotes the constitutional goal of equality or not.61  
 
Substantive equality further demands „transformatory‟ change as opposed to 
an inclusionary approach.62 An inclusionary approach to equality supports a 
liberal idea of inclusion into the status quo which broadens the umbrella of 
social recognition but fails to investigate the structural conditions that initiate 
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and propagate systemic inequalities.63 A transformatory approach on the 
other hand aims to address inequalities by shifting the power relation that 
maintains that status quo ‘by restructuring the underlying generative 
framework‟.64 
 
In most of the cases where social recognition was sought for same-sex life 
partners, courts reverted to a more inclusionary approach to equality. The 
extension of rights to same-sex life partnerships has been permitted to the 
extent that the life partnerships conform to the characteristics of an ideal 
marriage.65 The result is therefore „a society in which social inclusion is based 
on sameness, rather than difference, and which limits choice unless exercised 
within the stated boundaries of acceptable relationships‟.66  
 
The notion of inclusionary equality militates against the anti-subordination 
principle as envisaged by the constitutional court in National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice.67  In this case the court held that 
„the desire for equality is not a hope for the elimination of all difference‟ and 
that „the experience of subordination . . . lies behind the vision of equality‟.68 
Equality should not be confused with uniformity; equality entails „equal 
concern and respect across difference‟ and does not presuppose the 
suppression of difference.69  
 
The Constitution imposes an obligation on the law to acknowledge the 
variability of human beings and further requires the abolition of the notion of 
the exclusivity of marriage for establishing what is legally normative.70 The 
acknowledgment of human variability will broaden the scope of what is 
constitutionally normal in order to include the widest range of perspectives. It 
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will require a more revolutionary understanding of relationships and family law 
that is not governed by heterosexual marital norms or by the libertarian idea of 
choice but rather the enhancement of transformative ideas of diversity, human 
agency, context and choice.71 
 
5.2.4 TO SUMMARISE 
 
The Napoleonic proverb „cohabitants ignore the law and the law ignores them‟ 
can no longer be applied within South African family law.72 Social reality 
demands the recognition of different family forms, and this implies that the law 
and courts must move away from defining relationships in terms of marriage 
and must focus on the actual function that these relationships perform within 
society.73 Where life partnerships have created responsibilities for and 
expectations by partners, the law should intervene in that it must enforce such 
responsibilities and realise the partners‟ expectations.74 The recognition of life 
partnerships is further supported by the right to equality which prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of, inter alia, sexual orientation and marital 
status. Although the Constitution recognises the importance of marriage in 
section 15(3)(a)(i), it does not entrench the right to marry.75 Reserving 
marriage as the only institution worthy of legal protection and social 
recognition creates ongoing marginalisation of an already vulnerable group. 
The conservative view of the majority in Volks that privileges marriage 
compels individuals to conform to the idealised heterosexual marriage. The 
result will inevitably be that the consensual element of marriage is eliminated 
because marriage will become a juristic act which is „imposed, managed, 
organised, propagandised, and maintained by force‟.76 The objective model of 
choice militates against the right to equality, which is conceptualised as the 
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right to be different from the stated or unstated norm without suffering adverse 
consequences.77 „Transformatory change‟ is essential for the restructuring of 
the current framework that governs family relations in society. Such an 
approach will dismantle the current generative framework that governs family 
relations, which is marriage, in order to create a framework that acknowledges 
a variety of family forms. 
 
5.3 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CIVIL UNION ACT 17 OF 2006 
AS A SEPARATE MEASURE TO GOVERN SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
5.3.1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S GUIDING PRINCIPLES TO THE 
LEGISLATURE 
 
In delivering the majority judgement of the constitutional court in Minister of 
Home Affairs v Fourie,78 Sachs J emphasised that Parliament had to „avoid a 
remedy that on the face of it would provide equal protection, but would do so 
in a manner that in its context and application would be calculated to 
reproduce new forms of marginalisation‟.79 A remedy that would amount to a 
„separate but equal‟ approach would be unacceptable because it would serve 
„as a threadbare cloak for covering distaste for or repudiation by those in 
power of the group subjected to segregation‟.80 Differential treatment does not 
necessarily constitute a violation of the dignity of same-sex couples. However, 
the moment that a „separate but equal‟ approach amounts to repudiation or 
inferiority and perpetuates a caste-like status, it becomes intolerable within a 
constitutional paradigm.81 In essence, the constitutional court required that the 
legislative remedy must accord same-sex couples a public and private status 
equal to heterosexual couples and must also equate same-sex couples and 
heterosexual couples with regard to the tangible and intangible benefits 
associated with marriage. The remedy must further enhance the dignity of 
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same-sex couples by taking into account past unfair discrimination and 
continuing homophobia.82 
 
The constitutional court gave the legislature 12 months to rectify the 
unconstitutionality. Based on the extensive research already conducted by the 
South African Law Reform Commission on reform possibilities for same-sex 
marriage, the court concluded that the legislature would be able to fulfil its 
responsibility within this short period of time.  
 
5.3.2 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A CIVIL UNION REGIME AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO CIVIL MARRIAGE 
 
The Civil Union Act makes provision for same-sex couples and heterosexual 
couples to enter into either a marriage or civil partnership.83 At first glance the 
Act appears to comply with all the guiding principles provided by the 
constitutional court, but in view of the research conducted in Chapter 3 of this 
study it is evident that shortcomings within the Act may render it 
unconstitutional. For the purposes of the present chapter the question that 
must be answered is why the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 was never rectified 
after the constitutional court declared section 30(1) and the common-law 
definition of marriage to be unconstitutional. The effect of the enactment of the 
Civil Union Act as the remedy for the unconstitutionality of section 30(1) and 
the common-law definition is that heterosexual couples have a choice 
between the Marriage Act and Civil Union Act to formalise their relationships 
while same-sex couples are limited to the Civil Union Act only. The retention 
of the Marriage Act as an exclusive piece of legislation available to 
heterosexual couples only creates the impression that heterosexual couples 
remain „superior‟ and that the institution of marriage must be protected from 
„tainted‟ and „inferior‟ homosexual couples.84  
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Sinclair argues that the political and social pressure that caused the 
constitutional court to defer to the legislature caused the legislature to defer to 
the moral majority of society in formulating its remedy.85 This submission is 
based on the majority judgement in Fourie where Sachs J held that in finding 
an appropriate remedy, the moral and religious sensitivities of the case called 
for a more tentative approach and that public debates on the sacred and the 
secular were essential to satisfy the concerns of religious groups and 
traditional leaders.86 During the public participation process Parliament failed 
to comply with its constitutional duty, because it did not inform the public of 
the constitutional and legal limitation within which the participation process 
was supposed to take place.87 Sections 59(1) and 72(1)(a) of the Constitution 
oblige Parliament to „provide education that builds capacity for such 
participation‟ and to facilitate „learning and understanding in order to achieve 
meaningful involvement by ordinary citizens‟.88 This must be done in order to 
guarantee that the public participates in the law-making process in coherence 
with our democracy.89 The result of Parliament‟s failure to comply with its 
constitutional duty was a public participation process which turned into a 
homophobic outburst; an opportunity to advance arguments against the evils 
of homosexuality.90  
 
The public hostility against same-sex marriage certainly had an impact on the 
legislature‟s decision to enact separate legislation to regulate same-sex 
marriage. I submit that the inclusion of heterosexual couples within the ambit 
of the Civil Union Act was merely an attempt by the legislature to insure itself 
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against a claim that separate legislation for gays and lesbians is 
unacceptable.91  
 
Certain provisions of the Act apply only to same-sex couples, which renders 
the objectivity and constitutional commitment by the legislature to provide 
same-sex couples with an equal status that the law accords to heterosexual 
couples questionable. For example, the blanket exclusion of same-sex minors 
from entering into a civil union creates the impression that minors must first 
attain majority and some degree of maturity in order to establish their sexual 
orientation92 and that the legislature has a moral obligation to protect minors 
from formalised homosexual conduct. The discretion of ex officio marriage 
officers to refuse to solemnise same-sex unions on the grounds of 
religious/conscientious objection93 and the compulsory dual application to 
solemnise same-sex unions by religious institutions and religious marriage 
officers94 limit same-sex couples‟ access to formalisation of their 
relationships.95  
 
I submit that the Civil Union Act is a „separate and unequal‟ Act which confers 
a second-class marital status upon same-sex couples and further produces 
new forms of oppression and repudiation. This is clearly in conflict with the 
guiding principles of the constitutional court that the legislature should not 
provide a remedy that in its context and application would be calculated to 
produce new forms of marginalisation. In instances where individuals were 
already subjected to past unfair discrimination and never provided with equal 
concern and respect because of personal characteristics, for example, 
homosexual orientation, any additional differential treatment imposed by 
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legislation increases their unfair social characterisation and accordingly has a 
more severe impact on them, since they are already vulnerable.96 
 
The co-existence of the Marriage Act and Civil Union Act creates a threefold 
hierarchy within the institution of marriage ─ the heterosexual superior 
marriage under the Marriage Act; then the more inferior marriage or civil union 
between heterosexual couples; and lastly the marriage or civil union between 
homosexual couples.97 Until this hierarchy is removed, homosexual couples 
will remain inferior. It is therefore essential, from an integrative point of view, 
that same-sex couples and heterosexual couples be brought together under 
one common institution in order to eradicate the structural inequalities.98  
 
Based on the above submissions, I recommend the amendment of the 
Marriage Act by the insertion of a definition of „marriage‟ that extends 
marriage in terms of the Act to same-sex and opposite-sex couples; the 
amendment of the Act by the insertion of a definition of the word „spouse‟; and 
the amendment of the marriage formula in the Act to include the words „or 
spouse‟99 and that the Civil Union Act be declared unconstitutional.  
 
5.3.3  ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY  
 
In our constitutional realm there must be mutual respect and co-existence 
between the secular and the sacred based on the accommodation of 
diversity.100 The religious beliefs of some cannot be used to determine the 
constitutional rights of others. And, importantly, recognition should not be 
given to the view of the religious majority on marginalised homosexual 
members of our society. It is the function of our Constitution and law to step in 
and counteract rather than reinforce unfair discrimination against a minority 
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  M v H 1999 171 DLR 4
th
 ed 577 at par 63 as cited by Ackermann J in National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) at par 44. 
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  Idem, at 825. 
99
 Report on Project 118 (2006) Domestic Partnership at pars 5.6.6 and 5.6.7. 
100
  Fourie at par 98. 
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group.101 This was the view expressed by the majority judgement in Fourie but 
it did not accord with the relief ordered by the court. 
 
The judicial deference to the legislature in this case brings the transformative 
role of judges within the South African constitutional dispensation and the 
appropriate application of the doctrine of separation of powers into 
question.102 The Constitution vests the constitutional court with the power to 
declare any law inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent of 
its inconsistency and to make any order that is just and equitable.103 The 
constitutional court further has inherent power to develop the common law 
taking account of the interests of justice.104 With the exception of same-sex 
marriage, the constitutional court has in all its previous cases relating to 
sexual orientation applied its inherent power in order to determine appropriate 
relief. Sachs J was convinced that the moral and religious sensitivities of the 
Fourie case called for a more tentative approach and necessitated public 
participation but he ignored the reality that public sentiments are 
predominantly against the legalisation of same-sex marriage.105 These 
sentiments should not prevail if they result in the continued marginalisation of 
minorities. 
 
Bohler-Muller condemns the failure by the constitutional court to do justice to 
the particularity of the case and describes the decision as a retreat from 
„ethical responsibility‟ by the judiciary.106 Judges should rather „guide than 
constrain the potential of the judiciary to carve out an institutional role that 
contributes meaningfully to the social transformation of South African 
society‟.107 What is therefore needed is an appropriate balance between 
judicial alertness and deference, as our courts have wide powers that allow for 
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  Fourie at par 92. 
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106
  Ibid. See also Sinclair „A new definition of marriage: Gay and lesbian couples may 
marry‟ (2008) The International Survey of Family Law 397 at 400. 
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  Pieterse „Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights‟ (2004) 20 
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flexible and creative (original emphasis) judicial engagement.108 In Fourie the 
constitutional court clearly deferred to the legislature for political reasons.109  
The welfare and needs of a minority group were sacrificed in favour of public 
interest as well as in the interest of social stability and maintaining a good 
relationship with the legislature.110  
 
In sum, South Africa has made a giant leap forward by providing marriage 
rights to same-sex couples but it is impossible to ignore the fact that the Civil 
Union Act represents a cautious and tentative approach that is synonymous 
with the view of the majority in Fourie and the hostile majority of our society. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The continued conferment of spousal benefits on partners in same-sex life 
partnerships is justified in view of ongoing homophobia in society. 
Furthermore, section 9(2) of the Constitution permits differential treatment for 
all groups of people who were subjected to unequal treatment in the past in 
order to alleviate social and economic imbalances that were created by 
segregation. Importantly, substantive equality necessitates transformatory 
change to eradicate systemic inequalities imposed by apartheid. The 
extension of marital rights to same-sex couples is insufficient to address social 
inequalities because it maintains the status quo which initially excluded same-
sex couples from legal recognition. The ongoing protection of same-sex life 
partnerships as a family form is, therefore, essential for the achievement of a 
society based on equality. The Civil Union Act as a „separate and unequal‟ 
measure to govern same-sex marriage indicates the prevalence of civil 
marriage as an exclusive institution available to heterosexual couples only. In 
essence, the guarantee of democratic tolerance for all who belong to South 
Africa still remains somewhat illusory. 
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The next chapter will provide a critical analysis of the emancipation of gays 
and lesbians in South Africa. 
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‘Although individuals may obtain certain rights as gay men, lesbians, bisexuals or other 
sexual minorities, they cannot fully claim their citizenship because they are assumed to 
warrant protection only in as much as they conform to the hierarchical assumptions of the 
heteronormative state’.
1
 
 
 
 
6 CONCLUSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EMANCIPATION 
OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
This study was undertaken with a view to answering two questions. The first 
question related to the scope of the legal consequences and protection 
provided to same-sex couples by the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
 
In Chapter 2 of this study it was indicated that, based on the concept of 
marriage as defined within Christendom, any kind of recognition of same-sex 
unions in South Africa was forbidden.2 The legal notion of marriage as defined 
by the common law and statutes represented principles of monogamy and 
heterosexuality, principles dedicated to upholding Christian beliefs. The pre-
constitutional period was characterised by the presence of a distinct bias for a 
certain brand of Christianity which inevitably created a church-state 
consubstantiality. This church-state relationship provided a religious 
foundation for the political and social exclusion of those members of society 
who dared to deviate from what was regarded as normal behaviour. The 
religious bias formed an indispensable component of the apartheid 
government’s totalitarian recipe. It was concluded in Chapter 2 that the 
political and legal systems of pre-1994 were particularly noted for the 
totalitarian interference of the state with the private life of members of 
society.3 
 
With the abolition of apartheid and the establishment of a new constitutional 
dispensation based on affirmed principles of equality, dignity and freedom it 
became evident that the exclusion of certain members of our society on the 
                                                             
1
  De Vos ‘From heteronormativity to full sexual orientation?: Equality and sexual freedom 
in Laurie Ackermann’s constitutional jurisprudence’ (2008) Acta Juridica 254 at 257. 
2
  At par 2.2.2. 
3
  At par 2.3. 
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basis of their sexual orientation belonged to a past era. It was clear that the 
repressive prohibition on marriage of same-sex couples would not survive a 
constitutional challenge. 
 
In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International and Others, 
Amicus Curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs4 the constitutional court held that same-sex couples had to be 
provided with the same ‘status, rights and responsibilities’5 the law accords to 
heterosexual couples. The court however deferred to the legislature regarding 
the statutory avenue through which such ‘status, rights and responsibilities’ 
should be conferred on same-sex couples. The Civil Union Act represents the 
outcome of the deference to the legislature by the constitutional court.  
 
As indicated in Chapter 3 of this study the legislature provided same-sex 
couples with a civil union regime to formalise their relationships as opposed to 
a civil marriage regime, which remains exclusively reserved for heterosexual 
couples. Section 13(1) of the Civil Union Act equates a civil union with a civil 
marriage. The effect of this equation is that the variable and invariable 
consequences of a civil marriage apply mutatis mutandis to a civil union. 
Although the Civil Union Act formally provides same-sex couples with the 
same legal consequences the Marriage Act affords to heterosexual couples 
some inequalities and differentiations still exist – as indicated in Chapter 3 of 
this study.6 These inequalities and differentiations call the objective 
constitutional commitment of the legislature to the social and legal 
transformation of a sexual minority group disadvantaged by past 
discrimination into question. 
 
The accessibility of a civil union to same-sex couples is limited by certain 
provisions of the Civil Union Act. For example, the Act imposes a blanket ban 
on minors’ entering into a civil union. As pointed out in Chapter 3,7 this differs 
from the legal position in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 and 
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  2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
5
 Fourie at par 120. 
6
 At par 3.5. 
7
  At par 3.5.2. 
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Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and accordingly violates 
the constitutional rights to equality and dignity of a minor with a same-sex 
orientation.8 The blanket ban further fails to promote the child’s best interests 
as required by the Constitution and Children’s Act 38 of 2005.9 In essence, 
minors with a same-sex orientation have no legal means to make their 
relationships official and are accordingly deprived of the social and legal 
standing that the law affords to heterosexual minors. This situation confers a 
sense of inferiority upon same-sex minors.  
 
The Civil Union Act requires a dual application by religious institutions and 
religious marriage officers to solemnise same-sex unions.10 The Act also 
provides for the religious accommodation of ex officio marriage officers that 
allows for their refusal to solemnise same-sex civil unions.11 Religious 
accommodation as provided for by the Civil Union Act creates the impression 
that the state supports the majoritarian opinion which condemns same-sex 
marriage based on moral and religious objections.  
 
It was argued in Chapter 5 that the deference to the legislature in Fourie was 
a political decision and a failed opportunity by the constitutional court to 
participate in judicial activism.12 Importantly, it was submitted that the political 
and social pressure that caused the constitutional court to defer to the 
legislature caused the legislature to defer to the moral majority of society in 
formulating an appropriate remedy for same-sex marriage. This submission 
was based on the majority judgment of the constitutional court which 
emphasised the necessity of public debates on the sacred and secular to 
satisfy the concerns of religious groups and traditional leaders. The 
constitutional court, however, ignored the reality that public sentiments are 
predominantly against the recognition of homosexuality. Parliament allowed 
the public participation process to take on the form of a forum for hate speech 
directed against the recognition of same-sex marriage and an overall outburst 
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against homosexuality. In instances where hate speech is allowed in public 
affairs, democracy is endangered and totalitarianism encouraged.13  
 
The fact that a separate marital institution was formulated for same-sex 
couples was the result of hatred expressed during the public participation 
process. In essence, the religious beliefs and moral sentiments of the majority 
of society determined the constitutional rights of same-sex couples. It can 
therefore be concluded that the legislature supported the majoritarian ‘desire 
for theocracy’ and ‘absolute heteronomy’; tactics associated with the 
totalitarian regime of apartheid.14 
 
I argued in Chapter 5 that the Civil Union Act is a ‘separate and unequal’ Act 
which confers a second-class marital status upon same-sex couples and 
further produces new forms of marginalisation in its context and application 
and accordingly fails to comply with the guiding principles as set out by the 
constitutional court in Fourie.15 It was recommended in Chapter 5 of this study 
that same-sex couples and heterosexual couples must be provided with one 
common institution to formalise their relationships. It was indicated that this 
can only be achieved by the amendment of the Marriage Act and declaration 
of unconstitutionality of the Civil Union Act.16 Only after the eradication of this 
structural inequality will it be possible for the secular and sacred to mutually 
co-exist in our constitutional realm. 
 
The second question that was raised in this study related to the legal 
consequences of same-sex life partners who fall outside the ambit of the Civil 
Union Act. 
 
In Chapter 4 of this study it was indicated that the Civil Union Act did not 
displace the pre-existing rights extended to same-sex life partners by 
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legislation and judicial developments.17 It was further indicated that the 
concept of a ‘same-sex life partnership’ has not been defined by our courts in 
a comprehensive manner with the result that it is uncertain when same-sex 
life partners will qualify for certain spousal benefits. It was established that the 
most telling example of uncertainty is created by the required presence of a 
reciprocal duty of support or the voluntary assumption of a contractual duty of 
support between same-sex life partners in some cases.18  
 
It was submitted that in order to qualify for spousal benefits the presence of 
two criteria is essential namely, a consortium omnis vitae19  and the intention 
of creating a permanent20 same-sex life partnership.21 Whether a permanent 
same-sex life partnership is in existence is a question of fact which must be 
determined in light of the intention of the partners as established by the facts 
and circumstances of each case. South African law, therefore, confers legal 
consequences on same-sex life partnerships which mimic characteristics 
associated with civil marriage although the life partnerships are not 
solemnised and registered under the Civil Union Act.  
 
In Chapter 5 of this study it was pointed out that the constitutional court 
judgment in Volks NO v Robinson22 will most probably have an impact on 
future claims by permanent same-sex life partners. In this case, the 
constitutional court reassessed the objective model of choice and confirmed 
that certain rights and duties which are attached by law to marriage need not 
be extended to non-marital life partners since they have chosen not to make 
their relationship official.23 It was emphasised that this approach assesses the 
availability of ‘choice’ by merely focusing on the presence or absence of legal 
impediments to marriage. In this instance it is assumed that ‘choices’ are 
made by free, autonomous individuals.24 
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Chapter 5 emphasised the social and economic reality of many same-sex 
couples who are not in a position to ‘choose’ to formalise their relationship by 
entering into a civil union. I argued that in view of ongoing homophobia in our 
society it will be unwise to force same-sex life partners to formalise their 
relationships. Research has shown that the extent of homophobia experienced 
by homosexuals must not be disregarded or underestimated because such 
homophobia renders the option to enter into a civil union for many gays and 
lesbians illusory.25 
 
Importantly, I argued that continued protection and recognition of permanent 
same-sex life partnerships are further supported by the notion of substantive 
equality.26 It was indicated that a substantive approach to equality dictates an 
examination of the actual social and historical treatment of groups in order to 
establish whether the Constitution’s commitment to equality is being upheld. 
The concept of substantive equality further encompasses a conception of 
‘remedial equality’ which permits preferential treatment of groups 
disadvantaged by past discrimination. Section 9(2) of the Constitution, 
therefore, imposes a positive obligation on the government to enact certain 
measures to ensure that gays and lesbians fully and equally enjoy all rights 
and freedoms. I concluded that the retention of spousal benefits for same-sex 
life partners by means of judicial and certain statutory provisions qualifies as a 
measure which is designed to advance the social and economic standing of 
gays and lesbians in our society in order to achieve substantive equality within 
the context of section 9(2) of the Constitution.27 
 
In Chapter 5 I emphasised that substantive equality requires ‘transformatory’ 
change as opposed to an inclusionary approach.28 It was explained that an 
inclusionary approach merely entails inclusion into the status quo and 
expands social recognition but fails to take cognisance of the structural 
conditions that initially created systemic inequalities. A transformatory 
approach, on the other hand, addresses the structural inequalities by 
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‘restructuring the underlying generative framework’. It was, therefore, 
indicated that the latter approach is indispensible in order to dismantle the 
current generative framework that governs family relations, which is marriage, 
in order to create a framework that acknowledges a variety of family forms, 
including same-sex life partnerships. 
 
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice29 the 
constitutional court emphasised that the right to equality does not encompass 
the elimination of all differences but entails ‘equal concern and respect across 
difference’. The right to equality requires the acknowledgement of human 
variability, that is, plurality. I therefore concluded that the objective model of 
choice creates intolerance for the plurality of our society and enhances the 
heteronormative framework that was responsible for initial marginalisation of 
those members of society who expressed same-sex desire.30 
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